



AESTHETIC PHILOSOPHY OF ABHINAVAGUPTA



Dr. Kailash Pati Mishra



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संस्कृत

To my teacher

Prof. Kamalakar Mishra

Preface

It can not be said categorically that Abhinavagupta propounded his aesthetic theories to support or to prove his Tantric philosophy but it can be said definitely that he expounded his aesthetic philosophy in light of his Tantric philosophy. Tantrism is non-dualistic as it holds the existence of one Reality, the Consciousness. This one Reality, the consciousness, is manifesting itself in the various forms of knower and known. According to Tantrism the whole world of manifestation is manifesting out of itself (consciousness) and is manifesting in itself. The whole process of creation and dissolution occurs within the nature of consciousness. In the same way he has propounded Rasādvaita Darśana, the Non-dualistic Philosophy of Aesthetics. The Rasa, the aesthetic experience, lies in the consciousness, is experienced by the consciousness and in a way it itself is experiencing state of consciousness. As in Tantric metaphysics, one Tattva, Śiva, manifests itself in the forms of other tattvas, so the one Rasa, the Śānta rasa, assumes the forms of other rasas and finally dissolves in itself. Tantrism is Absolute idealism in its world-view and epistemology. It refutes the Realistic and dualistic theories of reality and epistemology. Abhinavagupta too has refuted the realistic and dualistic theories of Aesthetics. And he did it in light of his Tantric philosophy.

Therefore, it was needed to bring out clearly the connecting points or the running thread between his Tantric philosophy and his Aesthetic philosophy. The present work endeavours to discuss Abhinavagupta's Aesthetic theories philosophically and critically. Abhinavagupta's Aesthetic Philosophy is so convincing and logically grounded that it is found difficult to raise some critical points.

But it is found, and it is true, that he has propounded his Aesthetic philosophy on the ground of absolute idealism, therefore it is quite natural for him to ignore or underestimate the utility and value of the Realistic theories. To throw flood of light on such issues, along with expounding his theories, is the objective of this present work.

I am indebted to my teachers sitting under whose feet I learnt the alphabets of the Tantric philosophy and, to some extent, got insight in peeping in it. I do not find words to express my gratitudes to them. May Lord Śiva grant them long, healthy and happy life.

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Abbreviations

Abh.	=	Abhinavabharati
Ananda	=	Anandavardhana
B.N.	=	Bhattanayaka
BORI	=	Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
Bharata	=	Author of Natya Sastra
D.L.	=	Dhvanyaloka
GOS	=	Gaekwad Oriental Series
IPV	=	Isvarapratyabhijnnavimarsini
KP	=	Kavya Prakasa
KSTS	=	Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies
Locana	=	Dhvanyalokalocana
M.Bh.	=	Mahabharata
N.S.	=	Natyasastra of Bharata
P.P.	=	Para pravesika
PVT	=	Paratmsikavivarana
PV	=	Pramanavartika
R.P.	=	Rahasya Pancadasika
R.T.	=	Rajatarangini
S.Ka	=	Samkhyakarika
S.D.	=	Sivadrsti
S.D.V.	=	Sivadrstivrtti
S.S.	=	Sivasutra
S.S.V.	=	Sivasutra vimarsini
S.S.Va	=	Sivasutra Vartika
S.S.T.	=	Sattrmsattattvasamdoh
T.A.	=	Tantraloka
T.A.S.	=	Tantraloka viveka
T.S.	=	Tantrasara
V.B.	=	Vijnanabhairava
V.J	=	Vakroktijivita
V.P.	=	Vakyapadiya
V.V.	=	Vyaktiviveka
Y.S.	=	Yogasutra
Y.V.	=	Yogavasitha

Contents

	Page No.
<i>Dedication</i> :	
<i>Preface</i> :	i-ii
<i>Abbreviations</i> :	iii-iv
<i>Chapter 1</i> : <i>Introduction</i>	1-23
(1) <i>Philosophical tradition</i>	
(2) <i>Life and Works</i>	
<i>Chapter 2</i> : <i>Philosophical Background</i>	24-60
(1) <i>Nature of Consciousness</i>	
(2) <i>Nature of Knowledge</i>	
(3) <i>Idealism of Kashmir Śaivism</i>	
<i>Chapter 3</i> : <i>Nature of Aesthetic Object</i>	61-81
<i>Chapter 4</i> : <i>Refutation of Dualistic Theories</i>	82-102
<i>Chapter 5</i> : <i>Concept of Rasa</i>	103-118
<i>Chapter 6</i> : <i>Obstacles of Aesthetic Experience</i>	119-131
<i>Chapter 7</i> : <i>Aesthetic and Spiritual Experience</i>	132-143
<i>Chapter 8</i> : <i>Kinds of Rasa</i>	144-196
<i>Bibliography</i> :	197-207

**AESTHETIC PHILOSOPHY OF
ABHINAVAGUPTA**

Chapter 1

Introduction

The Indian philosophy of aesthetics has been discussed and developed in the context of drama and poetry. The major problem before the Indian philosophers was to discuss the nature of aesthetic pleasure experienced by watching drama and by reading or hearing poetry. They started to search the location, where the aesthetic pleasure lies, and the mode of its experience. In the context of aesthetic pleasure experienced by drama they got a well systematically written treatise on drama, the Nāṭya Śāstra by Bharata Muni for their discussion. In the context of poetic pleasure, different schools were developed holding different views regarding the cause of the origin of the aesthetic experience, such as use of style (Rīti), use of figures of speech (Alaṅkāra) and capacity of words to express suggestive meaning (Vyaṅgārthadhvani) in the poetry.

The Indian theory of language (specially that of Bhartrhari and Abhinavagupta), as well as the Indian aesthetic theory (the Rasa theory of Bharata and Abhinavagupta) has a definite metaphysical background. Interestingly, the metaphysical background of the linguistic theory is the same as that of the aesthetic theory. More amazingly, the process of reaching the metaphysical position too is almost the same. The philosopher starts with the analysis of the existential situation and logically and consistently moves to discover the metaphysical ground. For example, the linguist begins with finding out what is the actual origin of the spoken word

(vaikharī-vāk) and comes to the finding that the speech (Vāk) which seems to come from the vocal chord, really first originates in the mind in the form of the ideation (madhyamā vāk). This too logically presupposes the will to speak the word (paśyantī vāk). Through this search process it becomes evident that language or speech is an activity and that it is not a physical activity but an ideational one -- a deliberate activity of consciousness. This finding clears the ground for accepting a metaphysical entity in which this entire process of language is going on. After all the language activity, the philosopher thinks, would not take place in air; there must be a sentient reality -- the consciousness (Citi or Saṃvit) in which the linguistic process originates and is also sustained. The scientific limitation of the western philosopher of language may not allow him to go beyond the boundaries of empirical experience, but there is no difficulty on the part of the Indian philosopher in accepting consciousness as an ontological entity, as the Indian tradition provides the clue for accepting a deeper or higher mode of experience, acquired by the seers and the yogins, through which they are believed to have had the actual cognition of the Reality or Consciousness.

It can be said that the Indian philosopher of language was moving in search of language, and as a pleasant surprise he caught hold of the reality called Consciousness or the Self. In the context the adage goes -- 'One was searching for 'Cowries (pennies), and luckily one tumbled upon 'Cintāmaṇi, the wish-fulfilling gem ('Varātikāman-Visyamānaḥ cintāmaniṃ labdhavān). The same process of discovery is to be found in the case of the aesthetic experience too. If we analyze the situation of beauty, it becomes evident that beauty is not a physical thing but a matter of experience -- the aesthetic experience. Moreover the joy of beauty

(the aesthetic enjoyment) spontaneously comes from within the self or consciousness, although the stimulus may come from the external world. It will not be very difficult to discover that the joy which seems to be derived from the external object, does not really belong to that object but springs forth from within the self or consciousness of the enjoyer. So, aesthetic enjoyment (the Rasa) too presupposes the Self or Consciousness which is the natural matrix of Rasa and the Self is not a mere presupposition but is also confirmed in the experience of the seers. The Upaniṣadic and Tantric seers have experienced the Self as made of 'Rasa' as it were (*raso vai saḥ*).

It is, therefore, quite natural for Abhinavagupta to base his aesthetic theory, as also his theory of language, on the metaphysics of consciousness or the Self. The link between aesthetics and the metaphysics of the Self, suggests similarity between aesthetic experience and the spiritual experience called Self-realization or Brahma-realization or the experience of Mokṣa. Abhinavagupta, as also other Indian aesthetic philosophers, regards the aesthetic joy as the 'sibling' (*sahodara*) of the spiritual joy ('*Brahmānanda sahodara*'). The aesthetic philosophy of Abhinavagupta is propounded in his two great writings : *Abhinavabhāratī* and *Dhvanyālokalocana*. *Abhinavabhāratī* is a commentary on the *Nāṭya Śāstra* of Bharata and *Dhvanyālokalocana* is a commentary on *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana. According to Śaiva Tantrism, The process of creation is held to be the play, *līlā*, drama of Śiva. Śiva is perfect bliss and dynamic in nature and the cosmic drama is due to the natural flow or overwhelming of the bliss. Since the world is the manifestation of Absolute Consciousness which is bliss in nature the world is the expression of bliss. Tantrism maintains that whatever pleasure is found in the world

is the grossified form of the manifestation of the Absolute bliss. The goal of the seeker is to experience the Absolute bliss, which can be attained by realizing the non-dual state of consciousness. Through aesthetic experience one rises above the level of the individual enjoyment to the universal experience. Commenting on Dhvanyāloka Abhinavagupta took inspiration from Bharṭṛhari's theory of *sphoṭa* to propound his aesthetic concept of *Dhvani*. Bharṭṛhari propounded that the ultimate Reality is *Śabda*, the word, *Śabda Brahman*. The whole material world (*artha*) is the manifestation of *Śabda Brahman*. There is nothing in the world which is devoid of *Śabda*. Bharṭṛhari differentiated between the word (*Śabda*) which manifests or causes the meaning and the word (*dhvani*-sound) which bears or conveys the meaning. Sound (*dhvani*) which bears the meaning is not the real word (*Śabda*). The real word (*Śabda*) is *sphoṭa* which is *Ātman* or consciousness itself. Vedas are the first creation or manifestation (*anukāra*) of *Śabda Brahman* to which follows the whole material world. Bharṭṛhari has propounded non-dualism (*Śabdādvaita*), the pure unity and set the goal of the Grammarians to realize the pure unity by *kramasamhārayoga* and *Śabdapūrvayoga*. For Abhinavagupta, the uttered words and the meaning (*arthas*) they manifest are the mere particularities, like the outer adornments of the body. The true inner soul of the aesthetic experience is the *rasadhvani* (aesthetic experience) that the words and ideas evoke. In the aesthetic experience one is completely caught up, subject-object duality is overcome and there is oneness with the universal *rasadhvani* itself. In this way aesthetic experience at its highest level is the experience of the Self itself as pure and perfect bliss. In Indian tradition Śiva is held to be the originator of all sorts of art, music, dance etc., and He is called *Naṭarāja*, the great *naṭa*, the actor of the drama and the great dancer. So, it was natural for

Abhinavagupta, a great Tantric, to comment on drama and poetry in view of Tantric philosophy. He propounded his aesthetic theories in the light of his Tantric philosophy and his aesthetic theories are almost held established in Sanskrit poetics. He was so occupied with his Tantric philosophy that his expositions of aesthetic theories do not seem to be literary rather to be spiritual. According to Tantric Śaivism there are thirty six tattvas (Categories) through which the Universal Consciousness, Śiva, manifests itself in the form of creation of the world. The Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta consists of thirty seven chapters. It is said that the main subject of Tantrāloka is contained in thirty six chapters. Abhinavagupta added thirty seventh chapter to show the transcendence (Anuttara) of Śiva that the Reality is beyond thirty six tattvas. The Nāṭya śāstra of Bharata also consists of thirty seven chapters and about it also it is said that the main subject is contained within the thirty six chapters. The thirty seventh is the mere extension of the thirty sixth. Abhinavagupta, in his Abhinavabhāratī, commenting on the Nāṭya śāstra, has prayed all the thirty six categories of creation in his benedictory verses, praying one category in the beginning of a chapter and in the thirty seventh chapter he has prayed the Anuttara. In his Dhvanyālokalocana also he has prayed the four levels of Vāk in his benedictory verses.

Although, Abhinavagupta explains aesthetic experience in line of spiritual experience, he places the aesthetic experience in status next to the spiritual experience and accepts parity between the two, he maintains that there is a basic difference between the aesthetic experience and the 'laukika' (secular or empirical) experience. Aesthetic enjoyment is caused or triggered, for example, by watching the drama which may be the 'anukṛti' (copy) of the

laukika life but not by the laukika life itself. Though, according to Abhinavagupta's metaphysical position, the laukika is as much related with the self as the aesthetic and the spiritual. So far as the logical relation between the spirit (Consciousness or Self) and the world of matter is concerned, creation is taken to be the free manifestation or self-creation of the Śiva-consciousness. Moreover this position has aesthetic overtones, as creation is regarded the blissful dance of Śiva, the Naṭarāja (the cosmic Dancer). Creation is a play or sport (Līlā or Kṛīḍā) or a drama played or enacted by Śiva together with the Paśus (the individual selves) who too are his own manifestations. However, in the case of the Paśus, because of their malāvaraṇa' (the covering of impurity), the world has ceased to be drama, but it is quite possible that by removing the impurity with the help of sādhanā, the Paśu too (like Śiva) can enjoy the world activity as drama or poetry or music or as any other artistic activity. The entire empirical life itself can be made aesthetic and spiritual. Abhinavagupta calls the world the līlā-vilāsa' (playful enjoyment) of consciousness, and advises to 'blissfully play and enjoy, being seated in the self and taking everything as it is (.....vilasa svastho yathāvasthitaḥ -- Anuttarāṣṭikā).

(i) Philosophical tradition of Abhinavagupta

The philosophical tradition of Abhinavagupta comprises three schools of Kashmir Śaivism, namely, Krama, Pratyabhijñā and Kula. In its combined or reconciled form it is called Trika darśana or Trika śāstra.¹ Each of these schools have their own independent philosophical tradition, literature and line of teachers. Abhinavagupta learnt the philosophy of each tradition from the

1. यथा सम्यङ्ग मुच्यन्ते न तथा शैव संस्कृताः।

अतिमार्गक्रमकुलत्रिकस्रोतोत्तरादिषु॥ — Mālinīvijayavārtika, 192, p. 20.

teachers of each tradition and reconciled the philosophy of these schools in his own philosophical works. There is found difference among these schools in regard of some views but these differences are not so that they can not be reconciled. These schools originated independently and separately but in due course of time their thoughts were dissolved into one stream of tantric tradition, especially in the time of Abhinavagupta and it was clearly expressed in his works like Tantrāloka. He learnt the texts of each of these schools, practised the spiritual sādhanā prescribed in each of these schools and then presented them in a reconciled form in his works. All of these schools have contributed in the development of Tantric philosophy. These schools have tantras and Āgamas as their original source so they are called Tantric schools and their philosophy is called Tantric Philosophy. Each of these schools have different Tantras and Āgamas and also different texts composed by the scholars of each of these schools. All the ācāryas, the scholars, of these schools belong to the state of Kashmir, therefore the philosophy propounded by them is called Kashmir Śaivism.

As a school of philosophy, the Krama sampradāya, it is held, emerged in the later period of seventh century and in the period of the beginning of eighth century A.D. Śivānanda is held to be the first ācārya of this tradition. He initiated three female yogins in his Tantric discipline, namely, Keyūravti, Madanikā and Kalyāṇikā. There are three main ācāryas initiated by them, namely Govindarāja, Bhānuka and Eraka. Govindarāja initiated Somananda. In the tradition started by Bhanuka there were mainly two persons, Ujjaṭa and Udbhaṭa. There was no tradition of disciples of Eraka.

In this tradition the names of other ācāryas are also found

mentioned, such as Hrasvanātha, Bhojarāja and Somarāja. The basic Āgamas of this tradition are Kramasadbhāva, Kramasiddhi, Brahmayāmala, Tantrarāja Bhaṭṭāraka. The other important texts of this tradition are Kramasūtra, Kramodaya, Pañcaśatika, Sāraddhaśatika, Kramastotra, Mahānayaprakāśa, Mahānaya-paddhati, Kramakeli, Dehastha devatā cakra stotra, Kramavāsanā, Rjuvimarśinī, Mahārthamañjarī, Mahārthodaya and Tantrāloka Viveka.

This school is called Krama because it holds the purification of Vikalpa saṁskāras (citta vṛttis) essential for the attainment of ultimate Reality and it holds attainment of liberation in krama (succession), step by step. This school is called by many other names also, such as Kramanaya, Anuttara-krama, Anupāya-krama, Devatā-krama, Mahākrama, Mahārtha-krama, Auntara-krama, Mahārtha amahārtha-naya, Mahānaya, Mahāsāra, Atinaya, Devatānaya, Devīnaya and Kālīnaya. These names have their philosophical significance. These various names depict the various characteristics of this tradition. This is called as Krama because it holds the successive manifestation of creation also.¹ Due to the manifestation of saṁvit (consciousness) in the processes of creation, maintenance and destruction (dissolution), it is called Mahākrama.² Despite the successive manifestation of the creation of the world in form of differences and duality, this school holds and maintains the transcendental aspect of the ultimate reality, so

1. क्रम अपि सृष्ट्यादि क्रमाभासकत्वात् तत्क्रमाभासरूपत्वात् च क्रम इत्यभिधीयते।
— Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, p. 94

2. भेदैश्चतुर्भिरकस्यां शक्तौ यत्क्रमणं क्रमात्।

सृष्टिस्थितिलयानाख्यैः स क्रमः परिकीर्तितः॥ — Mahānaya Prakāśa, p. 45.

..... विश्वमयी संवित् भासतेसा वक्ष्यमाणवर्तमानगुण्येन सर्वथा क्रमभानं भवति, स एव महाक्रम इति नयविदभिर्गीयते॥ — Mahānaya Prakāśa, p. 39.

it is called Anuttarakrama.¹ In this school, the ultimate truth is called Mahārtha, so it is called Mahārthakrama.² Due to holding Kālī as the ultimate reality, this school is called Kālīnaya. This school provides the highest spiritual and yogic achievements, so it is called Anupāya-krama.³ And, due to the divinity of the stages of spiritual discipline (sādhana), this school is called Devatā-krama.⁴

This is the specific feature of the Krama school that it holds five stages of the manifestation of vāk śakti (power of speech), as parā, sūkṣmā, paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī.⁵ Vāk śakti is held to be the vimarśa of Parāsaṃvit or the ultimate Reality. Parāsaṃvit manifests itself in these five stages of speech. From the view point of śakti these stages are called as cit, ānanda, icchā, jñāna and kriyā. From the view point of the manifestation of the world these stages are called as sṛṣṭi, sthiti, saṃhāra, anākhya and bhāṣā. From the view point of articulated word (varṇa dhvani) these stages are called as vimarśa, bindu, nāda, sphoṭa and śabda. The stages of vāk (speech) are held to be the stages of consciousness. Paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī are held to be icchā śakti, jñānaśakti and kriyāśakti respectively. Sūkṣmā is the unified form

-
1. श्रीमदनुत्तरक्रमप्रणयनप्रवीणस्य परमेश्वरस्य परमकारुण्यमात्रेऽप्यादितेयमास्माकीना यामली सिद्धिः ।
— Mahārthamanjarī Parimala, p. 172.
 2. श्रीमन्महार्थक्रमप्रपञ्चः सर्वोऽपि वृन्दचक्रे विश्राम्यति । — Mahārthamanjarī Parimala, p. 194.
 3. युक्तिचर्यादिविक्षेपवासनाक्षोभवर्जितः ।
अनुपायक्रमः सोऽयं यस्य रूढं योगिरात् ॥ — Mahānaya Prakāśa, 1/13.
 4. खण्डितेतरसमस्तगर्भगौ यास्तियं चविसराश्रयोक्रमः ।
देवताक्रम उदेत्यनारतं तस्य हि त्वमसि देवजन्मभूः ॥ — Cidgagana Candrikā, 4/113.
 5. Mahārthamanjarī, 89-90.

of all these three as the different colours live in unified form in the egg of the pea-cock. From this point of view sūkṣmā is the first manifestation or vimarśa of the ultimate Consciousness.¹

The period of the emergence of Kaula Tantras goes back to fifth century A.D. . The names of ten ācāryas of this tradition are mentioned in Tantrāloka, they are-- Ucchuṣma, Śabara, Candagu, Matanga, Ghara, Antaka, Ugra, Halahalaka, Krodhī and Huluhulu.² Abhinavagupta has given a detailed information about the Kaula literature in his Tantrāloka out of which many are now not available. The important texts of this tradition are - Kālīkula, Siddhayogīśvarīmata, Mālinīvijayottara, Ratnamālā, Vīrāvalī, Hāradeśa, Khecarīmata, Yonyarṇava, Siddhānta, Ufullakamata, Nimarthādaśāstram, Triśiromata, Gamaśāstra, Tantrarāja, Brahmayāmala Mādhavakula, Devyāyāmala, Kulakramodaya, Yogasañcara, Triśirobhairava, Kulagahvara, Deviyāmala and Nityānta. Kulārṇava tantra is an important text of this tradition. Parātrīṃśikā is also an important text of this tradition which deals with the problems of the philosophy of language. Abhinavagupta had got spiritual initiation of this tradition from Śambhunātha.

This school is called Kula and Kaula both in the Āgamas. It is called Kula because it calls the ultimate Reality as Kula. The whole world emerges from it and dissolves into it. This is the unity of Anuttara and Anuttarā which is called the sāmarasya (equilibrium) of Śiva and Śakti. To denote the transcendence of Parama Śiva it is called as Akula. Abhinavagupta and Somananda took Parātrīṃśikā as a basic text of Kaula tradition and interpreted

1. सूक्ष्मा तु शिखण्डरसन्यायात् उक्त्वाक्त्रयशवलीभौस्वभावा प्रत्यगदृष्टः परमेश्वरस्य उद्योगलक्षणावृत्तिरिति आख्यायते। — Mahārthamanjarī, 129.

2. Tantarāloka, Āhnika, 22.

and presented its principles in their commentaries and other texts.¹ They interpreted the Kaula concept of parā and the varṇa-krama, order of alphabets as held in Kaula tantras.

The time of the beginning of the Pratyabhijñā school of philosophy is held to be the ninth century A.D. The main tantras of this tradition are Mālīnīvijayottara tantra, Svachchanda tantra, Vijñānabhairava, Netra tantra, Svāyambhuva tantra, Rudrayāmala tantra, Naiśvāsa tantra, Ānandabhairava, Uchchūṣmabhairava and Mr̥gendra āgama. The first name in the history of the philosophical tradition of this school comes as Vasugupta who arranged the thoughts of Śaivāgamas in order and presented it in his Śiva-sūtra. According to the Śivasūtra vimarśinī of Kṣemarāja the Śiva-sūtras were found by Vasugupta in the state of dream. Śiva-sūtra is a basic text of this school of philosophy. There are many commentaries written upon it. The other works of Vasugupta are-- Spanda kārīkā, Spandāmṛta, Bāsavī ṭīkā (commentary) on Bhagavadgītā and Siddhānta candrikā. The time of Vasugupta is estimated between 825 to 850 A.D. . After Vasugupta there come the names of Kallaṭa, Rāmakantha and Bhāskarācārya. The works of Kallaṭa are -- Spanda Sarvasva, Tattvārthacintāmaṇi, Spanda Sūtra and Madhuvāhinī. The time of Kallaṭa is estimated to be 855 A.D. . The work of Rāmakantha is Spandvivarāṇasāramātra. The time of Rāmakantha is estimated to be in the early half of tenth century A.D.. The works of Bhāskarācārya are -- Śiva-sūtra Vārtika, Vivekājñāna and Kakavyā stotra. Bhāskarācārya is held to be contemporary of Rāmakantha.

1. वेदादिभ्यः परं शैवं शैवाद्द्वामं च दक्षिणम्।

दक्षिणाञ्च परं कौलं कौलात्परतरं नहि॥ — quoted in Tantrāloka, Āhnikā1, on page no. 48.

The other important name in the development of Kashmir Śaivism is of Somanāda. He gave the actual philosophical shape to this school. This is the man who at first propounded the path of pratyabhijñā for the attainment of liberation. His son Utpaladeva wrote Īśvarapṛtyabhijñā and commentary upon it, from then this school began to be called as Pratyabhijñā school. The time of Somananda is estimated to be the early half of the ninth century A.D. The works of Somananda are -- Śivadr̥ṣṭi, Śivadr̥ṣṭi vivṛti and Parātr̥ṃśikā vivṛti.

After Somananda there comes the name of his son and disciple Utpaladeva. The time of Utpaladeva is estimated to be in the early half of the tenth century A.D. The works of Utpaladeva are-- Īśvarapṛtyabhijñāṅkārikā, Īśvarapṛtyabhijñā vṛtti, Īśvarapṛtyabhijñāṭīkā, Stotrāvalī, Aḍḍapramāṭṛ siddhī vṛtti and vṛtti on the Śivadr̥ṣṭi of Somananda.

After Utpaladeva there comes the name of his son and disciple Lakṣmaṇagupta who was the teacher of Abhinavagupata. The mention of the works of Lakṣmaṇagupta is not found. After Lakṣmaṇagupta there comes the name of great scholar Abhinavagupta. After Abhinavagupta the names of Kṣemarāja, Maheśvarānanda and Jayaratha are worth mentioning. Kṣemarāja wrote uddyota (commentary) on tantras. His other works are Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam and Spandanirṇaya. The main work of Maheśvarānanda is Mahārthamanjarī.

There are some basic differences found among the concepts of these schools of Kashmir Śaivism. The main difference between Krama and Kula is that whereas the Kula school emphasizes upon Śāmbhavopāya for the attainment of liberation the Krama school prescribes Śāktopāya for the attainment of liberation. According to

Kaula school liberation can be attained by concentrating upon 'Ahaṃ' (the I) and holds that there is no succession or stage in attaining liberation. The Krama school prescribes the purification of vikalpa saṃskāras (citta vṛttis) and it holds that the seeker passes through many stages in the process of the attainment of liberation. The Pratyabhiniṇā school talks mainly about the thirty six categories of creation and holds that the recognition of self as ultimate reality is the means to attain liberation. The Krama school gives important place to religious rituals. The Kaula school prohibits the performance of religious rituals to the seekers (sādhakas). The Pratyabhijñā school neither prescribes nor prohibits the performance of religious rituals.

(ii) Life and Works of Abhinavagupta

The time of Abhinavagupta, a great scholar the India has ever produced, is held by the historians in between the latter half of the tenth century A.D. to early half of the eleventh century A.D. It is said that his ancestor, Atrigupta, a brahmin scholar of repute, originally belonged to Kannauj who later on migrated to Kashmir in the reign of king Lalitāditya of Kashmir. His mother was Vimalakalā. Both of the parent of Abhinavagupta were extreme devotee of Lord Śiva and the follower of Śaiva philosophy, religion and rituals. His mother departed in his childhood and soon after her death his father renounced the worldly life and took the life of asceticism. The early death of mother and renunciation of father turned Abhinavagupta to the devotion of Śiva. He began to spend his time in the houses of Āgamic teachers. Abhinavagupta went from one teacher to another teacher and sought knowledge of almost every branch of philosophy prevailing at his time. He learnt grammar from his father, Narasiṃhagupta, dvaita tantras from Vāmanātha, brahmavidyā from Bhūtirāja, dualistic cum-

nondualistic Śaivāgmas from Bhūtirājatanaya, Krama and Trika darśana from Lakṣmaṇagupta, poetic theory of dhvani from Indurāja and dramaturgy from Bhaṭṭa Tota. He mentions some others also as his teachers such as, Srīcandra, Bhakti vilāsa, Yogānanda, Candravarā, Abhinanda, Śivabhakti, Vicitrānātha, Dharma, Śiva, Vāmana, Udbhata, Bhūtīśa and Bhāskara. He learnt Kaulika literature and practices from Śambhunātha and he says that it is from his teaching that he got peace and self-realization.¹

A description of Abhinavagupta's personality is found in four verses composed by one of his disciples. In these verses he has narrated about the peculiar personality of a great tantric scholar. He says that Abhinavagupta is the incarnation of Dakṣiṇāmūrti and out of compassion he has taken the bodily form and come to Kashmir. He saw him sitting in a room situated in the middle of a garden of grapes. The room was pervaded by the smells of flower garlands and incense sticks. The walls of the room were smeared with sandalpaste. Dance with music was going on. Many women yogins and siddhas were gathered. He was sitting on a golden seat and served by his disciples among whom Kṣemarāja was also present. There were two dūtis, women partners of tantric sādhanā, standing his sides. One held a jug of wine and a box of betel in her hand and other held a lotus and a citron in her hand. Abhinavagupta's eyes were trembling in ecstasy. There was a rudrākṣa bead hanging from his ear and a tilaka of ashes was made on his forehead. His long hairs were tied with garland of flowers. He had a long beard and his skin was golden, his neck was shining with the use of Yakṣapaṅka powder, his upavīta was hanging down from his neck. He had worn a silken cloth which was white like the rays of moon. He was sitting in the position of Vīrāsana.

1. T.A., 1/51.

His one hand was lying on his knee holding a rosary with his fingers that denote the śāmbhavī mudrā. He himself was playing nāda-vīnā.¹

About the last events of his life it prevails in Kashmir Śaiva tradition that Abhinavagupta, with his twelve hundred disciples, entered a cave and did not return. The cave is called Bhairava cave.

His known works are-- Bodha Pañcadaśikā, Mālinīvijaya vārtika, Parāṭṭrīṅśikāvivṛti, Tantrāloka, Tantrasāra, Tantravaṭa-dhānikā, Dhvanyālokalocana, Abhinavabhārati, Bhagavadgītārthasaṅgraha, Paramārthasāra, Īśvarapratyabhijñānavimarśinī, Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivismarśinī, Paryantapañcāśikā, Ghaṭākarpaka-

1. द्राक्षारामस्य मध्ये स्फटिकमणिमये मण्डपोचित्ररम्ये,
पुष्पस्रग्धूपदीपैर्बहुलपरिमले चर्चिते चन्दनाद्यैः।
वाद्यैर्गीतैः सनृत्यैः सततमुखरिते योगिनीसिद्धसंघै-
राकीर्णैः स्वर्णपीठे मृदुतलिमतले बद्धमुक्ताविताने॥
आसीनः क्षेमराजप्रभृतिभिरखिलैः सेवितः शिव्यवर्गैः,
पादोपान्ते निषण्णैरवहितहृदयैरुक्तमुक्तं लिखद्भिः।
द्वाभ्यां पार्श्वस्थिताभ्यां शिवरसकरकं पूर्णताम्बूलपेटी
दूतीभ्यां विभ्रतीभ्यामपरकरलसन्मातुलिङ्गोत्पलाभ्याम्॥
आनन्दादोलिताक्षः स्फुटकततिलको भस्मना भालमध्ये
रुद्राक्षोल्लासिकर्णः कलितकचभरो मालया लम्बकूचः।
रक्ताङ्गो यक्षापङ्क्तोल्लसदसितगलो लम्बमुक्तोपवीतः।
क्षौमं वासो वसानः शशिकरधवलं वीरयोगासनस्थः।
जान्वासक्तैकहस्तः स्फुटपरमशिवज्ञानमुद्राक्षसूत्रो,
वामश्रीपाणिपद्मस्फुरितनखमुखैर्वादयत्नादवीणाम्।
श्रीकण्ठेशावतारः परमकरुणया प्राप्तकाश्मीरदेशः
श्रीमान्नः पातु साक्षादभिनवपुषा दक्षिणामूर्तिदेवः॥

kulakavivṛti, Kramastotra, Dehasthadevatācakrastotra, Bhairavastotra, Paramārthadvādaśikā, Paramārthacarcā, Mahopadeśaviṃśatikā, Anuttarāṣṭikā, Anubhavanivedana, Rasyapañcadaśikā, Tantroccaya, Purūravovicāra, Kramakeli, Śivadrṣṭyālocana, Pūvapañcikā, Padārthapraveśanirṇayaṭikā, Prakīrṇakavivarāṇa, Kāvya-kautukavivarāṇa, Kathāmukhatilaka, Laghvīprakriyā, Bhedavādaśikā, Devīstotravivarāṇa, Tattvādhvaprakāśikā, Śivaśaktyāvinābhāvastotra.

Dhvanyālokalocana and Abhinavabhāratī are his two works on Aesthetics. Dhvanyālokalocana is a commentary by Abhinavagupta on the Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana. The historians of Indian poetics intend to fix his time during the middle of the ninth century A.D. The Dhvanyāloka contains two distinguishing parts--first there are kārīkās (verses) presented, then second, there is vṛtti (explanation) given in prose. There is a debate among the scholars whether Ānandavardhana is the author of both the parts or of only the vṛtti part as sometimes the words like dhvanikāra and vṛttikāra are used by Abhinavagupata which give ground to hold the author of the kārīkās to be other than Ānandavardhana. However Abhinavagupata has commented on the both parts and showed difference found in both and also tried to reconcile them. Abhinavabhāratī is a commentary on the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata.

Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata

In the early Indian literature descriptions of many Bharata are found. Mentions of Ādi Bharata, Vṛddha Bharata and Jaḍa Bharata as author of Nāṭya Śāstra are found. Therefore it is a problem before the historians to determine who was the Bharata, the author of Nāṭya Śāstra and what was his real date of living.

Śāradātanaya, the author of Bhāvaprakāśhana says that there were two versions of Nāṭya Śāstra, one ascribed to Ādi Bharata or Vṛddha Bharata and the other to Bharata. The first version of Nāṭya Śāstra was two times larger than the present available text of Nāṭya Śāstra. The first version contained twelve thousand verses and was called 'dvādaśasāhasrīsamhitā'. The present available version of Nāṭya Śāstra contains six thousand verses and is called 'Ṣaṭasāhasrī samhitā'.¹ There were different views prevailing regarding the author of Nāṭya Śāstra and the identity of Bharata. Some held that Bharata was not a name of an individual but a title to be given to any dramatist. Some were of the view that some portion, specially the first six chapters were written by a disciple of Bharata and the questions asked in the form of disciples were also asked by his disciples and this portion was not the work of Bharata. This view was refuted by Abhinavagupata.² He says that there is no evidence to hold the view that some portions were written by a person other than Bharata and he asserts that it was the style of Bharata to raise questions and answer them by himself.³ There was also a view that there were three propounder ācāryas of nāṭyaśāstra-- Sadāśiva, Brahmā and Bharata and by taking the essence of the thoughts of the three ācāryas this present Nāṭya Śāstra was prepared to establish the supremacy of the views of Brahmā and this was not the original work of Bharata. This view was also refuted by Abhinavagupta on the

1. एवम् द्वादशसाहस्रैः श्लोकैरेकमतदर्शितः सद्भिः श्लोकसाहस्रैर्योनाट्यवेदस्य संग्रहः। — Bhāvaprakāśhana, p. 287.

2. एकस्य ग्रन्थस्यानेकवक्तृवचनसन्दर्भमयत्वे प्रमाणाभावात्। स्वपरव्यवहारेण पूर्वोत्तरपक्षादीनां श्रुति-स्मृति-व्याकरण-तर्कादिशास्त्रेष्वेकविरचितेष्वपि दर्शनात्। — Abh., p. 40.

3. एवं भरतमुनिः परवदात्मानं प्रकल्प्येयन्तं ग्रन्थमभिहितवान्। — Abh., p. 39.

basis of non-availability of any evidence in this regard in the text.¹

Descriptions of many ācāryas of Nāṭya being existent before Bharata are found in various literary works. Pāṇini, the grammarian has mentioned the names of Śilālin and Kṛśāsva as the author of Nāṭa sūtras (aphorism) in his Aṣṭādhyāyī.² Bharata himself has mentioned four ācāryas of Nāṭya in the last part of his Nāṭya Śāstra as-- Kohala, Vātsya, Śāṇḍilya and Dhūrtila.³ Abhinavagupta has also mentioned Kohala many times in his Abhinavabhāratī.⁴ He has mentioned the name of Dattila in Saṅgītādhyāya but has not mentioned Vātsya and Śāṇḍilya anywhere in his work. There are mentions of Nakhakuṭṭa and Aśmakūṭṭa also found as the earlier ācāryas of Nāṭya. Viśvanātha in his Sāhityadarpaṇa and Sāgaranandī in his 'Nāṭakalakṣaṇakośa' have discussed the views of Nakhakuṭṭa and Aśmakūṭṭa. Sāgaranandī has mentioned Śātakarṇī as an ācārya of Nāṭya in his 'Nāṭyalakṣaṇaratnakośa', Śāradātanaya and Abhinavagupta have mentioned Nandi or Nadikeśvara as Nāṭyācārya. Śāradātanaya in his Bhāvaprakāśana has mentioned Sadāśiva, Padmabhū, Drohiṇi, Vyāsa and Āṇjaneya as Nāṭyācāryas. Abhinavagupta has cited vrses composed by Kātyāyana.⁵ He has also mentioned the names of Rāhula and

1. एतेन-सदाशिव-ब्रह्म-भरतमतत्रयविवेचनेन ब्रह्ममसारताप्रतिपादनाय मतत्रयीसारासारविवेचनं परं तदग्रन्थखण्डप्रक्षेपेण विहितमिदं शास्त्रं, न तु मुनिविरचितम् इति यदाहुनास्तिकधुर्योपाध्यायास्तत्प्रत्युक्तम्। — Abh., N.S. part 1, Ch.1, p. 40.
2. पाराशर्यशिलालिभ्याम् भिक्षुनटसूत्रयोः। — Pāṇini, 4/3/110.
कर्मन्दकशाभ्वादिनः। — Pāṇini, 4/3/111.
3. कोहलादिभिरे तैर्वा वात्स्यशाण्डिल्यधूर्तिलैः एच्छास्त्रम प्रयुक्तम् तु नराणाम बुद्धिवर्धनम्। Abh., N.S. part 1, Ch.1, p. 75.
4. इत्येष ... कोहलप्रदर्शिता नान्दी उपपन्ना भवति।—Abh., N.S. part 1, Ch.1, p. 87.
5. यथोक्तम् कात्यायनेन—
वीरस्य भुजदण्डानाम वर्णनेस्त्रग्धरा भवेत्
नासिकावर्णने कार्ये वसन्ततिलकामिदम्
शार्दूललीला प्राच्येषु मन्दाक्रान्ता च दक्षिणे। — इत्यादि. Abh., Ch.14, p. 245-246.

Mātrguptācārya as commentators of the views of Bharata. No independent work of Nāṭya of all these ācāryas mentioned above is found. The only available text of Nāṭya is the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata.

There are two editions of the available Nāṭya Śāstra found-- (1) Published from Nirāṇayasagar press, Mumbai which contains Thirty Seven chapters and (2) Published from Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi which contains thirty six chapters. Abhinavagupta has asserted the Nāṭya Śāstra to be of thirty six chapters.¹

The content of the Nāṭya Śāstra is as following --

- (1) The first chapter of the Nāṭya Śāstra is named Nāṭyotpatti addhyāya which deals with the origin of drama.
- (2) The second chapter is Maṇḍapāddhyāya. It describes about the making of the stage, auditorium, etc.
- (3) The third chapter is named 'Raṅgadaivatapūjana addhyāya. It describes about the worship of the gods related to the art of drama.
- (4) The fourth chapter is called 'Tāṇḍavalakṣaṇa'. It describes the characteristic of Tāṇḍava, a kind of dance.
- (5) The fifth chapter is named 'Pūrva raṅgavidhāna'. It describes the preparations made before the start of the play.
- (6) The sixth chapter is called 'Rasāddhyāya'. It deals with the

1. षट्त्रिंशकात्मक-जगद्गगनावभास-

संविन्मरीचिचयचुम्बितबिम्बशोभम्।

षट्त्रिंशकं भरतसूत्रमिदं विवृण्वन्

वन्देशिवं श्रुति-तदर्थविवेकि धाम॥ — Abh., Ch.1, Verse 2.

nature of 'Rasa', the aesthetic pleasure or aesthetic experience.

- (7) The seventh chapter is named 'Bhāva-vyañjaka'. It deals with the nature of emotions (bhāvas).
- (8) The eighth chapter is termed 'Aṅgābhinayāvddhyāya'. It deals with the various aspects of acting.
- (9) The ninth chapter is called 'Upāṅgābhinayādhyāya'. It also deals with the factors of acting, such as about the movement of hands and feet in course of acting.
- (10) The tenth chapter is called 'Cārīvidhāna'. It deals with the motion of dance.
- (11) The eleventh chapter is called 'Maṇḍalavikalpanam'. It describes about the speed etc. of dance.
- (12) The twelfth chapter is named 'Gati pracāra'. It instructs the actors how to go on the stage.
- (13) The thirteenth chapter is called 'Kakṣāpravṛttidharmī vyañjaka'. It deals with the various parts of the stage and the various pravṛttis, the attitudes.
- (14) The fourteenth chapter discusses about the nature of chanda, the nature of verses.
- (15) The fifteenth chapter also discusses about the nature of chanda.
- (16) The sixteenth chapter discusses the various aspects of poetry, such as lakṣaṇa, guṇa, alaṅkāra and doṣa etc.
- (17) The seventeenth chapter describes 'Kākusvaravidhāna' which contains discussions about the uses of language.

- (18) The eighteenth chapter deals with the kinds of drama. It is called 'Daśarūpakāddhyāya'.
- (19) The nineteenth chapter is called 'Sandhinirūpaṇādhyāya'. It describes about the sandhi, how to relate the different phases of the play.
- (20) The twentieth chapter deals with the vṛttis, such as kaiśiki etc.
- (21) The twenty first chapter describes about the āhārya abhinaya, the dresses etc.
- (22) The twenty second chapter is called 'Sāmānyābhinaya'. It deals with the various emotions, the states of love and kinds of nāyikā (heroine).
- (23) The twenty third chapter describes about the action of love making and the role of dūti (the messenger).
- (24) The twenty fourth chapter describes about the grades of the actors.
- (25) The twenty fifth chapter is called 'Citrābhinaya'. It describes about the specific aspects of acting.
- (26) The twenty sixth chapter is called 'Vikṛtivilalpādhyāya'. It deals with the falsity of acting.
- (27) The twenty seventh chapter deals with the skill of acting and the vighnas (obstacles) and the way to remove them.
- (28-35) From the twenty eight to thirty fifth chapter there are descriptions about the art of music etc.
- (36) The thirty sixth chapter describes the qualities of the hero and other workers.

- (37) The thirty seventh chapter also deals with how the heaven of drama came down to earth from the heaven. This has been held the subject of the thirty seventh chapter.

Although the aesthetic philosophy of Abhinavagupta is contained in his commentary works but these commentaries have occupied more important place in the history of Indian poetics than the text commented upon. The aesthetic theories of Abhinavagupta are treated as his original contribution. In the exposition of his theories he had an extremely independent mind. Whereever found necessary he disagreed with his teachers and he was ready even to oppose the tradition. He says, "We don't care in the least if it is described in this way in the Rāmāyaṇa itself. In fact, it might be described in the Veda itself, and we won't be stifled by this fact.

रामायणेऽपि तथा वर्णितमिति चेत्किमतः। वेदेऽपि तथा वर्ण्यतां न वयमतो विभीमः। -- Abh. Vol. III, p. 74.

Nature of Drama

Nāṭya (drama) in Indian aesthetic tradition, is held to be the fifth Veda, of a next status to the four vedas i.e. Ṛg, Yajur, Sāma and Atharva. According to the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata, Nāṭya was created by Brahmā, the god of creation of Hindu mythology, on request of the devas who wanted an object of entertainment which can be seen and heard. Brahmā borrowed various things from the different Vedas and used them as various aspects of Nāṭya. He took art of speech (dialogue) from the Ṛgveda, the art of music from the Sāmaveda, the art of acting from the Yajurveda and Rasas from the Atharvaveda¹ and after compiling all these into one the Nāṭya-veda was formed. It was meant for all. There was

1. Nāṭya Śāstra, Ch. 1, Verse 2.

no discrimination of caste, creed or sex in reading it or utilising it.

The purpose of Nāṭya Veda, Drama

The purpose of drama is to give aesthetic pleasure or enable to spectators to experience aesthetic pleasure and along with it to educate them into the pursuit of the Purusārthas. It was meant for the persons of all intellectual levels. The persons who find it hard to read or understand the Vedas and the Purāṇas can get education by watching drama.¹ Drama directly and perceptually presents the relation between action and its fruits and, therefore, it educates and brings improvement in the spectator.² All necessary instructions concerning the presentation of drama are given in Nāṭya Veda which is found in the systematic presentation of the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata.



1. Abh., Vol. I, 4.

2. Abh., Vol. I, 12.

Chapter 2

Philosophical Background

(i) Nature of Consciousness

Kashmir Śaivism, the philosophical tradition of Abhinavagupta, is a non-dualistic philosophical system of Tantric or Āgamic tradition. This system holds the existence of only consciousness. It does not accept the independent existence of matter (jaḍa). According to this system the consciousness manifests itself in the various forms of individual beings and the matter (jaḍa) or the world made of matter. In accord of the different characteristics of consciousness it has been called by different names. These different names of consciousness depict the different characteristics of consciousness, therefore the nature of consciousness can be better understood by discussing in this perspective.

From the viewpoint of tattva (category or entity) the consciousness is called Ātmā (soul).¹ In Kashmir Śaivism the existence of soul is held to be self-proved. The Kashmir Śaiva philosophers say that there is no need of arguments to prove the existence of soul. Even the negation of the existence of soul proves its existence. They say that the knower is presupposed in every process of knowledge. As there can not be any activity without a doer, so there can not be knowledge without knower. In this way if the soul is negated or its existence is refuted, as this negation or refutation can not be performed without any negator or refuter, the

1. चैतन्यमात्मा। — Śivasūtra, 1.

existence of the refuting agent is proved.¹ Thus the existence of soul is naturally proved. In the Kashmir Śaivism the consciousness or soul is held to be jñānarūpa (of the form of knowledge) and the knowledge is held to be the very nature of the soul. As light and brightness are not two different things so the soul and knowledge are non-different. Brightness is not the quality of light, it is its nature. In the same way knowledge is not the quality of the consciousness or the soul, it is its nature. Advaita-vedānta of Śaṅkarācārya and Kashmir Śaivism both hold knowledge to be nature of the soul, but there is a basic difference between the two concepts. According to Advaita-vedānta knowledge is a state of inactivity or passivity, whereas knowledge is activity in Kashmir Śaivism.² According to Advaita-vedānta knowledge is vastutantra (object oriented) whereas in Kashmir Śaivism it is puruṣa-tantra (subject oriented).

Kashmir Śaivism holds that the existence of soul is self-proved and it is told by the Āgamas that in its ultimate nature the soul is Śiva.³ Being even in the form of soul Śiva is ultimate reality.⁴ In its ultimate nature Śiva is inderscribable. Being of the form of consciousness Śiva has no form or figure as the matter

1. कर्तरि ज्ञातरि स्वात्मन्यादिसिद्धेमहेश्वर।

अजडात्मा निषेधं वा सिद्धिं वा विदधीत कः। — I.P.V., 1/1/2.

2. एवमन्तर्बहिर्वृत्तिः क्रिया कालक्रमानुगा।

मातुरेव तदन्योन्यावियुक्ते ज्ञानकर्मणी॥ — I.P.V., 3/1/1.

3. तेन आत्मादेर्निराकरणे साधने वापि अवश्यमेव साधयिता पूर्वकोटावातिप्रः सिद्धः। नहि साधयितारमन्तरेण अर्थानां साध्यतैव स्यात्; स च स्वतः सिद्धः प्रकाशात्मा परमार्थरूपः परमेश्वरः शिव एव। — T.A., 1/56, Commentary.

4. अस्मद्रूप समाविष्टः स्वात्मनात्मनिवारणे।

शिव करोतु निजया नमः शक्तया तदात्मने॥ — Śivadṛṣṭi., 1/1.

possesses form, not the consciousness. Being without form and figure Śiva is unknowable by the intellect. Its ultimate nature can not be described within the categories of reason. Being totally unknowable by reason, it can be said neither sat (real) nor asat (unreal) and even not sadasat (real and unreal both). Being indescribable Śiva is called Anuttara.¹ Here a question arises that being Śiva indescribable how can be the knowledge of its nature or any statement about its nature or any description of its nature possible. In this regard the Kashmir Śaiva philosophers say that the ultimate nature of Śiva can be described on the basis of Āgamas which are the records of the higher experiences of the yogins and so they are authentic too.

Śiva is perfect.² There is nothing like any type of shortcoming or lackness in it. It is a non-dual entity. There is nothing besides it. The soul present in everything is Śiva. Ultimately there is no difference of knower and known in the external world. The one self is manifesting in the various different forms of the world.³ That ultimate reality is absolute because it is independent, non-relative and beyond the sphere of all the limitations.⁴ Parama Śiva is sat (existence), cit (consciousness) and ānanda (bliss). In Advaita-vedānt also Brahman is called sat, cit and ānanda, but there is difference in the interpretation of this term between

1. न सन्न चासत्सदसन्न च तन्नोभयोऽङ्गितम्।

दुर्विजेया हि सावस्था किमिष्येतदनुत्तरम्॥ — T.A., 2/28.

2. तावान्पूर्णस्वभावोऽसौ परमः शिव उच्यते। — T.A., 1/108.

3. श्रीमत्परमशिवस्य पुनः विश्वोत्तीर्ण विश्वात्मक परमानन्दमय प्रकाशैकघनस्य। एवं विधमेव शिवादिधरण्यन्तमखिलं, अभेदेनैव स्फुरति। — Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, Sūtra 3, Commentary.

4. तस्य देवातिदेवस्य परापेक्षा न विद्यते।

परस्य तदपेक्षत्वात्स्वतन्त्रोऽयमतः स्थितः॥ — T.A. 1.59.

Advaita-vedānta and Kashmir Śaivism. Advaita-vedānta explains saccidānanda in negative way or in terms of *neti-neti*, (not this, not this), the upaniṣadic style. According to Advaita-vedānta Brahman is called *sat* because it is not *asat* (non-existent), it is *cit* because it is not *acit* (non-consciousness-matter-*jaḍa*), it is *ānanda* because it is beyond all kinds of imperfection and limitation. Kashmir Śaivism explains saccidānanda in positive way. According to it it is *sat* because it has existence, it is *cit* because it is consciousness, and it is *ānanda* because it is full of bliss (*ānandaghana*). According to this system existence and consciousness are identical. Existence (*sattā*) is consciousness (*cetanā*) and consciousness is existence. The consciousness has the awareness of its existence and perfect bliss because consciousness (*saṃvit*) is self-luminous.¹

From the viewpoint of *kriyā* (activity) the consciousness is called Śakti. The word Śakti is made of the term 'Śakana'² which means the capability of doing something. In Kashmir Śaivism consciousness is held to be active. The meaning of the term 'cetana' is that who possesses the activity of *cetanā* (consciousness) or the activity of knowing. The *ghaṭa* (pot) can not be called *cetana* (conscious) because it has no awareness of either its own existence or the existence of others different from it. Therefore it is *acetana* (non-conscious).³ Opposite to it, the person named Caitra performs the activity of *cetanā* (consciousness), as he has awareness of himself and the things different from him like *nīla*

1. संवित्त्वं स्वप्रकाशम्.....। — T.A., 2/10.

2. 'शकनं शक्तिः' सामर्थ्यं विश्वनिर्माणादिकारिभैरवस्वरूपम्। — Vijñāna Bhairava, p. 13.

3. घटेन स्वात्मनि न चमत्क्रियते, स्वात्मा न परामृश्यते, न स्वात्मनि तेन प्रकाशते, न अपरिच्छिन्नतया भास्यते ततो न चेत्यत इत्युच्यते। — I.P.V., 1/5/13.

(blue), pīta (yellow), sukha (pleasure) and duḥkha (pain), so he is cetana.¹ According to Kashmir Śaivism the activity of consciousness is the very nature of consciousness. In Nyāya philosophy consciousness is said to be the accidental quality of the soul. In Advaita-vedānta the soul is said to be a cetana tattva (conscious entity) but the soul is said to be originally inactive. According to this system whatever the conscious activity is in the soul, it is aupādhika (imposed) and it is due to Māyā or Avidyā. Kashmir Śaiva philosophers say that it is not apt to say that soul is conscious rather to say that consciousness is soul. As to say 'the head of Rāhū (rāhoḥ śiraḥ) is just a formal usage, actually Rāhū and its head both are one and the same thing.² According to Advaita-vedānta activity in consciousness comes due to Māyā. Activity is not the nature of the consciousness. Advaita-vedānta takes kriyā (activity) in the sense of karma (action-voluntary action). In this sense activity denotes imperfection as it is motivated for the fulfilment of desire which signifies the desire to get something which is lacking in the agent. On the other hand it implies the state of duality (difference), as there is something different from the agent to which it aspires. Thus according to Advaita-vedānta in the state of perfection and non-duality there is no possibility of activity (kriyā). Opposite to it, in Kashmir Śaivism the conscious entity Śiva is by nature active. There is a form of activity which is possible in the state of perfection and non-duality. The technical name of such kind of activity in

1. चैत्रेण तु स्वात्मनि अहमिति संरम्भोद्योगोल्लासविभूतियोगात् चमत्क्रियते नीलपीत सुखदुःखतच्छून्यताद्यसंख्यावभासयोगेन अवभास्यते, ततः चैत्रेण चेत्यत इत्युच्यते।
— I.P.V., 1/5/13.

2. चैतन्यं चितिः चेतनं आत्मा इति राहोः शिर इतिवत् काल्पनिकम्, वस्तुत एकमेव सर्वम्। — Śivasūtra vimarśnī, 1/1, Com. 21.

Kashmir Śaivism is Spanda.

The word spanda is derived from the root 'spadi' which means 'subtle movement'.¹ This activity of consciousness is called vimarśa which is in it by nature.² In Advaita-Vedānta the conscious entity Brahman is said to be only prakāśa or jñānarūpa, there is no concept of kriyā or Vimarśa in it. In Kashmir Śaivism the consciousness is always prakāśavimarśamaya' (prakāśa and vimarśa both) and 'jñāna- kriyā- rūpa' (of the form of knowledge and activity both).³ The vimarśa is said to be the sāra (essence) or hṛdaya (heart) of Śiva.⁴ The conscious entity is always active and its activity is of the form of Ahaṃvimarśa (I-consciousness).⁵ Prakāśa can not be imagined without vimarśa, Prakāśa without vimarśa is like jaḍa (matter).⁶ The conscious entity can never be without vimarśa. It is said that if it would be so then in the absence of consciousness nothing other than the material stone etc. can be found to be in the world; in other words, no living entity can be found in the world. Spanda is said to be the svātantrya śakti (power of freedom) of the consciousness. By the power of freedom the consciousness, in itself, manifests the world of idaṃ-vimarśa (this consciousness). There are two categories of vimarśa told in

1. किञ्चिच्चलनमेतावदनन्य स्फुरणं हि यत्।

ऊमिरिषा विबोधाब्धेर्न संविदनया विना॥ — T.A., 4/184.

2. स्वात्मन्युच्छलनात्मकः। — T.A., 4/183.

3. चित्तिक्रियाप्रकाशविमर्शः, तस्यभावः चैतन्यं स्वतन्त्रम्। — S.S.V., 1/1, Comm.21.

4. सैषा सारतया प्रोक्ता हृदयं परमेष्ठिनः। — I.P.V., 1/5/14.

5. हृदये स्वविमर्शोऽसौ द्राविताशेषविश्वकः।

भावग्रहादिपर्यन्तभवी सामान्यसंज्ञकः॥ — T.A., 4/182-83.

6. स्वभावमवभासस्य विमर्शं विदुरन्यथा।

प्रकाशोऽर्थोपरक्तोऽपि स्फटिकादिजडोपमः॥ — I.P.V., 1/5/1.

Kashmir Śaivism-- the pure vimarśa-- ahaṃvimarśa (I consciousness) and the vimarśa of multifarious world (idaṃ vimarśa). When the vimarśa is only in the non-dual state of consciousness, there is no process of creation, then it is pure vimarśa or ahaṃvimarśa, and when the process of creation begins, it assumes the form of idaṃvimarśa (this consciousness).¹ These categories are also called as internal creation (antaḥsrjana) and external creation (bahiḥsrjana).² The capacity to do anything is called the power of freedom. According to Kashmir Śaivism the power of the vimarśa of the spanda inheres such kind of freedom and capability that it can dissolve the manifested things in its nature, it can manifest itself in the form of existent things, it can bear them by uniting them, and at the same time it can remain separated from them.³ In Advaita-vedānta Brahman is said to be free but there is no freedom of activity in the nature of Brahman. Brahman is called absolute for being independent in the sense of its existence as it does not depend upon any one for its existence. The concept of freedom is from the viewpoint of existence there in Advaita-vedānta. Kashmir Śaivism takes the concept of freedom in both sense, i.e., freedom for existence and freedom for activity. It holds that freedom of activity is the real meaning of freedom. The power of freedom in the form of spanda can perform any type of activity of manifestation,⁴ it can even imagine the forms of non-existent

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1. यदा स्वस्मिन् हृदयप्रकाशस्वरूप एवं आत्मनि तिष्ठति, तदाविमर्शः शुद्धो विमर्श एव इत्येवं व्यवहियते, यदा तु विकल्पोपश्लेषलक्षणक्षोभमनुभवति, तदा विश्वविस्तारः प्रपञ्च स्फुरणवैचित्र्यात्मा विमर्श इति। — M.M., p. 34.
 2. सृजन्ती बहिर्विश्वमन्तश्च संवित् परादेवताहं परामर्शरूपा। — R.P., 25.
 3. विमर्शो हि सर्वसहः परमपि आत्मीकरोति, आत्मानं परीकरोति, उभयम् एकीकरोति, एकीकृतम् द्वयमपि न्यग्भावयति इत्येवं स्वभावतः। — I.P.V., 1/5/13.
 4. इदमेव संविदः संवित्वं यत् सर्वम् आमृशतीति। — T.A., V. 4, p. 214.

entities like, sky flower, barren woman's child, hair's horn etc.¹ Power of freedom is the main śakti of parama Śiva, the other śaktis are inherent in it.² This is never uncontradictable will of Parama Śiva.³ This is called Absolute.⁴

In Kashmir Śaivism the conscious entity, the consciousness, is said to be basically free. Freedom is said to be parā śakti (the transcendental power). Śakti is non-different from Śiva. The consciousness manifests itself in the form of power of consciousness. To manifest itself in the form of power of consciousness is vimarśa. Its other name is ānanda (bliss). The bliss is the nature of Parama Śiva and it is not different from freedom. Due to its unimpeded freedom and overwhelming bliss Parama Śiva, despite manifesting in various multifarious forms, remains whole (one) and perfect. The unlimited extension or manifestation of its will is its freedom.⁵ The freedom of the ultimate reality is the vimarśa of consciousness. Vimarśa is the nature of consciousness which can never be separated from it. According to Kashmir Śaivism Prakāśa and Vimarśa are inseparable. Prakāśa can not be without vimarśa and Vimarśa also can not be without Prakāśa. Vimarśa is called by different names in Kashmir Śaivism, such as, parā śakti, parā vāk, svātantrya, aiśvarya, kartṛtva, sphurattā, sāra, hṛdaya, spanda, etc. From the viewpoint of tattva, prakāśa is called Śiva

1. सत्ता च भवनकर्तृता सर्वक्रियासु स्वातन्त्र्यम्। सा च पुष्पादिकमपि व्याप्नोति इति महती, देशकालौ नीलादिवत् सैव सृजति ताभ्यां विशेषणीया न भवति। — I.P.V., 1/5/14.

2. स्वातन्त्र्यमेतन्मुख्यं तदैश्वर्यम् परमात्मनः। — I.P.V., 1/5/13.

3. आत्मैव सर्वभावेषु स्फुरनिवृत्तचिद्वपुः।

अनिरुद्धमिच्छाप्रसरः प्रसरदृक्-क्रिय शिवः॥ — S.D., 1/2.

4. अनन्यनिरपेक्षतेव परमार्थतः आनन्दः ऐश्वर्यम्, स्वातन्त्र्यम् चैतन्यम्। — I.P.V., 1/5/14.

5. S.D., 1/2.

and Vimarśa is called Śakti. There is Absolute unity or identity (sāmarasya) between Śiva and Śakti.

According to Kashmir Śaivism the Universal Consciousness, due to its will of creation, manifests itself in the various multifarious forms of the world. The will of creation remains in the universal consciousness, before its external manifestation, in the same way as our thoughts remain in consciousness before expression. From the nondual Absolute Consciousness, the multifarious world comes out in the same way as the different colours of pea-cock comes out of the liquid of its egg. The ultimate Consciousness, Parama Śiva is the root cause of the world. It is the material as well as the efficient cause of the world. It is the material cause as the world is manifested from within itself. Śiva is the efficient cause because it creates the world by itself from within itself. The point is that the material of the world is Consciousness. The main cause of the creation of the world is the freedom of will of Parama Śiva. Parama Śiva creates the world for its līlā (play) out of its freedom of will. It does not need any material or base (adhikaraṇa) other than it for the creation of the world. The creation is performed by its will only. Parama Śiva creates the world by its freedom of will and manifests itself in the stages of creation. Being infinite it manifests itself in the forms of finite. It has no purpose or motive in creating the world. Creation is called its svabhāva (nature). He is said to be the performer of five actions, viz., sṛṣṭi (creation), Sthiti (maintenance), saṁhāra (dissolution), nigrāha (concealment) and anugraha (grace). Parama Śiva creates the world out of play and assumes the stage of bondage. But, actually it remains infinite and ultimate reality in the stage of bondage or limitation. No real change occurs in its nature. All the changes are mere appearance. Parama Śiva is full

of bliss and its overwhelming bliss or spanda becomes manifested in the form of world. Creation and dissolution are its play which is said to be unmeṣa (externalization) and nimeṣa (inward contraction) of its spanda.

Parama Śiva out of its freedom of will manifests itself in the form of the world. The creation of world is explained in order of thirty six categories (tattvas). Out of these, the first five tattvas are the manifestation of different Śaktis of Parama Śiva and the remaining others are the manifestation of the power of Māyā, a form of the power of freedom of Parama Śiva. The remaining thirty one tattvas, the manifestation caused by Māyā, are called ābhāsa (appearance) of the consciousness. Being set to create the world, the immanent aspect of Parama Śiva is called Śiva. Śiva tattva is called the first spanda of Parama Śiva.¹ This is the state of the predominance of the power of consciousness (cit śakti). This is the state of the experience of pure I (aham). The second tattva of the order of creation is Śakti tattva, which is the non-different nature of Śiva. The vimarśa of Prakāśa (Śiva) is śakti. The activity set for external manifestation is Śakti.² Śiva and Śakti are non-different and one. The difference between them is made only for practical purpose, to understand or analyse the two aspects of one Reality. In the state of Śiva tattva the nature of experience is aham (I), in the state of Śakti tattva the nature of experience is ahamasmi (I am). Ānanda śakti predominates in this state. The

1. यदयमनुत्तरमूर्तिर्निजेच्छयाखिलमिदं जगत्स्रष्टुम्।

पस्पन्दे स स्पन्दः प्रथमः शिवतत्त्वमुच्यते तज्ज्ञैः॥ — S.T.S., 1.

2. इच्छा सैव स्वच्छा संततसमवायिनी सती शक्तिः।

सचराचरस्य जगतो बीजं निखिलस्य निजनिनीनस्य॥ — S.T.S., 2.

third tattva in the order of creation is Sadāśiva.¹ This is the state of the manifestation of the power of will of Parama Śiva. The nature of experience in this state is 'ahaṃ idaṃ (I this). Ahaṃ denotes Śiva whether idaṃ denotes the world. In this state the part of experience as this is less expressed whereas the part of the experience as ahaṃ predominates and it let it to be covered. The external spanda of the will of Śiva is called Īśvara tattva.² This is the state of the manifestation of the power of knowledge (jñāna śakti) of Parama Śiva. The nature of experience in this state is 'ahaṃ idaṃ (I-this) where the idaṃ part of the experience is predominant and the ahaṃ part becomes secondary. In this stage of creation the states of jñāna śakti and kriyā śakti both are held to be there but the jñāna śakti predominates here. The fifth tattva of the order of creation is Sadvidyā.³ At this level of creation there is predominance of kriyā śakti. The nature of experience in this state is 'ahaṃ idamasmi' (I am this). This is the state of the equal level of the aspects of ahaṃ (I) and idaṃ (this).

In Kashmir Śaivism Consciousness is held to be Vāk śakti (power of speech) and the whole process of creation is explained in terms of the manifestation of Vāk śakti.⁴ There are four stages of Vāk śakti in the process of the manifestation of creation -- parā, paśyanti, maddhyamā and vaikharī. Parā is the transcendental state. This is the state of Śiva and Śakti which is the level of cit

1. स्वेच्छाशक्त्युद्गीर्णं जगदात्मतया समाच्छाद्य।

निवसन्स एव निखिलानुग्रहनिरतः सदाशिवोऽभिहितः। — S.T.S., 3.

2. विश्वं पश्चात्पश्यन् इदन्तया निखिलमीश्वरो जातः।

सा भवति शुद्धविद्या येदन्ताहन्तयोरभेदमतिः॥ — S.T.S., 4.

3. S.T.S., 4.

4. P.T.V., p.4.

śakti and ānanda śakti from the point of view of śakti.¹ There is no world at this level, even there is no will of creation at this level. This is the state of pūrṇāhaṃ or pūrṇāhantā (the perfect I).² Parā Vāk is the highest state of Śiva-śakti tattva.⁴ When there arises the will to create in the state of Parā vāk, that will to create is called Paśyantī. In the state of Paśyantī the world remains in the form of will. This is the state of the manifestation of the power of will. Maddhyamā vāk is the level of the manifestation of the power of knowledge. At this level the world becomes more manifested in comparison to the level of Paśyantī, but it remains in ahaṃ. When the world becomes manifested in the form of external world it is called Vaikharī. Vaikharī is the state of the manifestation of the power of action (kriyā śakti).⁴ From the viewpoint of the manifestation of word the state of Parā is that level where there is no form of word, or, in other words, the word is not yet manifested. At this level, the transcendental aspect of the word is there which is being without form, or, being akrama (without succession), is the source of the manifestation of all the words. This primeval word is called Onm. This Onm is present in

1. चिन्मात्रमेव देवी च सा परा परमेश्वरी। — T.A., 6/180.

2. निराशंसात्पूर्णादहमिति पुरा भासयति यद्
द्विशाखामाशास्ते तदनु च विभक्तुं निजकलाम्।

स्वरूपादुन्मेषप्रसरणनिमेषस्थितिजुषस

तदद्वैतं वन्दे परमशिवशक्त्यात्मनिखिलम्। — I.P.V., maṅgalācaraṇa .

3. चित्तिः प्रत्यवर्शात्मा परावाक् स्वरसोदिता। — I.P.V., 1, p. 203.

4. वैखरी नाम क्रिया

ज्ञानमयी भवति मध्यमा वाक्।

इच्छा पुनः पश्यन्ती

सूक्ष्मा समरसता वृत्तिः॥ — M.M., 49, p. 105.

our pure consciousness. This is the Parā Vāk. When we will to speak to express our thoughts, this is the level of Paśyantī Vāk. After having will to speak out, the form of what to be spoken arises in our mind, this is the state of Maddhyamā Vāk. When we articulate that word, it is Vaikharī Vāk.

From the viewpoint of experience, there are five states of consciousness described in Kashmir Śaivism. These states are -- jāgrat, svapna, suṣupti, turīyā and turīyātita.¹ Out of these the two states, turīyā and turīyātita are the transcendental states of consciousness. There is no actual difference between them. The difference made is just from the point of view of subtilty and most subtilty. Jāgrat is the state of the sense experience of the worldly being.² In this state the pramātā (knower) knows the object different from him. At this level of experience the jñāna is in the mode of subject- object. In this state the knower uses his inner senses (antaḥkarnas) and his jñānendriyas and gets knowlge of decision, egoism, saṁkalpa, word, touch, colour, taste and smell.³ This is the state of the predominance of sattva guṇa. In the state of dream⁴ the flow of the indriyas toward outside is checked

1. जाग्रत् स्वप्नः सुषुप्तं च तुर्यं च तदतीतकम्।

इतिपञ्च पदान्याहुः। — T.A., 10/228.

2. ज्ञानं जाग्रत्। — S.S., 1/18.

3. बौद्धं गार्वं च सांकल्पं शाब्दं स्पर्शं च रूपजम्।

रसजं गन्धजं चान्यदैन्द्रियज्ञानमेव यत्॥

अत्र गृहीतग्रहणग्राह्यरूपा चिदात्मनः।

स्फुरत्येव ज्ञानशक्तिर्जाग्रदवृत्तिरिहैव सा॥ — S.S. Vārtika, 8.

4. स्वप्नो विकल्पाः। — S.S., 1/9.

दृष्टिस्वभावस्य विभोरन्तर्नवनवोदयः।

विकल्पनां स्मृतः स्वप्नस्तद्वाह्यार्थनिरासतः॥ — S.S., Vārtika, 1/9.

and it becomes confined within the mind in the form of mental activities. The knower perceives the objects in the same way as he perceives in the state of jāgrat but the perception is mental, in the form of Vikalpas (ideal) only. In this state the rajoguṇa predominates. In the state of deep sleep getting experience only by inner senses (citta) is called the state of suṣupti. In this state the tamoguṇa becomes so dominating that the power of jñānendriyas become unable to experience neither in the form of knowledge nor in the form of the object of knowledge (jñeya).¹ In the state of suṣupti there is experience of the objects but in implicit form.

In every second state of consciousness the part of its preceeding state may be present. In this way by addition and then calculating them, there are many states of consciousness. In the state of Jāgrat there may be state of svapna and suṣupti, and in the state of svapna there may be state of Jāgrat and suṣupti, and in the same way there may be state of Jāgrat and svapna in the state of suṣupti. According to Kashmir Śaivism in all the five states of experience the knower is one.² The Kashmir Śaiva philosophers say that if in each state of experience the knower is different, then the knowledge of other states will not be possible neither to get nor to tell.³ These all five states are the states of the experience of

1. अविवेको माया सौषुप्तम्।

ज्ञानज्ञेय स्वरूपायाः शक्तेरनुदयो यदा।

चिद्रूपस्थाविवेकः स्याद सावेवाविमर्शतः॥

सैव माया वृत्तिजालपोषकत्वात् प्रकीर्तिता।

अथस्मृती स्वात्म संस्थे चिद्रूपे सा सुषुप्तता। — S.S. Vārtika, 1/10.

2. इति पञ्चपदान्याहुरेकस्मिन् वेदके सति। — T.A., 10/229.

3. एकस्मिन् वेदके सतीति। अनेकस्मिन् वेदके अन्यस्य जाग्रदन्यस्य स्वप्न इत्यवस्थानामवस्थानं पञ्चात्मकत्वं च न स्यात्। — T.A.V., 10/228.

one knower getting by himself.¹

From the viewpoint of the order of the manifestation of Consciousness from the state of perfection to the state of imperfection, there are seven states described in Kashmir Śaivism which are called together with *saptapramātā*. These stages are divided in two states as *śuddhādhvā* (pure category) and *aśuddhādhvā* (impure category). The first four stages come under *śuddhādhvā* and the remaining three are within *aśuddhādhvā*. The first stage of the manifestation of Consciousness is the state of Śiva *pramātā*. From the viewpoint of *tattva* it is the level of Śiva-śakti. The form of experience at this level is 'aham' (I) and from the viewpoint of Śakti this is the level of *cidānanda śakti*. The second stage of manifestation is called *Mantra maheśvara pramātā*. From the viewpoint of *tattva* this is the level of *Sadāśiva*² and from the viewpoint of śakti, this is the level of *icchāśakti*. The form of experience at this level is 'ahamidam'. The third stage of manifestation is called *Mantreśvara pramātā*. From the viewpoint of *tattva*, this is the level of *Īśvara*³ and from the viewpoint of śakti, this is the level of *jñāna śakti*. The form of experience at this level is 'idamaham'. The fourth stage of manifestation is called *Mantra pramātā* or *vidyā pramātā* or *vidyeśvara pramātā*. From the viewpoint of *tattva*, this is the state of *Sadvidyā*.⁴ At this level the form

1. एकमेव ह्यवस्थितारमधिकृत्यासां तथाभावो भवेदिति भावः। — T.A.V., 10/228.
2. तथा च सदाशिवतत्त्वे अहन्ताच्छदितास्फुटेदन्तामयं यादृशं परापररूपं विश्वग्राह्यं तादृगेव श्रीसदाशिवभट्टारकाधिष्ठितो मन्त्रमहेश्वराख्यः प्रमातृवर्गः परमेश्वरेच्छावकल्पिततथावस्थानः। — P.H., Sūtra 3, Comm.
3. ईश्वर तत्त्वे स्फुटेदन्ताहन्तासामानाधिकरण्यात्मयादृक विश्वं ग्राह्यं तथाविध एव ईश्वर भट्टारकाधिष्ठितो मन्त्रेश्वर वर्गः। — P.H. Sūtra 3, comm.
4. विद्यापदे श्रीमनन्तभट्टारकाधिष्ठिता बहुशाखावान्तरभेदभिन्ना यथाभूता मन्त्राः प्रमातारः तथाभूतमेव भेदैकसारं विश्वमपि प्रमेयम्। — P.H. Sūtra 3, comm.

of experience is 'ahañcedaṇca' and from the viewpoint of śakti this is the level of Kriyā śakti. The fifth stage of manifestation is called the state of vijñānākala-pramātā. From the viewpoint of tattva this is the state of puruṣa. In the sixth stage of manifestation the pramātā is called sakala pramātā and in the seventh stage it is called pralayākala pramātā. From the viewpoint of tattva the pramātā in sixth and seventh stages is puruṣa tattva. These three stages, viz., vijñānākala, sakala and pralayākala, are the stages of bondage, impurity and limitation. In the state of vijñānākala Śiva is fettered with āṇavamala only. In the state of sakala it is fettered with all the three malas, viz, āṇava, māyīya and kārma. In the state of sakala all the malas are active and in the state of pralaya, they remain inactive.¹

(ii) Nature of Knowledge

The first thing which is considered regarding the nature of knowledge is whether knowledge is substance or quality. This issue is related to another issue that what is the relationship between knowledge and consciousness or soul. In Indian philosophical tradition some schools hold knowledge to be substance and some hold it to be quality. The schools that hold knowledge to be substance are-- Sāṃkhya, Advaita-Vedānta. Kashmir Śaivism and Śaiva-siddhānta. The schools which hold knowledge to be quality are-Cārvāka, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā. Cārvāka holds knowledge to be the quality of the body, it does not

1. मायोर्ध्वं यादृशा विज्ञानाकलाः कर्तृताशून्यशुद्धबोधात्मनः तादृगेव तदभेदसारं सकल प्रलयाकलात्मक पूर्वावस्थापरिचितमेषां प्रमेयम्। मायायां शून्य प्रमातृणां प्रलयकेवलिनां स्वोचितं प्रलीनकल्पं प्रमेयम्। क्षितिपर्यन्तावस्थितानां तु सकलानां सर्वतो भिन्नानां परिमितानां तथाभूतमेव प्रमेयम्। तदुत्तीर्णाशिवभट्टारकस्य प्रकाशैकवपुषः प्रकाशैकरूपा एव भावाः। श्रीमत्परमशिवस्य पुनः विश्वोत्तीर्णविश्वात्मकपरमानन्दमय प्रकाशैकधनस्य एवं विधमेव शिवादिधरण्यन्तमखिलं अभेदेनैव स्फुरति। — P.H. Sūtra 3, comm.

admit the existence of soul. According to this school knowledge is product of the combination of four mahābhūtas, viz, earth, water, air and fire. When these elements get united the knowledge or consciousness is born naturally. They do not need existence of soul to explain the phenomena of consciousness or knowledge. The Cārvāka's position is refuted by Naiyāyikas and others by saying that consciousness can not be produced by matter as they are opposite to each other. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system holds knowledge or consciousness to be the quality of the soul. According to this school consciousness or knowledge is an accidental quality of the soul, this is not inherent in its nature as its essential aspect. When the soul gets united with the body etc. made out of the combination of atoms (paramāṇus) consciousness or knowledge arises in soul and when the soul is separated from the combination of atoms, in the state of liberation, the soul ceases to be conscious or to have the activity of knowledge. The Mīmāṃsā school holds knowledge to be the essential quality of soul.

Kashmir Śaivism holds consciousness to be the nature of the soul. Knowledge and Consciousness are held to be synonymous. In this way knowledge is the very nature of consciousness. As light and brightness are not two different things, so are the knowledge and consciousness. Being the nature of consciousness knowledge is held to be substance. Kashmir Śaiva Philosophers say that as brightness is not the quality of light but it is the nature of light so knowledge is not the quality of consciousness but it is its nature.

Here Naiyāyikas may raise objection that if knowledge is the nature of soul then there should be the process of knowledge in the state of deep sleep. Knowledge being the nature of soul must be present with the soul always. In the state of deep sleep there is the existence of the soul but there is no process of

knowledge there. In reply to this objection Kashmir Śaiva philosophers say that in the state of deep sleep the consciousness is covered so its light does not come out. When the sun is covered with clouds and its rays do not appear, it does not mean that the sun has ceased to have rays. When the clouds are removed the sun again appears shining. The point is that the sun never ceases to shine. What happens is that it is covering which obstructs the shining and it is the covering which is removed. In the same way in the state of deep sleep the activity of consciousness or knowledge is obstructed and when the obstruction is removed by getting awakened the consciousness again appears working. The knowledge is always there in the nature of consciousness.

Another issue which is discussed in relation to the nature of knowledge is whether knowledge is a state of activity or it is a state of passivity. Advaita-Vedānta and Kashmir Śaivism both hold knowledge to be the nature of consciousness but they differ whether it is activity or passivity. According to Advaita-Vedānta knowledge is a state of passivity. Advaita-Vedānta takes activity in the sense of karma or voluntary action which is performed for the fulfilment of desire. As the Absolute Consciousness, Brahman is Perfect, there is nothing to be desired, there can not be any place for activity in the nature of Consciousness. Advaita-vedānta explains that as the water of pond receives shadow of any one, as the mirror receives the shadow, our consciousness receives the knowledge of object. There is no activity on the part of the water of pond and on the part of mirror while receiving the shadow. In the same way the phenomenon of knowledge occurs remaining passive. Opposite to it, Kashmir Śaivism holds knowledge to be a kind of activity. According to Kashmir Śaivism all sorts of activity are not karma and all are not motivated for the fulfilment of desire.

There can be activity in the state of perfection. The activity which is held to be in the nature of consciousness is called *spanda* in Kashmir Śaivism. This is also called the freedom of consciousness. Kashmir Śaivism holds that activity is the nature of consciousness.¹

It is said conscious because it performs the activity of knowledge. Without holding activity on the part of the knower or consciousness we can not explain grasping or understanding which occurs in knowing. In the examples of pond and mirror there occurs physical reflection. The pond or mirror does not grasp, understand or apprehend the object of which shadow falls in it. But when a conscious knower knows an object he grasps, understands and apprehend it. This may occur in an effortless manner. But there is activity in the process of knowing.

The other issue related to the nature of knowledge is how the knowledge itself is known. Whether knowledge is *parataḥ prakāśa* or it is *svataḥprakāśa*, illumined by others or illumined by itself. The Nyāya system propounds the theory of *anuvyavasāya*, repeated knowledge. According to it knowledge occurs always in subject-object mode. Any object is known only after being the object of knowledge. Nyāya is the system which holds that even the knowledge of self (soul) occurs in subject-object mode. In this way, according to Nyāya knowledge is *parataḥ prakāśa*. Kashmir Śaivism holds knowledge to be *svataḥ prakāśa*. It holds that in the process of knowing the object, the knowledge is also known. It is not the case that knowledge becomes the object of knowledge then it is known. For example, the light of a bulb falls on the table and the table is illumined, in the process of illumining the table the

1. यदि निर्विमर्शः स्यात् अनीश्वरो जडश्च प्रसज्येत। — *Parāprāveśikā*, p. 2.

bulb itself is illumined. It does not happen that after falling the light of bulb on the table and illumining the table the light goes back and falls on the bulb and then the bulb gets illumined. In the same way knowledge is known while knowing the object.

The other issue regarding the nature of knowledge is whether validity (*prāmānya*) found in knowledge is external to it, for validity the knowledge depends upon other things external to it, or the validity is internal and the knowledge is valid by itself, it does not depend upon external factors for its validity. There are different views in the schools of Indian philosophy regarding the validity of knowledge. According to Sāṃkhya system validity and invalidity both are internal, *svataḥ*. The Sāṃkhya system holds consciousness to be inactive by its nature and holds that the act of knowledge is performed by *buddhi*. *Buddhi* is the product of *prakṛti* which has its three constituents *sattva*, *raja* and *tama* (*guṇas*). These *guṇas* are also present in *buddhi*. In the process of knowing when there is predominance of *sattvaguna*, the knowledge gained is valid and when the other *guṇas* are predominant, the knowledge gained is invalid. This theory of Sāṃkhya is refuted by Mīmāṃsā and Kashmir Śaivism saying that validity and invalidity can not be there simultaneously in *buddhi*, as both are opposite to each other. Buddhism holds validity to be external and invalidity to be internal in the knowledge. Buddhism holds *nirvikalpaka* (indefinite) stage of perception as perceptual knowledge and it holds *savikalpaka* stage of perception as a part of inference (*anumāna*). According to it in the stage of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* the nature of the thing (object) is not known. At the stage of *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* the thing is changed, it is not the same thing which was at the time of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. The nature or form of the thing known at the time of *Savikalpaka*

pratyakṣa is the result of our thought construction, imagination (kalpanāpodham), inferred on the basis of our previous perception, the nivikalpaka pratyakṣa. Thus in the light of the theory of momentariness Buddhism holds that invalidity is internal and validity is external.

The Nyāya school of philosophy holds validity and invalidity both to be external (parataḥ prakāśa). It propounds its theory of anuvyavasāya (repeated knowledge). According to this school our first hand knowledge is neither valid nor invalid. The validity or invalidity of knowledge is apprehended only after applying the second hand knowledge, by making the first hand knowledge the object of our second hand knowledge. It is the state of second hand knowledge, anuvyavasāya, when the validity or invalidity of the knowledge is ascertained.

The Mīmāṃsā school and Kashmir Śaivism holds validity to be internal in the knowledge and invalidity external to the knowledge. According to these schools the knowledge is valid by itself. It does not depend upon external factors for its validity. It depends upon external factors only to ascertain the invalidity of knowledge. Our all behaviour goes holding our knowledge to be valid. We need its verification only when there is doubt about its validity. So it is for the invalidity that external factors are required. Kashmir Śaiva philosophers and also the Mīmāṃsakas say that if there is not validity internal in the knowledge or if the knowledge is not valid by itself, svataḥprakāśa, then the validity of the knowledge can not be ascertained. If the second knowledge is required for the validity of first knowledge, the second knowledge will require third and the third will require the fourth and it will go infinitely and there will be fallacy of infinite regress.

The other issue which is discussed regarding the nature of knowledge is whether knowledge is vastutantra or it is puruṣatantra. Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and others hold knowledge to be vastutantra, knowledge is always of the thing. According to this there is always duality of knower and known. Kashmir Śaivism holds knowledge to be puruṣatantra, oriented to puruṣa. According to Kashmir Śaivism there is unity in knower, knowledge and the known. Knowledge is the nature of the knower and the known resides in knowledge, it is not different from the knowledge. The knower manifests himself in the form of the known. Kashmir Śaivism maintains non-dualism in the epistemology also. Advaita-Vedānta is also non-dualistic system but it holds knowledge to be vastutantra. According to this school, in the state of non-dualism the activity of knowledge is not possible, as there is nothing different from the knower to know. So the process of knowledge occurs only in the state of duality (difference), which is caused by Māyā or avidyā. According to Kashmir Śaivism the knower wills to see himself in the form of object. In the state of non-duality the knower knows himself, there is I-consciousness (ahaṃ vimarśa). The known is the ābhāsa (appearance) of the knower. It is the freedom of the Absolute knower or it is the nature (svabhāva) of it that it manifests itself in the various multifarious forms of the objects of the world.

Another specific feature of the epistemology of Kashmir Śaivism is that it holds citi (consciousness) to be the sole pramāṇa. The Kashmir Śaiva philosophers say that this is citi or consciousness which knows the object, which ascertains the validity of knowledge and which applies the pramāṇas (perception etc.) to gain the knowledge. All the pramāṇas are only the means of citi. The real pramāṇa is the citi itself.

(iii) Idealism of Kashmir Śaivism

The words 'Idealism' and 'Realism' are used in the philosophical traditions of East and West in a technical sense, different from that in literature or in common parlance. In ordinary language the word 'ideal' stands for a model to be achieved. Similarly, the word 'real' stands for the actual truth which we come across in life. In the philosophical tradition, however, the words 'ideal' and 'real' are used in ontological sense. They are used chiefly in the context of the world or the object which we perceive. That the object is real would mean that it is independent of our knowing. In other words, it is not a creation or projection of mind, and as such it exists in its own right. Such a thing would naturally be made of independent matter and not of idea. On the other hand, that the world is 'ideal' would mean that it is a projection of mind or consciousness, appearing as real, although not real in itself. It would be like a dream object which poses to be a real material thing but which is really an appearance. The crucial difference between Realism and Idealism lies in the question whether the world exists independently as material entity or it depends for its existence on a knowing consciousness which ideates it. Idealism takes the world to be an appearance of consciousness; the world is 'ideal' that is, it is made of ideas so to say.

So far as the ontological status of the world appearance is concerned, there seem to be two forms of idealism in the Indian tradition. The first one represented by the Advaita-Vedānta and the Mādhyamika Buddhism, holds that the world appearance, though having practical reality (*vyāvahārika satya* or *saṃvṛta satya*), is ultimately unreal; from the point of view of the ultimate reality, there is no world at all. In other words, appearance can not

stand reality, just as the illusion of the snake can not survive after the knowledge of the rope.

The second form of idealism, represented by Kashmir Śaivism, maintains that appearance, although false in so far as it is taken to be independent material thing is co-existent with the real as the ideal projection of reality. In other words, appearance as appearance is true, and as a process of ideation or ideational projection it is part of reality. According to Kashmir Śaivism, the world appearance is a free self-projection of consciousness and as such it is not contradictory reality.

We can also find another classification of Idealism into two types, made from different angle. According to the first type, the world appearance is a creation or projection of the individual consciousness, this is called *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivāda* (Subjective idealism). According to the second, the world-appearance is a creation of a cosmic or universal consciousness -- this is called *sr̥ṣṭidr̥ṣṭivāda* (Absolute idealism). The Buddhist *Vijñānavāda* is of the first type, and the rest of the Indian idealistic systems are of the second type. Obviously Kashmir Śaivism is an Absolute Idealism.

Before we see how Abhinavagupta, the principal philosopher of Kashmir Śaivism, refutes realism and establishes idealism and how for his idealism differs from that of Śaṅkara and others, we would like to cast a glance upon its development in Kashmir Śaivism. Primarily, seeds of idealism are found in the *Āgamas*. On which the philosophy of Kashmir Śaivism is based, but there it is not stated in clear philosophical form. It is stated in the *Āgamas* that the world is an idealistic manifestation or, ideation (*Vimarśa*) of the ultimate reality, Śiva or the Self. The post *Āgamic* history of Kashmir Śaivism starts with the *Śiva-sūtras* of Vasugupta, where emphasis is laid upon the *upāyas* (paths of salvation) only.

Idealistic thought is found in the works of Somananda, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. Somananda, the father of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy in his Śivadr̥ṣṭi brings out the position that the world is a manifestation of the ultimate Consciousness or Self. This position is developed by Utpaladeva in his Īśvarapratyabhijñā kārikā. The fullest exposition of this position is found in the works of Abhinavagupta, specially in Īśvarapratyabhijñā Vimarśinī and Tantrāloka. The principle of the non-duality and freedom (Svātantrya) of the Self, emphasized in the Āgamas, is fully spelt out in the philosophy of Abhinavagupta who maintains that the world is a free self-projection of the Self.

The idealism of the Kashmir Śaiva school has developed almost autonomously from its own sources, the Tantras (or the Āgamas). However, we can trace with some success historical influence on Abhinavagupta. Before the coming of Abhinavagupta on the philosophical scene, Indian tradition had some eminent idealistic thinkers among whom Bhartṛhari of the Grammarian school is an important figure. The thinkers of the Buddhist Vijñānavāda and Śaṅkarācārya existed prior to Abhinavagupta. So it may be said that these philosophies were well known to him. He often refutes vijñānavāda and vivartavāda in his writings, yet we can find striking similarities between his own idealism and those of vijñānavād and vivartavāda. Thus it would not be a far fetched idea to guess that these two powerful forms of idealism influenced Abhinavagupta. He states the name of Bhartṛhari with great respect. It is clear that he was very much influenced by Bhartṛhari. Bhartṛhari accepts the ultimate reality as 'word' (Śabda Brahman) and explains the creation of the world from Śabda. Abhinavagupta too conceives Śakti as Vāk (speech) and explains the creation of the world as ideation (vimarśa) of Śakti which is

the very nature of Śiva, the ultimate Reality. The Ābhāsavāda (idealism) of Abhinavagupta seems to have been influenced, to some extent, by the Vivartavāda of Bhartṛhari. Here it is noteworthy that Somananda has criticised the theory of Śabda Brahman (word as ultimate Reality). He does so because according to him creation of the world can not be explained simply from the 'word' (Śabda) without bringing consciousness therein. Obviously, Somananda has not done justice to the position of the Grammarian. There is no doubt that Bhartṛhari regards Śabda as also consciousness. As a Grammarian, he conceives consciousness (citi śakti) in term of Śabda. Abhinavagupta, however, understands the Grammarian in the right perspective. He himself propounds the theory of vāk (Speech) in Tantrāloka¹ and in the commentary on Parāṭṛmśikā.²

According to Kashmir Śaivism, the world is the manifestation of Śiva-consciousness and the process of manifestation occurs not outside it, but within itself. The world exists in consciousness. It is ideation or appearance of consciousness, and in that sense is not inert (jaḍa), so Kashmir Śaiva philosophers negate the inertness of things propounding their ideal existence.

As an idealist, Abhinavagupta is obliged first to refute the realist. The realist ammounts to present mainly two arguments in his favour. Firstly, the existence of things does not depend upon their being known, the process of knowing does not influence or transform the things, it merely reveals what already exists. To be related to the knower is not significant for the existing thing, the relation is accidental and not necessary. In other words the things exist in their own right, secondly, the object has pragmatic value

1. T.A., 3/66 onwards.

2. Parāṭṛmśikā-vivaraṇa, pp. 3-15.

(arthakriyākāritva or saṃvādī pravṛtti), and therefore it is real. To put this argument in the naive way, the world is real because it is experienced as real.

In answer to the realist Abhinavagupta would say that even if the things exist in their own right, we have no way to ascertain their independence, for they never come to us in the independent way. They always come to us through our knowledge; epistemologically speaking, their existence is always related to our knowledge (jñāna-sāpekṣa). We do not and can not know them as independent of our knowledge (jñāna-nirapekṣa). In plain words, the things always come to us as we see or know them and not as they are in themselves. Therefore, the independent existence of things can not be proved.

Answering the second argument of the realist concerning arthakriyākāritva (pragmatic test) of the thing, Abhinavagupta shows that illusion too has arthakriyākāritva, therefore it cannot be the test for truth. The realist argues that the thing is real because it proves its reality existentially; for example, water is real because it quenches our thirst, and wound on the body is real because it causes pain. The idealist would reply that we find all these things in our dream also. In dream, the ideal water too quenches our thirst and we feel pain there too after being hurt. In other words, illusion too has an equal amount of arthakriyā, the beauty of illusion is, and that is its very nature, that it is false and yet it has complete arthakriyā. Therefore, the realist can not prove the reality of the object on the basis of arthakriyā.

It may be noted here that the idealist does not really succeed in disproving the reality of the object. In refuting the realist what the idealist really succeed in is not disproving the realist, but showing that the realist's argument is not potent enough to prove

his position, that is, the realist's position gets the benefit of doubt. The idealist really clarifies only the fact that whenever the thing comes to us it comes in the form of knowledge or appearance. We do not know what it is in itself, we know only how it appears to us. Therefore its independent and real existence can not be proved.

Now we are in a position to understand Abhinavagupta's idealism which is called *pratibimbavāda* or *Ābhāsavāda*. According to Abhinavagupta what we perceive is the reflection or appearance of our consciousness. Ideas are inherent in our consciousness and by projecting them outside we perceive them in material form. So ultimately things are ideal. They are like reflections in a mirror. The entire world is reflected in the mirror of cosmic consciousness. However, this analogy should not be stretched too far. The mirror is an unconscious thing (*jaḍa*) and therefore it does not have the freedom of reflection, the objects are reflected in it from outside and in a conditional way. But the consciousness reflects the objects from within itself, and that too freely.

Here, a question naturally arises which Abhinavagupta himself raises as a *pūrva-pakṣa*. The question is : How is reflection (*pratibimba*) possible without the real thing of the archetype (*bimba*).¹ We find in our empirical experience that reflection occurs in the mirror only when there is a real object to be reflected. In answer to this, Abhinavagupta says that the existence of '*bimba*' is not necessary for '*pratibimba*'. Of course, normally we find that *pratibimba* has *bimba* too, but the two are not logically related. We can find in our actual experience the existence of reflection (*pratibimba*) without *bimba*. In our dream experience,

1. ननु बिम्बस्य विरहे प्रतिबिम्बम् कथम् भवेत् किम् कुर्मो दृश्यते तद्धि ननु तदबिम्बमुच्यते। —

for example, we perceive the object that is reflected in our mind without the presence of real object outside. So it is quite possible that the whole world is reflected in consciousness without being a real world there outside.

A further question arises here : Even if it is granted that the world is a big dream, we will have to accept a real world which we see in the working state and from which we derive the ideas which in turn reflect themselves as real objects in the dream experience. This is the same question which Aristotle asked in refuting Plato's idealism. In answer to this, Abhinavagupta says that this too is not necessary. Ideas are inherent in consciousness; they are not due to external things. Just as, according to the materialist, forms of matter are inherent in matter itself, they have not come from outside, so also the ideas can be inherently present in consciousness. The Śaiva philosophers hold that the Śiva-consciousness has not borrowed the ideas from any where else, the ideas are inherent in itself. The possibilities of free reflection is exemplified in yogin's creation. A yogin can project or materialise things out of his free will.¹ So consciousness can freely reflect or project ideas.

It should be pointed out that Abhinavagupta's idealism is an Absolute idealism. The world is not the reflection of the individual consciousness but of the Absolute consciousness that is Śiva. That the ideas are inherent in Śiva-consciousness does not mean that the ideas are the necessary nature of it. The ideas are really freely assumed by Śiva. In other words, ideas are not the 'Svarūpa' (eternal nature) but the svātantrya (freedom) of Śiva-consciousness. The ideas are inherent in consciousness or they are

1. चिदात्मैव हि देवोऽन्तः स्थितमिच्छावशादवहिः योगीव निरूपादेन अर्थजातम् प्रकाशयेत् । —

nature of consciousness only in the sense that they do not come from outside. This contention is significant for it distinguishes the Kashmir Śaiva idealism from that of the Hegelian type. In the Hegelian idealism it is held that difference is inherent in the nature of the Absolute and its evolution is logically necessary, as for example, the form of a tree consists in the seed in its potential form and the seed must evolve in the form of the tree. But in Kashmir Śaivism, the idea of the world is not necessarily inherent in the nature of the Absolute, but it is its free manifestation. Although the whole process occurs within the Absolute consciousness, as dream occurs in our mind, there is no determinism or causal necessity in the Absolute here.

It may be pointed out that the Absolute idealist has an upper hand on the Subjective idealist or is placed in a more convenient position in answering certain objections from the side of the realist. For example, the question from the side of the realist may be as to why the world appears to all the subjects in one and the same way, or what is the explanation of the harmony or co-relation present in the experiences of different individuals, or why the world is three even if there is no individual visualising it. We do not mean that these questions can not at all be satisfactorily answered by the subjective idealist, what we mean is that the Absolute idealist can do it more easily by saying that the world is a projection of a cosmic mind and not of the individual mind.

One of the most significant points in the idealism of Abhinavagupta is that he calls the appearance (ābhāsa) real or true (satya). This should not give the misunderstanding that he is a realist. He emphatically denies realism and calls the world illusory like the rope-snake or the shadow-ghost.¹ What he means by

1. मिथ्यामोहकीदृशः रज्जुभुजगलयापिशाच भ्रमो.....। — Anuttarāṣṭikā.

calling the appearances real is that appearance as appearance is true. That is, the object is false in the sense that it is not an independent material object, but it is true as projection or appearance of consciousness. We may understand this position with the help of an analogy. The filmshow projected on the cinema screen is false only in the sense that actual persons in flesh and blood are not working there or that there are no real material objects. But that the show is a motion picture or that it is an actual projection from the film reel we can not deny. As picture it is true, as an actual material object it is false. Similarly, the world appearance like the cinema show is true and it is only in this sense that Abhinavagupta calls it real. The insight he gives is that if we have to deny the independent and material nature of the world from the point of view of the real, we can do so not by calling the world totally unreal but by calling it a projection or apparent manifestation of the real (consciousness). The point is that it can not be denied that a process of appearance is going on in the bosom of reality. To say that the world is not even *ābhāsa* and is totally unreal is self-contradictory, for then we can not explain the hard fact that the world appears before us. The world can not vanish by cursing it, as Abhinavagupta would put it.

The above point in Abhinavagupta's idealism can be better appreciated if we consider it by juxtaposing it with the type of idealisms like that of Advaita-Vedānta and Mādhyamika Buddhism. According to Advaita-Vedānta, the world is ultimately unreal (*tuccha*), in Para-Brahman it does not exist even as appearance. It comes as appearance only in the state of *Īśvara* which is ultimately false. But the question is : How can the world-appearance be denied even as appearance? In order to maintain the falsity of the world, we are obliged to hold the world as appear-

ance or projection of consciousness even from the real point of view; we can not say that the world is mere nothing from the point of view of Reality. The point is that appearance as appearance becomes a fact or is true even from the point of view of reality.

Moreover, Abhinavagupta would agree, if the world-appearance is not accepted as a self-creation or self-projection of Reality but is accepted as a super-imposition on Reality from outside, then in that case there would be duality as we find in the case of the rope-snake illusion where the rope lies natural and inactive and the snake is super-imposed on it from the side of the ignorant individual. The point is that in order to preserve the non-duality of the Absolute Reality, the world-appearance must be taken as the self-projection of the Absolute and not as a super-imposition on it. Kashmir Śaivism takes it as a self-creation or self-projection of Śiva.

A further point to be noted in this connection is that Śiva is not obliged to project the world. There is no determinism or necessity on the part of Śiva to create. He does it perfectly out of his freedom (*svātantrya*) as sport or play (*krīyā* or *līlā*). This activity of Śiva is what is called *Spanda* (spontaneity) or *Vimarśa* (effulgence). Creation is a free sportive activity of the Śiva-consciousness, it is symbolically called the dance of the *Naṭarāja* (the dancing Śiva). Freedom (*svātantrya*) is one of the fundamental principles of Kashmir Śaivism.

The above contention of Kashmir Śaivism again distinguishes its position from the idealism of the Hegelian type. In the Hegelian idealism the Absolute is not pure unity but unity in difference and is logically bound to evolve its potentiality into concrete actuality, and in this very process it realises its freedom.

In other words, the Absolute, in order to attain its inherent freedom, is obliged to manifest itself. But in Kashmir Śaivism the Absolute Reality is pure unity, and its manifestation into the form of difference or unity-in-difference is its freedom. Śiva does not manifest in order to attain freedom or get ānanda, but it does so out of freedom and ānanda. This is done in the state of freedom and ānanda is already there, and it freely overflows in the form of the cosmic dance.

Thus the Kashmir Śaiva philosopher would differ from Hegel and side with the Advaitin in so far as he maintains that the Absolute is pure unity and that it is by no means obliged to manifest. But he differs from the Advaitin in so far as he takes the world-appearance to be a self-projection of Śiva and not a superimposition on Śiva. In this sense we can call Kashmir Śaivism Līlāvāda and Advaita-Vedānta Māyāvāda. In fact, the Advaitin would not be happy in being labelled as 'idealist', for 'idealism' in the technical sense means that the world is an ideal projection of consciousness. The Advaitin would prefer to call the world addhyāsa (superimposition) due to ignorance than ideal projection out of līlā.

This difference between the Advaita-Vedānta and Kashmir Śaivism could also be stated in the following way. The Advaitin conceives freedom as 'freedom-from' and not as 'freedom-to', 'Freedom-to' presupposes activity, and Brahman is inactive (niṣkriya). Brahman is pure knowledge and no will, and therefore, there is no question of 'freedom-to' in Brahman. But Kashmir Śaivism conceives freedom as both 'freedom-from' and 'freedom-to'. The Absolute of Kashmir Śaivism is both knowledge and will or Jñāna and kriyā or prakāśa and vimarśa or Śiva and Śakti. Spanda or Spontaneous activity is the nature of consciousness

(Śiva). Śiva is not only unaffected by the world-process (that is, free 'from' the world process) but is also 'free to' manifest the world process out of His ānanda.

It will be significant here to mention Apūrṇakhyāti, the theory of error, held by Kashmir Śaivism. The problem of error is well discussed in almost all the schools of Indian philosophy. In this context it is remarkable that realistic systems have discussed the problem from the point of view of realism showing that the illusory object is ultimately real, and on the other hand, idealistic systems have discussed the problem from their own point of view of idealism, showing that the object of illusion is ultimately appearance. For example, explaining the rope-snake illusion, the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika would say that the snake which we perceive in the rope, does exist elsewhere (anyathā); it is known here through what is called jñānalakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa; so the knowledge obtained here is the knowledge of a real thing existing elsewhere. Rāmānuja would say, according to his principles of pañcikaṇa (everything is present in everything), that the snake is actually present in the rope; the snake already implicitly present in the rope is now explicitly present to consciousness (satkhyāti or yathārthakhyāti). The Mīmāṃsaka (prabhakara) holds that error is due to non-apprehension (akhyāti) of the distinction between two knowldges obtained together. In the knowledge of the rope-snake, we have actually two knowldges-- the knowledge of the snake which comes from memory, and the knowledge of the rope which we receive through perception. Thus we find in the realistic treatment of error that the realist attempts to show that error is really knowledge and it has corresponding object. This shows also that he is not ready to accept the object of illusion as appearance.

The idealist would point out that a real sanke may exist

elsewhere, but the snake which is the object of our 'perception' here is not real, although it appears to be real. In the subjective idealism of Buddhist Vijñānavāda, it is held that the snake which we 'perceive; in the rope, is not there in the rope, it is actually in the subject or the mind, and is projected on the rope. The knowledge of the snake, therefore, is a case of knowing the ideal projection of one's own self (ātma-khyāti). The Advaita-Vedānta holds that the rope-snake is not real and yet it appears, so it can not be described as sat or as asat (anirvacanīyā-khyāti). In this context, Kashmir Śaivism holds that the illusory can not be said to be wholly false; it is not bare nothing., but is a projection or an actual ideal creation of consciousness. To hold the illusory a material entity independent of the knowing self, is an incomplete (apūrṇa) view of the object; the complete view is that it is an ideal projection of consciousness. Thus illusion, here, is a case of incomplete knowledge (apūrṇa khyāti or apūrṇa jñāna). It is remarkable here, that ignorance in Kashmir Śaivism is conceived as incomplete knowledge and not as total absence of knowledge. The Kashmir Śaivite would say that obviously illusion is not the absence of knowledge, really it is wrong knowledge, and wrong knowledge means imperfect knowledge. When we 'see' the snake in the rope, it is not the absence of knowledge for we are actually 'seeing' or knowing the snake. The only thing herein, is that we are not knowing the snake in its reality and therefore, our knowledge of the snake is imperfect. The reality of the snake is that it is a projection or appearance (ābhāsa) of our mind. When we come to know that the snake is not an independent material object but a projection (ābhāsa) of our mind, then we know the full truth, and our knowledge of the snake is now complete or perfect (pūrṇa).

Thus through the discussions in the foregoing pages we see

that Ahinavagupta succeeds in establishing his idealism consistently. A question may arise here : Self-consistency is there all right, but does Abhinavagupta really succeed in demolishing realism and establishing his own position? In answer we can point out that judging his position impartially, we find that he of course succeeds in not allowing the realist to positively prove his (realist's) case, but he does not succeed in actually disproving the realist's position. In other words, he succeeds in making the realist a doubtful case, but the realist gets the benefit of doubt, and the possibility of his position can not be ruled out. Similarly, on the other hand, the idealist does not succeed in proving his position, but certainly he succeeds in establishing the possibility of his position. To talk in the Kantian way, we can know the thing only as it appears to us, we can not know what it is in itself. In itself the object of our perception (the sense-datum) may be an independent material substance and it may be an ideal projection of consciousness as well. So, considering the question from the rational and critical point of view we can conclude that both the positions are possible, but none of the two stands proved or established.

However, the philosophy of Abhinavagupta can not be called speculative, as it is based on the Āgmic experience. As the proof of his philosophy he relies upon the Āgamas. He employs reason only to make his position self-consistent and to show its possibility. But he is well aware that his position, any position, can not be proved on the basis of reason. The proof can come only from the side of the Āgama which is a record of the esoteric experience of the seers and yogins. Abhinavagupta calls it the tradition of experience¹. His claim is that the Āgamic experience which is of

1. अनुभवसम्प्रदायोपदेश परिशीलनेन। — Parātr̥ṃśikā vivaraṇa.

a deeper or higher order, is an actual phenomenon and that it can be verified as well. There may be objections against the so-called higher experience, but here there is no room for considering them.

Chapter 3

Nature of Aesthetic Object

In Indian Aesthetics the aesthetic pleasure or aesthetic experience is called 'Rasa'. Therefore the aesthetic theory is called 'Rasa theory'. The whole Indian aesthetics rounds over the concept of Rasa. The word *rasa*, in ordinary usage, is used in the sense of taste, relish, flavour, juice, essence etc. In ordinary usage this word has two aspects -- the object of taste and the experience (activity) of taste. In aesthetics also this word denotes both of its aspects. The object of aesthetic experience is *rasa* and it is the aesthetic experience itself. Abhinavagupta, in his philosophy of aesthetics has emphasized on its aspect of experience but he has also discussed it as the object of experience. Here, we are concerned with the object of aesthetic experience and as object its constituting factors.

The aesthetic pleasure is obtained or experienced during the course of watching drama and hearing poetry. Poetry and drama are held to be the same. The drama has a upper hand upon poetry as it is enjoyed by applying two means, eyes and ear, and enjoyed in two ways as it is seen and heard; whereas the poetry is only heard, applying only the sense organ of ear. Abhinavagupta holds that the qualified persons conceive the dramatic situation narrated in the poetry in their mind and they enjoy the poetry like drama.¹

1. यदाहुः काव्यकौतुके—

‘प्रयोगत्वमनापन्ने काव्ये नास्वादसंभवः। इति
वर्णनोत्कलिकाभोग प्रौढोक्त्या सम्यगर्पिताः।

उद्यानकान्ता चन्द्राद्या भावाः प्रत्यक्षवत् स्फुटाः॥’ इति। — Abh. N.S. Part I, Ch. 6,
p.684, B.H.U. edition.

Therefore there is no basic difference between drama and poetry.¹ Hence drama is held to be the object of aesthetic experience. He says, 'Nāṭyameva rasāḥ', 'drama is rasa'. So it is necessary to discuss the nature of drama in regard to find out the real nature of the aesthetic object.

Defining drama Abhinavagupta says that 'drama is different from worldly things and it is also distinct from their imitation (anukāra), reflection (pratibimba), pictorial presentation (ālekhyā), imposition of similarity (sādrśyāropa), determination (adhyavasāya), fancy (utprekṣā), dream, magic shows (indrajāla) etc. It is also distinct from the correct knowledge (samyagjñāna), erroneous cognition (bhrānti), doubt (saṁśaya), uncertainty (anava-dhāraṇā), determination (adhyavasāya), ordinary knowledge (vijñāna) of its spectator. It is a thing which is of the nature of rasa and can be known by direct experience in the form of aesthetic enjoyment.'² In this way Abhinavagupta emphasizes on two things -- that the drama is not worldly (laukika) but non-worldly (alaukika) and, that it is not the imitation of any worldly object. He says that drama is of the nature of rasa, aesthetic enjoyment, and it is neither worldly nor the imitation of worldly object, thus by implication he wants to say that rasa is found only in drama,

1. नाट्यन एव च रसाः, काव्येऽपि नाट्यायमाने एव रसः।

— Abh. N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 684.

वयन्तु ब्रूमः। काव्यं तावन्मुख्यतो दशरूपकात्मकमेव।तेन नाट्य एव रसाः न लोक इत्यर्थः। काव्यं च नाट्यमेव।' — Abh. N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 684.

'नाट्यात् समुदायरूपाद्रसाः। यदि वा नाट्यमेव रसाः। रससमुदायोहि नाट्यम्।' — Ibid.

2. 'तत्र नाट्यं नाम लौकिकपदार्थव्यतिरिक्तं तदनुकारप्रतिबिम्बालेख्य सादृश्यारोपाध्यवसायोत्प्रेक्षा-स्वप्नमायेन्द्रजालादिविलक्षणं तद्ग्राहकस्य सम्यग्ज्ञान भ्रान्तिसंशयानवधारणाध्यवसाय-विज्ञानभिन्नवृत्तान्तास्वादनरूपसंवेदनसंवेद्यं वस्तु रसस्वभावमिति वक्ष्यामः।' — Abh. N.S. Part 1, Ch. 1, p. 15-16.

it can not be experienced in the worldly life.¹ Now the question arises that if drama is neither a worldly object nor the imitation of worldly object and also can not be known in the manner the things are known in the world, then what is drama and what is presented on the stage? To give the answer of this question Abhinavagupta comments on the verse² of Bharata which expounds that drama is the re-presentation of the bhāvas (emotions) found in all the three worlds. It is not the presentation of particular person or imitation of a particular person and also not the presentation of the bhāvas (emotions) of a particular person. Bharata says that emotions are presented on the stage and they too in a generalized way. Commenting on this verse of Bharata, Abhinavagupta discusses the possibility of the presentation of a particular person or character on the stage in the form of imitation. This discussion comes in reference to daityas and devas, to whom Bharata told that the drama presented before them was not their individual presentation but it was the presentation of bhāvas (emotions) in a generalized way. The story narrated in the Nāṭya śāstra is that in the drama, played in the presence of daityas and devas, consisted of the superiority of devas upon daityas which caused anger in daityas and consequently they intended to destroy the stage etc. of the drama and to becalm them Bharata preached the nature of drama. Abhinavagupta, in his commentary, examines all the possible ways of the presentation of the imitation of a particular person (character) on the stage. He says that oneness of character (a particular person) with the actor can not be presented on the stage.

1. नाट्ये रसः न तु लोके। — Abh. N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 685.

2. नैकान्ततोऽत्र भवतां देवानां चानुभावनम्।

त्रैलोक्यस्यास्य सर्वस्य नाट्यं भावानुकीर्तनम्॥

— Abh. N.S. Part 1, Ch. 1, Verse 107, p. 105-109.

The knowledge of oneness (or similarity) of the character and the actor can not arise in any way, in any mode of knowledge. The particular person (the character) and the actor can not be taken one or same as the twins are mistaken as one due to physical similarity. They can not be understood one as it occurs in erroneous knowledge in which silver is perceived in place of shell due to the similarity of whiteness belonging to both of them and after the rise of correct knowledge the perception of silver is contradicted. The sameness of both can not be established by āropa (imposition) as it occurs in the case of the beautiful face of nāyikā (heroine) is understood to be similar with the moon. It also can not be established by adhyavasāya (determination) as it occurs in the case of a wild animal to be understood as cow on the basis of some similarity. It also can not be established by utprekṣā (illustration, fancy) as it occurs in the case of the beautiful face of the nāyikā illustrated as held to be moon by the nāyaka (the hero). It can not be held to be the same as it is found in the pictorial presentation of some one either in painting or as described in words. It can not be taken as occurs in hevāka wherein the disciples repeat the pronunciation of Vedic mantras imitating the pronunciation of the guru (teacher). It can not be the same as a thing is created or presented by the magician by his power of magic (indrajāla) or by his skills of hands. Abhinavagupta says that if the oneness or sameness of both is taken in the ways mentioned above there will be something as extraordinary and being so it will create indifference in the spectator and consequently there will not be aesthetic enjoyment. He further says that if the sameness is taken as pre-supposition where the similarity is taken as determined then it will become like the things seen in worldly life and it will cause the rise of the emotions in the same way as it causes in the real worldly life. He says that when a

couple is seen in the condition of love making in the real world it causes the rise of happiness, anger, hatred etc. in the perceiver and the mind of perceiver gets disturbed. Here Abhinavagupta wants to say that if drama is taken as the imitation of the real world then it will cause disturbance in the mind of the spectator and he will not be able to get aesthetic enjoyment.¹

Abhinavagupta further says that when a particular person, i.e. a historical person, for instance, Rāma, Sītā, Rāvaṇa, Śakuntalā, is narrated in poetry and presented in drama, on the stage, he can not be presented as a particular person as such or as his imitation, because of the difference of time of his being existent and the presentation on the stage. Due to the physical absence of the historical person the actor can not imitate the conduct of that person. What is presented in drama is not the historical person but character (anukārya). The poet narrates the bhāvas, the emotions, the ideas, the concepts in poetry and the actor presents bhāvas on the stage with the association of other means of the drama, like music, dance, etc. Therefore drama has been said by Bharata, to be the bhāvānukīrtana of the three worlds. It is the anukīrtana of the bhāvas. Kīrtana means kathana (expression in words) and anukīrtana means re-expression. The bhāvas which are expressed

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1. तथाहि— तेषु न तत्त्वेन धीः। न सादृश्येन यमलकवत्। न भ्रान्तत्वेन इदं रजतमिति रूप्यस्मृतिपूर्वकशुक्तिरूप्यवत्। नारोपेण सम्यग्ज्ञानबाधानन्तरमिथ्या ज्ञानरूपेण मुखं चन्द्र इतिवत्। नाप्यध्यवसायेन गौर्वाहीक इतिवत्। नोत्प्रेक्ष्यमाणत्वेन मुखं नूनं चन्द्र इतिवत्। न प्रतिकृतित्वेन चित्रपुस्तकवत्। न तदनुकारेण गुरुशिष्यव्याख्याहेवाकवत्। न तात्कालिकनिर्माणेनेन्द्रजालवत्। न युक्तिविरचित तदाभासतया हस्तलाघवादिमायावत्। सर्वेष्वेतेषु पक्षेष्वाधारणतया द्रष्टरैर्दासीन्ये रसास्वादायोगात्। कवेश्च नियतवर्णनीयनिश्चितत्वे काव्यस्यैवासम्पत्तेरनौचित्यावर्जनायोगात्। लौकिकमिथुनदृशीव सांसारिकहर्षक्रोधान्वयिता- पतेरुभयदर्शनाकुलतया मुख्यदृष्टौ प्रयोक्तृदृष्टौ तद्धीसंपत्त्यभावात्।'

by the poet in his poetry (or drama) are being expressed again on the stage or the bhāvas which are expressed in all the three worlds are being re-expressed through the drama. When the character (Rāma) is presented on the stage it is presented in a generalized way. The conduct of Rāma is taken in a generalized way by the spectator. It becomes like, 'if such actions are done they give result like this.' If the character, Rāma, is not taken in a generalized way but taken as the historical man, there will not be any experience of aesthetic enjoyment on the part of the spectator due to the association of religious faith in Rāma. In place of aesthetic enjoyment there will arise the sense of worship etc. in the spectator.

Drama is not imitation (anukāra). When an actor (bhāṇḍa) imitates any one's (of prince or leader) actions, speech etc., declaring that he is imitating such and such person, it causes only laughter¹ in the spectators and not the aesthetic enjoyment. The purpose of such imitation is also to cause laughter among the spectators not to produce aesthetic enjoyment. Imitation of a person by another person is not possible in any way. It is not possible because physically both are different, one's body can not be the body of another, one's conduct can not be the conduct of another. In the case of a character (anukārya) being presented on the stage, imitation is not possible because the character is not a physical person, but poetic creation. The body of the character, conduct, action are not present actually to be imitated. These are present in narrations, in conceptual form, in the form of ideas. It may be said here that the character is not present physically but

1. अनेन भाण्डेन राजपुत्रस्यान्यस्य वाऽनुकृतमित्यन्यादिबुद्धेरभावात्। तद्धि विकरणमिति प्रसिद्धं, हासमात्रफलं मध्यस्थानाम्।

present in ideas or bhāvas, so if physical imitation is not possible then the actor may imitate the emotions of the character. Abhinavagupta says that imitation of emotions also is not possible. The emotion of Rāma (character) can not be the emotion of the actor. The sorrow of Rāma can not be the sorrow of the actor. There is emotion of sorrow in Rāma due to the loss of Sītā who was his wife. The actor can not take Sītā as his wife. Abhinavagupta says that due to absence (abhāva) of emotion in the actor, the imitation of bhāva (emotion) is not possible. For imitation implies difference (dualism) and when one is absent then it can not be imitated by other. Abhinavagupta says that emotions are universals. They are expressed in association with a particular but not in the all particular individuals equally, similarly or simultaneously. It is presented on the stage in a generalized way. The actor may present the general means (anubhāvas) of the expression of the emotions. He may show the state of face, movement of eyes, eyebrows, tearing etc. in the presentation of a particular emotion. It may be said that in the case of the arousal of such emotion such bodily and facial changes generally occur in all. So when the actor is presenting the emotion of the character (Rāma), it is not the presentation of the emotion of a particular character but it is the presentation of the emotion in a generalized way.¹

If drama is not imitation then what is the real nature of drama? Abhinavagupta says that it is *pratyakṣakalpa*, perceived in mind in conceptual form like perception but not the object of perception, and it is known by *anuvyavasāya*. According to him it

1. नहि ततो रामसदृशं स्वात्मनः शोकं करोति। सर्वथैव तस्य तत्राभावात्। भावे वाननुकारत्वात्। न चान्यद्वस्त्वस्ति यच्छोकेन सदृशं स्यात्। अनुभावांस्तु करोति। किन्तु सजातीयानेव, न तु तत्सदृशात्। साधारणरूपस्य कः केन सादृश्यार्थः। — Abh. N.S. Part 1, Ch. 1, p. 119-120.

is jñānarūpa, of the nature of knowledge, not perceived as physical object but known by anuvyavasāya. The poet expresses the ideas (emotions) in his poetry, it is presented on the stage and watched by the spectator. Anuvyavasāya is a term used in Nyāya philosophy to know the knowledge of the knowledge. According to it the knowledge 'I know the table', is known only by applying another knowledge, as to say, 'I know that I know the table.' The drama is anukīrtana means that it is first expressed by the poet and secondly presented on the stage or it is first expressed as bhāva in the world and secondly presented on the stage. It is of the nature of experience united with emotions.¹ Drama is non-worldly (alaukika). When a spectator goes to watch a drama he thinks in his mind that he will get something non-worldly to watch. He will be free from worldly tensions for some time and enjoy. All the efforts made by the dramatist, actors and other associates are directed to make the spectators able to get aesthetic enjoyment, something non-worldly (alaukika).² In poetry beautiful figures of speech and words are used³ and in drama music and dance are used to divert the mind of the spectator from worldly tensions. He identifies himself with the emotive situation pre-

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1. तस्मादनुव्यवसायात्मकमनुकीर्तनं रुषितविकल्पसंवेदनं नाट्यम्।

— Abh. N.S. Part 1, Ch. 1, p. 125.

2. 'नाट्ये तु पारमार्थिकं किञ्चिदद्य मे कृत्यं भविष्यतीत्येवंभूताभिसन्धिसंस्काराभावात्सर्वपरिषत्साधारण-प्रमोदसारापर्यन्तविरसनसमादरणीयलोकोत्तरदर्शनश्रवणयोगी भविष्यामीत्यभिसन्धिसंस्कारादुचित-गीतातोद्यचर्वणाविस्मृतसांसारिकभावतया विमलमुकुरकल्पीभूतनिजहृदयः।' — Abh. N.S. Part 1, Ch. 1, p. 113.

3. 'काव्ये तु गुणालङ्कारमनोहरशब्दार्थशरीरे लोकोत्तरसप्राणोक्त हृदयसंवादवशात् निमग्नाकारिका तावद् भवतिचित्तवृत्तिः।

किन्तु सर्वस्य प्रत्यक्षसाक्षात्कारकल्पा तत्र न धीरुदेति॥'

— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 1, p. 112.

sented on the stage. He rises above the limitation of time during watching the drama. His own heart becomes responsive to the emotions presented on the stage and his own cittavṛtti (mind) becomes immersed in the emotions arisen in itself and he experiences his own self united with his cittavṛtti. Therefore drama is that thing which is known by anuvyavasāya with the help of the processes of hr̥daya saṁvāda (response of heart), tanmayībhavana (identification), as mentioned above which itself is the nature of āsvāda (taste), where the self is manifested united with cittavṛtti, which is called by the synonymous words like camatkāra, carvaṇa, nirveśa, bhoga etc.¹

Here, at this stage of discussion, Abhinavagupta wanted to discuss the theories of error (khyātivāda) propounded by other schools of philosophy but due to the fear of subject to be too philosophical and consequently to be nīrasa (without rasa) he stopped promising to discuss this aspect elsewhere, in philosophical text.²

1. तेनानुव्यवसायविशेषविषयीकार्यं नाट्यम्। तथा चाहार्यविशेषादिना निवृत्ते तद्देशकाचैत्रमैत्रादि-
नटविशेषप्रत्यक्षाभिमाने, आदरणीयचरितवाचकस्य रामादिशब्दस्यात्रोपयोगात् प्रसिद्धतदर्थतयाऽ-
सम्भवामात्रनिकारणेन; विशेषलेशोपक्रमेण च विना प्रत्यक्षाप्रवृत्ते; प्रत्यक्षकल्पस्याभिनयत्यनृत्य-
हृद्यगीताद्यनुस्यूततया चमत्कारस्थानत्वाद्वदयानुप्रवेशयोग्यत्वे आयाते; अभिनय-चतुष्टयेन स्वरूप-
प्रच्छादनं, प्रस्तावनादिना नाट्यज्ञानजसंस्कारसाचित्र्यं, तेनरञ्जकसामग्रीमध्यानुपविष्टेन प्रच्छादित्
स्वस्वभावेन दृश्यमानेन प्रयोक्ता प्राक्प्रवृत्तलौकिकप्रत्यक्षानुमानादि-जनितसंस्कारसहाये हृदयसंवाद-
तन्मयीभावनासहकारिणि सहृदये योऽनुव्यवसायो जन्यते सुखदुःखाद्याकारतत्तच्चित्तवृत्तिरूप-
रूषितनिजसंविदानन्दप्रकाशमयः अत एव विचित्रो रसनास्वादनचमत्कारचर्वणनिर्वेशभोगाद्यपरपर्यायः
तत्र यदवभासते वस्तु तन्नाट्यम्।'

— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 1, p. 121-123.

2. 'तत्र ज्ञानाकारमात्रम्, आरोपितस्वरूपं, सामान्यात्मकं, तत्कालनिर्मितरूपं चान्यद्वा किञ्चिदस्तु।
नात्राप्रस्तुतलेखनेनात्मनो दर्शनान्तरकथापरिचयप्रकटनफलेन प्रकृतवस्तुनिरूपणविघ्नमाचरन्तः
सहृदयान्वेदयामः।' — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 1, p. 123-125.

Discussing the nature of drama Abhinavagupta says that according to Kohala (a dramatacian different from Bharata) there are eleven āṅgas (parts) of drama-- rasa, bhāva, abhinaya, dharmī, vṛtti, pravṛtti, siddhiḥ, svāra, ātodya, song and raṅga,¹ but according to Bharata there are five āṅgas (parts) of drama²-- rasa, bhāva, abhinaya, song, and ātodya (music). Rasa is of nine kinds Śṛṅgāra (erotic), Hāsyā (comic), Karuṇa (pathetic), Raudra (furious), Vīra (heroic), Bhayānaka (terrible), Bībhatsa (odious), Adbhuta (marvellous) and Śānta (quietistic).³ Bhāva is of three types-- sthāyī, sañcārī and sāttvika.⁴ The word bhāva, etymologically, is derived from the root bhū which means -- to be, to cause to be. It also gives the meaning of 'to pervade'. Therefore the word bhāva is used in two senses -- (i) that causes something to be, and (ii) that affects or pervades (vāsana). According to the first meaning it is that which is brought about in the poetry by the poet, that is kāvyārtha (the meaning or the essence of the poetry) and that is the very purpose of the poetry, that is rasa and later on it is

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1. रसा भावा ह्यभिनयाः धर्मी वृत्तिप्रवृत्तयः।

सिद्धिः स्वरास्तथातोद्यं गानं रङ्गश्च संग्रहः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, Verse 10, p. 601.

2. संग्रहं दर्शयति— रसा भावा इत्यादिना। च शब्द इतिशब्दार्थे। अभिनयत्रयं गीतातोद्ये चेति पञ्चाङ्गं नाट्यम्। अनेन तु श्लोकेन कोहल(स्य) मतेनैकादशाङ्गत्वमुच्यते। न तु भरते (तस्य)। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, Verse 10, p. 601.

3. शृङ्गारहास्यकरुणा रौद्रवीरभयानकाः।

बीभत्साद्भुतशान्ताश्च नव नाट्य रसाः स्मृताः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, Verse 15, p. 608.

4. एते नव रसाः प्रोक्ता द्रुहिणेन महात्मना।

पुनश्च भावान्वक्ष्यामि स्थायिसञ्चारिसत्त्वजान्॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, Verse 16, p. 612.

brought about by the means of drama.¹ According to the second meaning these are so called (as bhāvas) because they pervade, as a smell, the minds of the spectators.²

Some bhāvas are held to be existent permanently in the mind of every one and so they are called sthāyī bhāvas (the permanent state of emotions, basic emotions etc.). Sthāyībhāvas are inborn in man's heart. They permanently exist in the mind of every man in the form of latent impressions (vāsanā). These impressions (vāsanā) are derived from actual experience of life, either from this present life or from previous lives, and the man carry them with him from life to life. The sthāyībhāva is also so called because it is more deeply felt and dominates all other emotions. It is so called also because it persists in the poetry or drama from beginning to end. It belongs to both to the character and to the spectator. The sthāyībhāvas are nine in number³ --

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| (1) Rati (delight) | (2) Hāsa (laughter) |
| (3) Śoka (sorrow) | (4) Krodha (anger) |
| (5) Utsāha (heroism) | (6) Bhaya (fear) |
| (7) Jugupsā (disgust) | (8) Vismaya (wonder) |
| (9) Śama (serenity) | |

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1. भावाः इति कस्मात्? किं भवन्ति इति भावाः, किं वा भावयन्ति इति भावाः? उच्यते वागङ्गसत्वोपेतान् काव्यार्थान् भावयन्ति इति भावाः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 7, p. 783.
 2. लोकेऽपि च प्रसिद्धम् अहो हृदनेन गन्धेन रसेन वा सर्वमेव भावितमिति। तच्च व्याप्यर्थम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 7, p. 787.
 3. रतिर्हासश्च शोकश्च क्रोधोत्साहौ भयं तथा।
जुगुप्सा विस्मयश्चेति स्थायिभावा प्रकीर्तिताः। — Abh., N.S., Ch. 6, verse 17, p. 613.

Abhinavagupta says that in our beginningless wanderings in the universe passing through one life to another life, we have had every conceivable experience to have every possible emotion. He says that there exists no living being who is devoid of the latent impressions of these basic emotions.¹

The sthāyībhāvas do not appear in a pure form. They are accompanied with other emotions which depend on it and have no independent existence. They appear as invariable concomitants and are liable to change. They are called vyabhicārībhāvas (transitory emotions). These emotions arise simply because of the presence of permanent emotions. It is said that these are like waves, which rise from the ocean of the permanent emotions and subside into it. The vyabhicārībhāvas are thirty three in number²-

(1) Nirveda (indifference), (2) Glāni (disgust), (3) Śaṅkā (doubt), (4) Asūyā (jealousy), (5) Mada (pride), (6) Śrama (exertion), (7) Ālasya (idleness), (8) Dainya (affliction), (9) Cintā (anxiety), (10) Moha (delusion), (11) Smṛti (memory), (12) Dhṛti (firmness), (13) Vrīḍā (bashfulness), (14) Capalatā (fickleness),

1. नह्येतचित्तवृत्तिवासनाशून्यः प्राणी भवति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, p. 282.

2. निर्वेदग्लानिशङ्काख्यातस्तथासूयामदः श्रमः।

आलस्यं चैव दैन्यं च चिन्ता मोहः स्मृतिर्धृतिः॥

व्रीडा चपलता हर्ष आवेगो जड़ता तथा।

गर्वो विषाद औत्सुक्यं निद्रापस्मार एव च॥

सुप्तं विबोधोऽमर्षश्चाप्यवहित्यमथोग्रता।

भतिर्व्याधिस्तथोन्मादस्तथा मरणमेव च॥

त्रासश्चैव वितर्कश्च विज्ञेया व्यभिचारिणः।

त्रयस्त्रिंशदमी भावाः समाख्यातास्तु नामतः॥

— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse, 18, 19, 20, 21.

(15) Harśa (joy), (16) Āvega (excitement), (17) Jaḍatā (stupor), (18) Garva (proud), (19) Viṣāda (gloom), (20) Autsukya (longing), (21) Nidrā (slumber), (22) Apasmāra (epilepsy), (23) Supta (asleep), (24) Bibodha (awakening), (25) Amarṣa (intolerance), (26) Avahitha (hiding), (27) Ugratā (acridness), (28) Mati (intellect), (29) Vyādhi (illness), (30) unmāda (insanity), (31) Maraṇa (death), (32) Trāsa (awe), (33) Vitarka (wrong argumentation).

With the rise or awakening of the sthāyībhāvas some physical changes occur naturally. These changes are called sāttvika bhāvas. They are eight in number¹ --

(1) Stumbha (trembling), (2) Sveda (sweating), (3) Romāñca (horripilation), (4) Svarabhaṅga (break in voice), (5) Vepathu (tremor), (6) Vaivarnya (change of the colour of body), (7) Aśru (tear), (8) Pralaya (dissolution).

Abhinaya (acting) is held to be of four kinds²--

(1) Āṅgika (bodily movement), (2) Vācika (speech), (3) Āhārya (dress), (4) Sāttvika (physical changes which occur naturally).

Gīta (song), ātodya (music) and other aṅgas (parts) of drama like dharmī, vṛtti, pravṛtti have been discussed by Bharata and Abhinavagupta. These parts of drama play the role of subsidiary in aesthetic experience and are not important for philosophical discussion. Therefore we intend to concentrate on the discussion of bhāva and ways of its expression.

1. स्तम्भः स्वेदोऽथ रोमाञ्चः स्वरभङ्गोऽथ वेपथुः।

वैवर्ण्यमश्रु प्रलय इत्यष्टौ सात्त्विकाः स्मृताः॥ — Abh., N.S., Ch. 6, Verse 22.

2. आङ्गिको वाचिकश्चैव ह्याहार्यः सात्त्विकस्तथा।

चत्वारोऽभिनया ह्येते विज्ञेया नाट्यसंश्रयाः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, Verse.23.

In our ordinary life, generally, an emotion is manifested accompanied by three elements -- causes (kāraṇa), effects (kārya) and concomitant elements (sahakārin). The causes are the various situations and factors of our life due to which the emotions are excited. The effects are the reactions caused by it which are expressed by our face, gestures, movement of eyes and eyebrows etc. The concomitant elements are the accessory emotions which accompany it temporarily. These are the means or ways of the expression of the basic emotion. In aesthetic experience these are not taken in the sense in which these are taken in the worldly affairs. These are treated different from their worldly sense of cause and effect. Therefore they have been given aesthetic terms. The cause is called vibhāva, the effect is called anubhāva and the concomitant elements are called vyabhicārībhāvas or sañcārī bhāvas. The vibhāva is rendered into English as the determinants or the emotive situation, the anubhāva is rendered as the consequent or the mimetic changes and the sañcārins are rendered as the transitory mental states or feelings. Thus the emotive situation presented in the poetry or drama is called vibhāva. It arouses emotion in the spectator not as cause in the sense of causation (causing effects) but in quite different form. The term vibhāva depicts the meaning of cognition, vijñāna.¹ They are so called because they are the ground of the determination of words, gestures and the representation of the temperament. According to

1. अथ विभाव इति कस्मात्। उच्यते— विभावो विज्ञानार्थः। विभावः कारणं निमित्तं हेतुरिति पर्यायाः। विभाव्यन्तेऽनेन वागङ्गसत्त्वाभिनया इत्यतो विभावः। यथा विभावितं विज्ञातमित्यनर्थान्तरम्।
अत्र श्लोकः—

बह्वेऽर्था विभाव्यन्ते वागङ्गाभिनयाश्रयाः।

अनेन यस्मात्तेनायं विभाव इति संज्ञितः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 7, verse 4, p. 792.

Abhinavagupta these things are known (vibhāvyate) by them so they are called vibhāva.¹ The vibhāva has two aspects, namely (i) Ālambana (primary sources), and (ii) Uddīpana (the setting). The referent of the emotive situation or the object (viṣaya) of the emotion is called ālambana vibhāva. Uddīpana vibhāva is that which provides support or tend to make the emotive situation more effective. For example, in the drama, Abhijñāna Śākuntalam, the ālambana vibhāvas will be Śākuntalā and Duṣyanta; the uddīpana vibhāvas will be the physical beauty of both characters, the spring flowers, the bees etc. The vibhāvas belong to the characters represented on the stage.

The physical changes which occur on the rise of an emotion as the consequent are called anubhāva. These are different from the consequents of an emotion happened in the real life so they are called anubhāva. The literal meaning of the word anubhāva would be, that which follows the bhāva, the rise of bhāva, or that which comes after the rise of bhāva. On the stage; when these are presented with the help of four kinds of abhinaya (acting) the basic emotion is expressed and known to the spectators.² The anubhāvas intend to illuminate the basic emotion related to the character. When these are acted on the stage by the actor these help the spectators to know the basic emotion of the character.

1. वागादयोऽभिनया येषां स्थायिव्यभिचारिणां ते वागाद्यभिनयसहिता विभाव्यन्ते विशिष्टतया ज्ञायन्ते यैस्ते विभावाः।

— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 7, p. 793.

2. अथानुभाव इति कस्मात्। उच्यते— अनुभाव्यतेऽनेन वागङ्गसत्त्वकृतोऽभिनय इति। अत्र श्लोकः— वागङ्गाभिनयेनेह यतस्त्वर्थोऽनुभाव्यते।

शाखाङ्गोपाङ्गसंयुक्तस्त्वनुभावस्ततः स्मृतः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 7, verse 5, p. 793.

There are two kinds of anubhāva-- (i) voluntary, and (ii) involuntary. The physical changes which occur following the rise of an emotion as the consequent of the will of the person in emotion or which are intended to express willingly, are voluntary anubhāvas, such as the movement of eyes and eyebrows in the situation of love. There are some other changes which occur automatically with the rise of an emotion, without any effort, such as change of the colour of body, horripilation, blush etc. These involuntary anubhāvas can be produced by efforts even in the case there is no such feelings in the heart. But the involuntary anubhāvas are the natural changes and they occur only when the emotions are present in the heart. Hence they can not be produced artificially. Therefore the voluntary anubhāvas are called simply bhāvas but involuntary anubhāvas are called sāttvika bhāvas. The anubhāvas belong to character. The vyabhicārībhāvas are the feelings that accompany the primary emotions of the character. They are liable to change and are not inherent in the character's personality.

These factors when they are presented in drama or poetry and they are experienced by the spectator they are not called as cause, effect and concomitants. The permanent emotion which is presented by the actor can not be said to be the cause of his emotion, as he is not expressing his own personal emotions, and it also can not be said the cause of the emotion experienced by the spectator. It is so because the situation presented is not related either to the actor or to the spectator in the manner it is related to the character presented. For example, the religious character Sītā, the wife of Rāma, can not be held the object of love either by the actor or by the spectator as the religious trust will prevent the rise of such an emotion in both of them. Sītā is the object of love only for Rāma and for others she is the object of respect and piety.

Therefore due to the absence of cause there will not be effect, and due to the absence of the effect other concomitants will become irrelevant. Hence these factors, in Indian aesthetics are not called as cause, effect and invariable concomitants (kāraṇa, kārya and sahakārin). They are termed as vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārībhāva. These are the means or medium through which the bhāvas are expressed by the poet, presented by the actor etc., and known by the spectator. The sthāyībhāva is the central and the most important factor of the aesthetic experience. The other factors, i.e., vibhāva, anubhāva and sañcārins are simply the necessary accompaniments of the aesthetic experience. They play the role of raising sthāyībhāva to prominence. Abhinavagupta has not included vibhāva and anubhāva among the bhāvas but as external element to the bhāvas as medium of the expression of bhāvas.¹ Regarding the presentation of vibhāva and anubhāva Bharata has not given any special instruction. He simply says that this must be learnt from the actual life and must be presented as it occurs in the actual life.² Abhinavagupta says that if in this sense the drama is called imitation then he has no objection.³

Abhinavagupta says that the bhāva of poet (arisen in the mind of poet) is expressed in poetry through the narration of vibhāva, anubhāva and sañcārins. This bhāva is not the personal

1. वयं तु ब्रूमः — भावशब्देन तावच्चित्तवृत्तिविशेषा एव विवक्षिताः। तथा च 'एकोनपञ्चाशता भावैः' इत्यादौ तानेवोपसंहरिष्यति। तेषां तु योग्यतावशाद्यथायोगं स्थायिसंचारिविभावानुभावरूपता संभवति। ये त्वेते ऋतुमाल्यादयो विभावा बाह्याश्च वाष्पप्रभृतयोऽनुभावा एकान्तजडस्वभावाः ते न भावशब्दव्यपदेश्याः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 7, p. 784.

2. लोकस्वभावसंसिद्धा लोकयात्रानुगामिनः।

अनुभावा विभावाश्च ज्ञेयास्त्वभिनये बुधैः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, verse 6, p. 796.

3. यदि त्वेयं मुख्यलौकिककरणानुसारितयाऽनुकरणमित्युच्यते तत्र कश्चिदोषः। स्थिते वस्तुतो भेदे शब्दप्रवृत्तेरविवादास्पदत्वात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 1, p. 126.

feelings of the poet but the generalized bhāva. These bhāvas when presented in drama through the various means of drama and the presentation of vibhāva, anubhāva and sañcārins with the use of acting they pervade the heart of the spectator and it makes the bhāvas of the nature of āsvāda (taste) and the spectator rises above the awareness of time and experience the aesthetic pleasure (rasa).¹ This bhāva (of the poet) comes in expression with the pratibhā (intuitive power) of the poet and is not born from worldly object.² In the context of poet and poetry it is called bhāva and as the object of aesthetic experience it is called rasa as the sole purpose of poetry (kāvyārtha) is to experience the aesthetic pleasure (rasa) and in the context of the spectator's experience also it is called rasa. There are nine sthāyībhāvas and corresponding to each of them there are nine rasas. Thus the Śṛṅgāra (erotic) has the sthāyībhāva rati (delight), the Hāsyā (comic) has the sthāyībhāva hāsa (laughter), the Karuṇa (pathetic) has the sthāyībhāva śoka (sorrow), the Raudra (furious) has the sthāyībhāva krodha (anger), the Vīra (heroic) has the sthāyībhāva utsāha (heroism), the Bhayānaka (terrible) has the sthāyībhāva bhaya (fear), the Bībhatsa (odious) has the sthāyībhāva jugupsā (disgust), the Adbhuta (marvellous) has the sthāyībhāva vismaya (wonder), and the Śānta (quietistic) has the sthāyībhāva śama (serenity). The sthāyībhāvas when they are presented through the

1. विभावेनाहतो योऽर्थः ह्यनुभावैस्तु गम्यते।

वागङ्गसत्त्वाभिनयैः स भाव इति संज्ञितः॥

वागङ्गमुखरागेण सत्त्वेनाभिनयेन च।

कवेरन्तर्गतं भावं भावयन् भाव उच्यते॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 7, verse 1,2, p. 789-799.

2. कवेः वर्णनानिपुणस्य यः अन्तर्गतः अनादिप्राक्तनसंस्कारप्रतिभानमयः न तु लौकिकविषयजः देशकालादिभेदाभावात् साधारणीभावेन आस्वादयोग्यः। — Ibid.

means of acting etc. and are tasted (experienced) by the mind of the spectators not by the organ of taste (tongue), or other sense organs, as it occurs in worldly tasting of fruit etc., it is called *rasa* of the *nāṭya* (drama).¹ Abhinavagupta emphasizes that the aesthetic object is not a physical object and also not experienced by applying sense organs, it is tasted by mind and directly by the consciousness.² *Bhāva*, *Vibhāva* and *anubhāva* all are *jñānasvarūpa* (of the nature of knowledge) and they are not physical object.³ The accumulation of all these, i.e., *bhāva*, *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* etc. is *nāṭya* (drama) and from this there is *rasa*, so the *nāṭya* is *rasa* and he says that the *rasa* is not only in *nāṭya* (drama) but also in poetry which also can be conceived as *pratyakṣakalpa* (similar to perception) as *nāṭya* (drama).⁴

In this way *bhāva* and *rasa* both are taken as the object of aesthetic experience. Now the question arises that from *rasas* *bhāvas* are derived or from *bhāvas* *rasas* are derived. Some scholars hold that they are connected interdependently and thus due to this interdependence of them there is aesthetic experience.⁵

1. भावाभिनयसंबद्धात्स्थायिभावांस्तथा बुधाः।

आस्वादयन्ति मनसा तस्मान्नाट्यरसाः स्मृताः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 33, p. 683.

2. न रसनाव्यापार आस्वादनम्। अपि तु मानस एव। सचात्राविकलोऽस्ति। केवलं लोके रसनाव्यापारानन्तरभावी स प्रसिद्ध इत्युपचार इह दर्शित इति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 683.

3. शुद्धतत्त्वरूपज्ञानस्वभावा अत्र भावाविभावव्यभिचारिणः। अभिनया अनुभावा एव। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 683.

4. नाट्यात्समायूरूपाद्रसाः। यदि वा नाट्यमेव रसाः। रससमुदायो हि नाट्यम्। न नाट्य एव च रसाः। काव्येऽपि नाट्यायमाने एव रसः। काव्यार्थविषये हि प्रत्यक्षकल्पसंवेदनोदये रसोदय इत्युपाध्यायाः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 684.

5. किं रसेभ्यो भावानामभिनवृत्तिरुताहो भावेभ्यो रसानामिति।

केषाञ्चिन्मतं परस्परसम्बन्धादेषामभिनवृत्तिरिति॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 687.

The rasas are expressed by the means of different types of acting so they are known as bhāvas by the dramatists.¹ As the different food items collectively are known as meal so the bhāvas with acting are known as rasas.² Neither rasas are devoid of bhāvas nor the bhāvas are devoid of rasas.³ As in the meal, the grains with association of other elements give taste so the bhāvas and rasas pervade each other and become the object of aesthetic taste.⁴ Rasas and bhāvas are related to each other like the seed of a tree and its fruit.⁵ As the seed lies in the root of the tree so the rasas lie in the root of the poetry or drama. The root is ultimately the consciousness of the poet which is of the nature of rasa (ānanda). From there the poetry is expressed being generalized which pervades the heart of the spectator. The rasa lies in the consciousness of the spectator which is experienced through the knowledge

1. नानाभिनयसम्बद्धान्भावयन्ति रसानिमान्।

यस्मात्तस्मादमी भावा विज्ञेया नाट्योक्तृभिः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 34, p. 688.

2. नानाद्रव्यैर्बहुविधैर्व्यञ्जनं भाव्यते यथा।

एवं भावा भावयन्ति रसानभिनयैः सह। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 35, p. 689.

3. न रसो भावहीनोऽस्ति न भाव रसवर्जितः।

परस्परकृता सिद्धिस्तयोरभिनये भवेत्॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 36, p. 689.

4. व्यञ्जनौषधिसंयोगो यथाऽन्नं स्वादातां नयेत्।

एवं भावा रसाश्चैव भावयन्ति परस्परम्॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 37, p. 690.

5. यथा बीजाद्भवेद वृक्षो वृक्षात्पुष्पं फलं यथा।

तथा मूलं रसाः सर्वे तेभ्यो भावा व्यवस्थिताः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 38, p. 691.

(apoddhāra buddhi) of vibhāva etc.¹



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1. बीजं यथा वृक्षमूलत्वेन स्थितं तथा रसाः। तन्मूलाहि प्रीतिपूर्विका प्रयोजने नाट्ये काव्ये सामाजिकक्षियं च। व्युत्पत्तिरिति त एव च व्याख्यानार्हाः। कविगतसाधारणीभूतसंविन्मूलश्च काव्यपुरस्सरो नटव्यापारः। सैव च संवित्परमार्थतो रसः। सामाजिकस्य च तत्प्रतीत्या वशीकृतस्य पश्चादपोद्धारबुद्ध्या विभावादिप्रतीतिरिति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 691.

Chapter 4

Refutation of dualistic theories of Rasa

Abhinavagupta expounded the nature of Aesthetic object to be *jñānarūpa* (of the form of knowledge). The constituents of aesthetic object, i.e. *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *sañcārī*, are *jñānarūpa* and different from worldly object or physical object. They are the means of the expression of *bhāva*, idea or emotion. These all factors involved in the experience of *Rasa* are *jñānarūpa*. In the epistemology, Tantric Śaivism of Abhinavagupta holds the non-dualistic nature of knowledge. Knowledge is held to be *puruṣatantra* contrary to the views of Advaita-vedānta and others who hold *jñāna vastutantra*. The knowledge is the very nature of the knower. Knowledge and consciousness are synonymous. The knowledge does not depend on the object (*vastu*). The object has no existence independent of knowledge. The object is always known united with the knowledge which is the very nature of the knower. The Tantric Śaivism of Abhinavagupta holds the **unity** of the knower, the knowledge and the known. In the light of non-dualistic philosophy Abhinavagupta can not accept any aesthetic theory which holds the existence of *Rasa* different from the knower, the consciousness. Therefore, Abhinavagupta refuted the theories which held the dualistic characteristic or position of *Rasa* in any form.

In *Abhinavabhāratī* and also in *Dhvanyālokalocana*, Abhinavagupta referred various theories prevailing before him and refuted them. This refutation comes in the context of the

interpretation of the Rasa sūtra (Rasa aphorism) of Bharata who defines Rasa as 'vibhāvānubhāva saṁyogād rasanīṣpattiḥ'.¹ Out of the combination of the determinant, consequent and the concomitants the rasa is born, and Bharata has given the example of the production of six rasas (tastes) from the combination of various food items. He says, 'as taste (rasa) results from the combination of various spices, vegetables and other food items, and as six tastes, (rasas) are produced by the food items such as raw sugar, spices and vegetables, so the permanent mental states, when they are combined with various other mental states attain the nature of rasa'.²

At first Abhinavagupta takes for examination, the theory which holds the rasa a produced entity and existing separately from the spectator. This theory is called utpattivāda and is ascribed to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and Dandin. According to this theory the birth of Rasa takes place when the sthāyībhāva (the permanent mental state) is combined with vibhāva (the determinant), anubhāva (the consequent) and the sañcārins (the concomitants). Rasa is the permanent mental state intensified with the combination of the determinant etc. When it is not intensified with the combination of the determinant etc. it is simply a permanent mental state. There is no fundamental difference between the permanent mental state and the rasa. This rasa is present in both the person reproduced (the character) and in the reproducing actor. It is present in the person reproduced in the primary sense

1. Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 621.

2. को दृष्टान्तः। अत्राह— यथा हि नानाव्यञ्जनौषधि द्रव्यसंयोगाद्रसनिष्पत्तिः तथा नानाभावोपगमाद्रसनिष्पत्तिः। यथा हि— गुडादिभिर्द्रव्यैर्व्यञ्जनैरोषधिभिश्च षाडवादयो रसा निर्वर्त्यन्ते तथा नानाभावोपगता अपि स्थायिनो भावा (शृङ्गारादि) रसत्वमाप्नुवन्तीति।' — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 678.

and in the reproducing actor in the secondary sense by virtue of the capacity of recollection of the similarity of the character.¹

In refuting the views of Lollaṭa Abhinavagupta has referred the arguments advanced by Śaṅkuka against the views of Lollaṭa which are as following :

- (1) The permanent mental states are known only after their combination with the determinants etc. The permanent mental states can not be known without the determinants etc. Which is known by the combination of the determinants etc. is the rasa and not the permanent mental state. Therefore rasa and permanent mental states are different. The permanent mental state can not be said the rasa.²
- (2) The knowledge of the permanent mental states which occurs before the combination of the determinants etc. is their indirect knowledge brought up by the means of mere words; that can not be said rasa. Before the combination of the determinants etc. the status of the permanent mental states can not be said rasa. Because in that state it is not tasted or experienced. And when it is combined with the determinants etc. and experienced then it is rasa and not the permanent mental state. Therefore it is not right to say that the permanent mental state is rasa.³
- (3) If the permanent mental state is held to be rasa before its

1. तेन स्थाय्येव विभावानुभावादिभिरुपचितो रसः। स्थायीत्वमुपचितः। स सोभयोरपि। मुख्यया वृत्त्या रामादावनुकार्ये, अनुकर्तरि अपि च नटे रामादिरूपतानुसन्धानबलादिति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 623.

2. विभावाद्ययोगे स्थायिनो लिङ्गाभावेनावगत्यनुपत्तेः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 624.

3. भावानां पूर्वमभिधेयताप्रसंगात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 624.

combination with the determinants etc. then the definition of rasa given by Bharata becomes redundant as rasa is already there prior to its combination with the determinants etc.¹

(4) Since there are various gradations of the permanent mental states of delight etc. are found, such as strong, stronger, strongest or weak, weaker and weakest, then accordingly there will be infinite gradations of the rasa if the permanent mental state is held to be rasa. But there is no gradation of rasa, so the permanent mental state can not be said rasa.²

(5) Bharata has propounded six varieties of the comic (hāsyā rasa) on the basis of the six qualities of laughter. This division can be the division of the permanent mental state of laughter but not of the comic (hāsyā rasa). There may be subdivisions of the permanent mental state but not of the rasa. Bharata has made this division on the basis of the permanent mental state and not on the basis of the division of rasa. There can be quantitative variations of the permanent mental state but not of the rasa. The six divisions of the laughter are : smita (slight smile), hasita (smile), vihasita (gentle laughter), upahasita (laughter or ridicule), apahasita (vulgar laughter) and atihāsita (excessive laughter).³

(6) If the variations of rasa are held on the basis of the quantitative variation of the permanent mental states then there will be infinite number of permanent mental states and rasas

1. स्थितिदशायां लक्षणान्तरवैयर्थ्यात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 624.

2. मन्दतरतममाध्यस्थ्याद्यानन्त्यापत्तेः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 624.

3. हास्यरसे षोढात्वाभावप्राप्तेः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 624.

in the ten states of love (kāma) propounded by Bharata and thus there will be infinite kinds of one Śṛṅgāra rasa (Erotic). The ten states of kāma (love) are : abhilāṣā (longing), arthacintā (anxiety), anusmṛti (recollection), guṇakīrtana (enumeration of the merits of the beloved), udvega (distress), vilāpa (raving), unmāda (insanity), vyādhi (fever), Jaḍatā (stupor) and maraṇa (death).¹

- (7) The intensified permanent mental states are called rasa but in experience its contrary is found. It is found that the śoka (sorrow) is at first intense and becomes weaker with time. In this way there is no chance for the intensity of sorrow and so there will not be karuṇa (pathetic) rasa.²
- (8) In the same way in the feelings of krodha (anger), utsāha (heroism) and rati (delight) a diminution is seen when the amarṣa (indignation), sthairyā (firmness) and sevā (sexual enjoyment) are found absent.³

In this way after refuting the views of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and Dandin Śāṅkuka presents his own theory. According to him there is no difference between the permanent mental state and rasa. The permanent mental state is rasa. The actor reproduces the permanent mental state of the character and because it is reproduction

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1. कामावस्थासु दशत्वसङ्ख्यरसभावादिप्रसङ्गवत्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 624.
2. विभावाद्ययोगे स्थायिनो लिंगाभावेनावगत्यनुपपत्तेः, भावानां पूर्वमभिधेयताप्रसंगात्, स्थितिदशायां लक्षणान्तरवैयर्थ्यात्, मन्दतरतममाध्यस्थ्याद्यानन्त्यापत्तेः, हास्यरसे षोढात्वाभावप्राप्तेः कामावस्थासु दशस्वसंख्यरसभावादिप्रसंगात्, शोकस्य प्रथमं तीव्रत्वं कालात् तनु-मान्द्यदर्शनं क्रोधौत्साहरतीनां अमर्षस्थैर्यसेवानिपर्यये हासदर्शनमिति विपर्ययस्य दृश्यमानत्वाच्च। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 624.
3. Ibid.

(anukaraṇa) it is called by a different name, rasa.¹ This reproduced permanent mental state is perceived by means of the presentation of the determinants, consequents and the transitory feelings by the effort of the actor. In the form of presentation these are artificial and unreal, as they are the imitation of the permanent mental state of the character and do not belong really to the actor but due to the skillful acting they seem to belong to the actor as lying in him. Śaṅkuka says that the determinants can be known through the power of poetry, the consequents through the skill of the actor and the transitory mental states through the actor's ability to present his own artificial consequents but the permanent mental state can not be known even through the power of poetry. It is known only through inference on the basis of the presentation of the actor. The words like delight and sorrow when they are used in poetry they merely refer them belonging to the expressed thing, they do not produce the knowledge of the feelings or they do not make the hearer to perceive the feelings; the knowledge is brought up only when they are presented in acting. The verbal representation (acting) does not consist merely in words but the effects which the words produce. The gesticular representation (āṅgikābhinaya) does not consist merely in the movement of the limbs but in the effect which this movement produces. Representation (abhinayana) is a power of communication which is different from the power of verbal expression (abhidhā śakti). The permanent mental state, narrated in poetry, therefore, is known only through the representation and not by the

1. तस्मात्, हेतुभिर्विभावाख्यैः कार्यैरनुभावात्मभिः, सहचारिरूपैश्च व्यभिचारिभिः प्रयत्नार्जितया कृत्रिमैरपि तथानभिमन्यमानैः, अनुकर्तृस्थत्वेन लिङ्गबलतः प्रतीयमानः स्थायिभावो मुख्यरामादिगतस्थाय्यनुकरणरूपः। अनुकरणत्वादेव च नामान्तरेण व्यपदिष्टो रसः।

— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 625.

poetry.¹ Therefore, the imitated (represented) permanent mental state is *rasa* and not the permanent mental state. Here a question may be raised that the knowledge gained on the basis of artificial representation of the determinants etc. must be also unreal. In answering this Śaṅkuka says that sometimes causal efficiency (*arthakriyā*) is found even in erroneous cognition. He gives an example of two persons who hold the light to be jewel and run to get it.² According to the analogy there was a jewel kept in a room and its light was seen from a distance and at another place there was a lamp kept and its light was seen similar to the light of jewel from a distance. One person held the light of the jewel to be the jewel and another person held the light of the lamp to be jewel and ran to get the jewel. The knowledge of the jewel of both the persons was erroneous as the light of the jewel is not the jewel itself and the light of the lamp is not the jewel. One gets the jewel and another does not get the jewel. Śaṅkuka further says that the imitated knowledge of the *rasa* is like the knowledge of the horse gained from the painted horse. It is neither true, nor false and nor erroneous. He calls it the knowledge gained from a special kind of inference, *citraturaganyāya* (logic of painted horse). He further says that the knowledge gained by seeing the reproducing actor is none of the following perceptions : 'The actor is really happy', 'Rāma is really that man', 'That man is not happy', 'Is this Rāma or not?', 'This is similar to Rāma' but it is the perception like, 'This

1. विभावा हि काव्यबलानुसन्धेयाः। अनुभावाः शिक्षातः। व्यभिचारिणः कृत्रिमनिजानुभावार्जनबलात्। स्थायी तु काव्यबलादपि नानुसन्धेयः। 'रतिः शोकः इत्यादयो हि शब्दा रत्यादिकमभिधेयी-कुर्वन्त्यभिधानत्वेन न तु वाचिकाभिनयरूपतयाऽवगमयन्ति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 625.

2. अर्थक्रियापि मिथ्याज्ञानदृष्टा—

मणिप्रदीपप्रभयोर्मणिबुद्धयाभिधावतोः।

मिथ्याज्ञानाविशेषोऽपि विशेषोऽर्थक्रियां प्रति॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p.627.

is that Rāma who was happy'. In this perception there is neither doubt, nor truth, nor error. This is not of the notion of 'This' is really that', but of 'This is that'.¹

In the refutation of the theory of Śaṅkuka that 'rasa is imitation of the permanent mental state', Abhinavagupta has presented the arguments advanced by his teacher, Bhaṭṭa Tauta. He says that from what point of view rasa has been said reproduction. Is it (1) from the point of view of the spectator's perception, or (2) from the point of view of the actor, or (3) from the point of view of the critics who analyse the real nature of dramatic presentation, or (4) following the opinion of Bharata himself?² The first alternative is untenable as there is no *pramāṇa* (means of cognition) involved in knowing it as reproduction. For example, in the case of a person drinking some milk it can be said that 'Thus so and so drinks the wine'. In this example the action of milk-drinking may be taken as reproduction of the action of wine-drinking. But in the drama what is it that is perceived on the part of the actor, which might seem to be a reproduction of some feeling, as, for instance, delight? Is it his body, the headwear that crowns it, his horripilations, his faltering words, the raising of his arms, the waving of his hands, his frowns, his expressive glances, etc. These things can not be regarded the reproduction of delight, which is a feeling. These things are insentient and are perceived

1. न चात्र नर्तक एव सुखीनि प्रतिपत्तिः। नाप्ययमेव राम इति। न चाप्ययं न सुखीति। नापि रामः स्याद्वा न वायमिति। नापि तत्सदृश इति। किन्तु सम्यङ्मिथ्यासंशय-सादृश्य प्रतीतिभ्यो विलक्षणा चित्रतुरगादिन्यायेन, यः सुखी रामः असावयमिति प्रतीतिरस्तीति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 627.
2. तदिदमन्तस्तत्त्वशून्यं न विमर्दक्षममित्युपाध्यायाः। तथाहि— अनुकरणरूपो रस इति यदुच्यते तत्किं सामाजिकप्रतीत्यभिप्रायेण, किं वा वस्तुवृत्तविवेचक— व्याख्यातृबुद्धिसमवलम्बनेन यथाहुः— 'व्याख्यातारः खल्वेव विवेचयन्ति' इति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 629.

by different sense organs and they have different substrata, therefore they are unlike feelings which is an activity of consciousness. Further, knowledge of a reproduction presupposes the perception of both of the original and of the copy. In the case of drama the spectator has ever not perceived the delight of the character, say, Rāma. Thus the possibility that the actor is reproducing the character, Rāma, can not be accepted.¹

It may be said that the feeling of the actor is perceived by the spectator as the reproduction of delight which is the erotic *rasa*. Then the question will arise in what form it is perceived? If it is said that the actor's feeling appears to the spectator in the form of the cause, such as women, effects, such as expressive glances, concomitant elements, such as contentment as it occurs in the perception of a feeling in the worldly life. But in this case the feeling of the actor would be perceived in the form of delight, not in the form of the reproduction of delight.² If it is said that the determinants, etc., are real in the character but unreal in the actor. But, even if these determinants, etc., are not the real causes, effects, and concomitant elements of the feeling of the actor and

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1. 'यथा 'एवमसौ सुरां पिबति' इति सुरापानानुकरणत्वेन पयःपानं प्रत्यक्षावलोकितं प्रतिभाति। इह च नटगतं किं तदुपलब्धं यदनुकरणतया भातीति चिन्त्यम्। तच्छरीरं, तन्निष्ठं प्रतिशीर्षकादि, रोमञ्चकाद्गदिकादि, भुजाक्षेपादि, अंगवलनप्रभृति, भ्रूक्षेपादि, कटाक्षादिकं, च न रतेश्चित्तवृत्तिरूपतयानुकारत्वेन कस्यचित्प्रतिभाति। जडत्वेन भिन्नाधिकरणत्वेन च ततोऽतिवैलक्षण्यात्। मुख्यामुख्यावलोकने च तदनुकरणप्रतिभासः। न च रामगतां रतिमुपलब्धपूर्विणः केचित्। एतेन रामानुकारो नट इत्यपि निरस्तः प्रवादः।' — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 629-30.
 2. अथ नटगता चित्तवृत्तिरेव प्रतिपन्ना सती रत्यनुकारः शृङ्गार इत्युच्यते, तत्रापि किमात्मकत्वेन सा प्रतीयत इति चिन्त्यम्। ननु प्रमदादिभिः कारणैः कटाक्षादिभिः कार्यैः धृत्यादिभिश्च सहचारिभिर्लिङ्गभूतैर्या लौकिकी कार्यरूपा कारणरूपा सहचारिरूपा च चित्तवृत्तिः प्रतीतियोग्या तदात्मकत्वेन सा नटे चित्तवृत्तिः प्रतिभाति। हन्त तर्हि रत्याकारेणैव सा प्रतिपन्नेति दूरे रत्यनुकरणतावाचोयुक्तिः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 631.

are thus artificial, then the question arises that they are perceived by the spectator as artificial or real. If they are perceived as artificial then how it would be possible to perceive the feeling of delight by the artificial means.¹ If it is said that for this reason what is perceived is not delight but the reproduction of delight then it will prove the foolishness of the arguer. Bhaṭṭa Tauta says that an unusual thing can be derived from an unusual thing only by the person who possesses the knowledge of the relation of those things, the ignorant of that relation can not infer that. He has given the example of a particular scorpion born out of cow-dung. Normally the cause of the birth of a scorpion is another scorpion. So generally the cause of that particular scorpion, born out of cow-dung, will be held by the general people as the normal scorpion; only the experienced person will derive its cause as cow-dung. So the inference of a normal scorpion from that particular scorpion is false. He says that when the cognition of the logical reason -- e.g., smoke -- is erroneous, the inference based on this apparent logical reason will itself be invalid. In the case of a veil of mist-- something which reproduces smoke and is understood as a reproduction -- does not legitimate the inference of a heap of red roses, something that reproduces fire.²

1. ननु ते विभावादयोऽनुकार्ये पारमार्थिकाः । इह त्वनुकर्तरि न तथेति विशेषः । अस्त्वेवम् । किन्तु ते हि विभावादयोऽतत्कारणातत्कार्यातत्सहचाररूपा अपि काव्यशिक्षादिबलोपकल्पिताः कृत्रिमाः सन्तः किं कृत्रिमत्वेन सामाजिकैः गृह्यन्ते न वा । यदि गृह्यन्ते तदा तैः कथं स्तेरवगतिः ।
— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 631.
2. 'नन्वत एव तत्प्रतीयमानं रत्यनुकरणबुद्धेः कारणम् । कारणान्तरप्रभवेऽपि हि कार्येषु सुशिक्षितेन तथाज्ञाने स्वस्वन्तरस्यानुमानं तावद्युक्तम् । असुशिक्षितेन तु तस्यैव प्रसिद्धस्य कारणस्य । यथा वृश्चिकविशेषाद्रोमयस्यैवानुमानम् । वृश्चिकस्यैव तत्परं मिथ्याज्ञानम् । यत्रापि लिंगज्ञानं मिथ्या तत्रापि न तदाभासानुमानमयुक्तम् । न हि बाष्पाद् धूमत्वेन ज्ञातादनुकारप्रतिभासमानादपि लिङ्गात्तदनुकारानुमानमयुक्तम् । धूमानुकारत्वेन हि ज्ञायमानाग्नीहारात्राग्न्यनुकारजपा- पुष्पप्रतीतिर्दृष्टा ।
— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 632-33.

It may be said that the actor seems to be enraged even if he is not really enraged. In this case it is said that he is like someone who is enraged. But this resemblance is due to some physical signs, such as contraction of the eyebrows, etc., in the same way as there is resemblance between a real ox and another ox-like species which is due to the shape of the muzzle etc. But in the case of the reproduction of feelings no such physical signs may be taken as the reproduction because feeling is not a physical element. Again, it is said that the spectators are not aware of any resemblance of the feeling of the character and the actor. The spectators are aware of the fact only that the actor is immersed in a state of consciousness in which they themselves are also immersed. Therefore the thesis that what appears is a reproduction is not tenable.¹

Further, if it is said that the audience has the perception, "That is Rāma", is not correct. Because if this perception, devoid of doubt during the drama is not contradicted by another cognition which contradicts it, why is it not a true cognition? And, if it is contradicted, why is it not a false cognition? Even if no contradicting cognition does appear, it will be always a form of false cognition as the aesthetic experience is held to be imitation, so it is unreal. In this way the theory of Śaṅkuka that *rasa* is 'an experience wherein, being it devoid of any contradictory idea, one cannot distinguish any error', is not correct. Further, the perception, 'This is Rāma' is found in other actors also so it can be said that the spectators can have only the universal aspect of Rāma (the

1. नन्वक्रुद्धोऽपि नटः क्रुद्ध इव भाति। सत्यम्। क्रुद्धेन सदृशः। सादृश्यं च भ्रुकुट्यादिभिः। गौरिव गवयो मुखादिभिरिति। नैतावताऽनुकारः कश्चित्। न चापि सामाजिकानां सादृश्यमतिरस्ति। सामाजिकानां च न भावशून्या नर्तके प्रतिपत्तिरित्युच्यते। अथ च तदनुकारप्रतिभास इति रिक्ता वाचोयुक्तिः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 633-34.

character) not the particular aspect connected with a particular actor.¹ Bhaṭṭa Tauta says that the assertion of Śaṅkuka that 'The determinants can be realized through the power of poetry' can not be explained successfully. The actor can not have the perception, 'Sītā is the woman I love', as taking Sītā a part of his own real life. The actor does not identify or unite the determinants taken from poetry with the things which are causes in his own real life. He does not have the perception that they form part of his real life. Therefore, it can not be established from the point of view of the spectators that Rasa is a reproduction of the permanent mental state.²

Discussing the theory of Śaṅkuka from the point of view of the actor Bhaṭṭa Tauta says that the actor does not have the notion, 'I am reproducing Rāma or his feeling.' Reproduction of someone who has never been perceived is not possible, as every imitation presupposes a previous perception. If the term reproduction is taken in the sense of after-production (paścātakaraṇa) then such reproduction would be extended to ordinary life also. Again, it may be said that the actor does not reproduce a particular person and he has the notion, 'I am reproducing the sorrow of some noble person (uttamaprakṛti). In this case the question arises that by

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1. यच्चोक्तं रामोऽयमित्यस्ति प्रतिपत्तिः। तदपि तदात्वे वा संततं वा यदि तदात्वे इति निश्चितं तदुत्तरकालभाविबाधकवैधुर्याभावे कथं न तत्त्वज्ञानं स्यात्। बाधकसद्भावे वा कथं न मिथ्याज्ञानम्। वास्तवेद्ध च वृत्ते बाधकानुदयेऽपि मिथ्याज्ञानमेव स्यात्। तेन विरुद्धसंभेदादित्यसत्। नर्तकान्तरेऽपि च रामोऽयमिति प्रतिपत्तिरस्ति। ततश्च रामत्वं सामान्यरूपमित्यायातम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 634.
 2. यच्चोच्यते विभावाः काव्यादनुसन्धीयन्ते इति तदपि न विद्रमः। न हि "ममेयं सीता काचित्" इति स्वात्मीयते प्रतिपत्तिर्नटस्य। अथ सामाजिकस्य तथा प्रतीतियोग्याः क्रियन्त इत्येतदेवानुसन्धानमुच्यते, तर्हि स्थायिनि सुतरामनुसन्धानं स्यात्। तस्यैव हि मुख्यत्वेन 'स्वस्मिन्नयम्' इति सामाजिकानां प्रतिपत्तिः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 635.

what this reproduction is performed? The reproduction can not be performed by sorrow as it is absent in the actor. It can not be performed by the tear etc. as these are insentient while sorrow being a feeling is of the nature of consciousness. Further it may be said that in the actor occurs the notion, 'I am reproducing the consequents of the sorrow of a noble person'. But in this case the question will arise, of which noble person? If it is said, 'any noble person', then it will be impossible because no person can be brought into the mind without a definite idea (viśiṣṭa). If it is said that the actor is reproducing a person who should have wept in the manner he weeps then Bhaṭṭa Tauta says that in this case the personality of the actor (svātma) will intervene and thus the relation of reproduced and reproducing will not be established.¹ In fact, the actor has no consciousness that he is imitating. At the time of performance the actor is conscious of his skill of acting, his memory of his own determinants, and the consent of his heart aroused by the generality of the feelings and he displays the corresponding consequents. He has no consciousness of reproducing any one.²

1. न चापि नटस्येत्यं प्रतिपत्तिः 'रामं तच्चित्तवृत्तिं वाऽनुकरोमि' इति। सदृशकरणं हि तावदनुकरण-
मनुपलब्धप्रकृतिना न शक्यं कर्तुम्। अथ पश्चात्करणमनुकरणं तल्लोकेऽप्यनुकरणात्मतातिप्रसक्ता।
अथ च नियतस्य कस्यचिदनकारः अपि तूत्तम—प्रकृतेः शोकमनुकरोति, तर्हि केनेति चिन्त्यम्।
न तावच्छोकेन, तस्य तदभावात्। न चाश्रुपातादिना शोकस्यानुकारः, तद्वैलक्षण्यादित्युक्तम्।
इयन्तु स्यात्— उत्तमप्रकृतेर्ये शोकानुभावाः ताननुकरोमीति। तत्रापि कस्योत्तमप्रकृतेः। यस्य
कस्यचिदिति चेत्सोऽपि विशिष्टतां विना कथं बुद्धावारोपयितुं शक्यः। य एवं रोदित्यिति
चेत्स्वात्मापि मध्ये नटस्यानुप्रविष्ट इति गलितोऽनुकार्यानुकर्तृभावः। — Abh., N.S. Part
1, Ch. 6, p. 636-37.

2. किञ्च नटः शिक्षावशात्स्वभावस्मरणाच्चित्तवृत्तिसाधारणीभावेन हृदयसंवादात्केवलमनु-
भावान्प्रदर्शयन् काव्यमुपचितकाकुप्रभृत्युपस्कारेण पठंश्चेष्ट इत्येतावन्मात्रेऽस्य प्रतीतिर्नत्वनुकारं
वेदयते। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 637-38.

From the point of view of the critic who analyses the nature of things (vastuvṛtta) Bhaṭṭa Tauta says that the thing which is perceived latter can not be said the nature of thing. Therefore from the point of view of the critic also the theory of reproduction is not tenable.¹

From the point of view of Bharata's assertion Bhaṭṭa Tauta says that Bharata never said, in any passage of Nāṭya śāstra that Rasa is the reproduction of a permanent mental state. Such assertion is not found even made indirectly.²

Further Bhaṭṭa Tauta says that the theory of reproduction can also not be taken in the sense of a person in love who wears the clothes of his beloved and behaves like her.³

Further, Bhaṭṭa Tauta refutes the theory of Śaṅkuka which holds that the permanent mental state is known through a specific kind of inference and hence it is said by a different name of Rasa. Śaṅkuka says that painting of a cow is painted by orpiment etc. and the mixture of the colours appears as cow. Bhaṭṭa Tauta says that if this appearance is taken in the sense of manifestation (abhivyaja) then it is incorrect. We can not say that the colour etc. manifest a real cow like a cow manifested in the light of a lamp. What the colour etc. do is to produce a particular aggregate similar to a cow. Actually what is seen in this case is simply the aggregate of colour etc. and not the real cow. In the case of the

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1. नापि वस्तुवृत्तानुसारेण तदनुकारत्वम्। अनुसंवेद्यमानस्य वस्तुवृत्तत्वानपपत्तेः। यच्च वस्तुवृत्तं तददर्शयिष्यामः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 638.
 2. न च मुनिवचनमेवंविधमस्ति क्वचित् “स्थाय्यनुकरणं रसा” इति। नापि लिङ्गमत्रार्थे मुनेरुपलभ्यते। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 638.
 3. तदनुकारेऽपि च क्व नामान्तरं कान्तावेषगत्यनुकरणादौ। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 638.

aggregate of the determinants etc. there is nothing to be perceived like this. Therefore it is not correct to say that Rasa is the reproduction of permanent mental state.¹

After refuting the views of Śaṅkuka Abhinavagupta refutes the theory based on the philosophy of Sāṃkhya. Sāṃkhya is a dualistic system. It holds the separate eternal existence of puruṣa (consciousness) and prakṛti (matter). This system also maintains the plurality of puruṣa (soul). According to this system puruṣa is of the nature of consciousness but it is inactive. The whole activity is ascribed to prakṛti which is constituted by three elements, guṇas, viz, sattva, raja and tama. Sattva has the characteristic of pleasure, the raja has the characteristic of pain and tama has the characteristic of stupor. The world and everything in it is the modification of prakṛti and since prakṛti is triguṇātma, made of three guṇas, so everything of the world is of the nature of pleasure, pain and stupor. According to Sāṃkhya the three guṇas of prakṛti are never in equipose in the course of creation; sometimes the sattva dominates, then there is the feeling of pleasure and when the raja or tama dominates then there is the feeling of pain. These feelings too, are actually, experienced not by the puruṣa but by the ego (ahaṅkāra), the product (evolute) of prakṛti with whom the puruṣa has identified himself due to ignorance. Abhinavagupta says that the theory based on the philosophy of Sāṃkhya, holds that rasa is the product of external object and the

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1. यच्चोच्यते वर्णकैर्हरितालादिभिः संयुज्यमान एव गौरित्यादि। तत्र यद्यभिव्यज्यमान इत्यर्थोऽभिप्रेत-
स्तदसत्। न हि सिन्दूरादिभिः पारमार्थिको गौरभिव्यज्यते प्रदीपादिभिरिव। किन्तु तत्सदृशः
समूहविशेषो निर्वर्त्यते। अत एव हि सिन्दूरादयो गवावयवसन्निवेशसदृशेन सन्निवेशविशेषेणावस्थिता
गोसदृश इति प्रतिभासस्य विषयः। नैवं विभावादिसमूहो रतिसदृशताप्रतिपत्तिग्राह्यः। तस्माद्
'भवानुकरणं 'रसः' इत्यसत्। —Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 639.

external object is made up of those elements which produce pleasure and pain. This theory holds that the permanent mental state is born out of the combination of the determinant etc. which are external to the spectator. There is given an example of food. In this example, in the combination, the determinants take the place of petals and the consequents and the transitory mental states play the role of that which garnishes it. Out of this combination the permanent mental states are born, and these are of the nature of pleasure and pain internally.¹ The supporters of this view interpret the assertion of Bharata metaphorically which is mentioned as 'we shall bring to the state of Rasa the permanent mental states'. Abhinavagupta says that to interpret the assertion of Bharata metaphorically itself shows the awareness of the contradiction with Bharata's assertion. The followers of Sāṃkhya hold the permanent mental states to be born from the external object whereas Bharata has asserted the existence of the permanent mental states prior to raise it to the status of Rasa. Therefore this theory does not need further argument for its refutation.² Besides it if rasa is taken of the nature of pleasure, pain and stupor then in one knowledge, of a rasa, there will be mixture of three different types of perception and hence it will be difficult to grasp.

After refuting the views of the followers of Sāṃkhya Abhinavagupta presents the views of Bhaṭṭanāyaka. At first

1. येन त्वभ्यधायि— सुखदुःखजननशक्तियुक्ता विषयसामग्री बाह्यैव। साङ्ख्यदृशासुखदुःखस्वभावो रसः। तस्यां च सामग्र्यां दलस्थानीया बिभावाः। संस्कारकाः अनुभावव्यभिचारिणः। स्थायिनस्तु तत्सामग्रीजन्या आन्तराः सुखदुःखस्वभावा इति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 640.
2. तेन स्थायिभावान् रसत्वमुपनेष्यामः' इत्यादावुपचारमंगीकुर्वता ग्रन्थविरोधं स्वयमेव बुध्यमानेन दूषणा विष्करणमौर्ख्यात् प्रामाणिको जनः परिरक्षित इति किमस्योच्यते। यत्वन्यत् प्रतीतिवैषम्यप्रसंगादि तत् कियदत्रोच्यताम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 640.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka refutes the theories which are called *pratītivāda*, *utpattivāda* and *abhivyaktivāda*.¹ According to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka the theory of *pratītivāda*, that *rasa* appears, is not acceptable, for if it were perceived by the spectator as present in himself then in the case of the perception of the pathetic *rasa* he would experience pain² and consequently he would not go to see drama again. Such perception is not logical because *Sītā*, the religious or historical character, can not be taken as determinant by the spectator. The spectators are not themselves *Rāma* so they can not take *Sītā* as their wife. So it can not be said that when the spectator see the actor as *Sītā* on the stage, this determinant arouse the consciousness of his own beloved in his mind; as there is no identification of the image of *Sītā* with his own beloved.³ The spectator can not take the representation of the deities in a general sense as their actions like ocean crossing etc. being extra-ordinary. Thus being devoid of the sense of generalization it can not be the case of the perception of *rasa*.⁴ In this it can not be said that in presentation of such things what occurs is simply the memory of *Rāma*, as endowed of such and such qualities as the spectator has never perceived such things previously.⁵ If it is supposed that *Rāma* is perceived through verbal testimony, inference etc. then also there can not be any occurrence of *rasa* in the spectators in the same

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1. भट्टनायकस्त्वाह— रसो न प्रतीयते। नोत्पद्यते। नाभिव्यज्यते। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 641.
 2. स्वगतत्वेन हि प्रतीतौ करुणे दुःखित्वं स्यात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 641.
 3. न च सा प्रतीतिर्युक्ता। सीतादेरविभावत्वात् स्वकान्तास्मृत्यसंवेदनात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 641.
 4. देवतादौ साधारणीकरणायोग्यत्वात्। समुद्रलङ्घनादेरसाधारण्यात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 641.
 5. न च तद्वतो रामस्य स्मृतिः। अनुपलब्धत्वात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 642.

way as there is no arousal of rasa by seeing a thing directly. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says that when in worldly life a pair of lovers are seen united together, the mind of the seer becomes followed with the feelings like shame, disgust, envy etc., and certainly it can not be said that the seer in such a scene is in a state of experiencing Rasa. If it is supposed that Rasa is perceived as present in a third person (paragatatvena) then in such case the spectator will be in a state of indifference as he has nothing to do with that which is not related to him. Therefore Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says that it is not possible to hold that Rasa can be perceived whether it be by direct perception or by memory.¹ He further says that the same errors are found in the theory of utpattivāda which holds that Rasa is produced. In refuting the theory of abhivyaktivāda, which is held by Abhinavagupta, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says that if it is supposed that Rasa first pre-exists in a potential form (śaktirūpatvena) and it is manifested later, then the determinants must necessarily illuminate it in succession, little by little. In this theory another problem will also arise that whether rasa is manifested as present in the spectator himself or present in a third person. The objections raised against the theory of Utpattivāda and pratītivāda will also be applied against this theory.² After refuting these three theories Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka presents his own theory. He holds a specific function of the word besides abhidhā, the power of denotation to which he calls the power of bhāvanā, that may be rendered in English as the power of revelation. He says that this power of the

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1. न च शब्दानुमानादिभ्यः तत्प्रतीतौ लोकस्य सरसताऽपि युक्ता, प्रत्यक्षादिव नायकयुगलकावभासे हि प्रत्युत लज्जाजुगुप्सास्पृहादिस्वोचितचित्तवृत्त्यन्तरोदयव्यग्रतयाकाशरसत्वमथापि स्यात्। तत्र प्रतीतिरनुभवस्मृत्यादिरूपा रसस्य युक्ता। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 642.
 2. उत्पत्तावपि तुल्यमेतददूषणम्। शक्तिरूपत्वेन पूर्वं स्थितस्य पश्चादभिव्यक्तौ विषयार्जनतारतम्यापत्तिः। स्वगतत्वपरगतत्वादि च पूर्ववद्विकल्पम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 643.

word removes the thick layer of mental stupor (moha) which has occupied our consciousness. This mental stupor is characterized in poetry by the absence of defects (doṣa) and the presence of qualities (guṇa) and ornaments (alaṅkāra), and in drama it is characterized by the four kinds of presentation (acting). When the mental stupor (moha) is removed the determinants etc. become generalized and then the rasa revealed by this power is enjoyed (bhuj) with a kind of enjoyment (bhoga) which is different from direct experience, memory etc. This enjoyment, due to the different forms of contact between sattva and raja and tama, is consisting of the states of fluidity (druti), enlargement (vistāra) and expansion (vikāsa), is of the nature of resting (viśrānti) on one's own consciousness (samvit), which due to the dominant state of sattva, is pervaded by beatitude (ānanda) and light (prakāśa). This beatitude, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says, is similar to the tasting (āsvāda) of the supreme Brahman.¹

After presenting the views of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Abhinavagupta refutes the views of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. He says that the refutation of the theory of utpattivāda (productive theory) propounded by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa done by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is acceptable to him also, as he can not accept this theory.² The other views of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, regarding pratitivāda and abhivyaktivāda are not acceptable to him. He says that any kind of enjoyment

1. तस्मात्काव्ये दोषाभावगुणालङ्कारमयत्वलक्षणेन, नाट्ये चतुर्विधाभिनयरूपेण निविडनिजमोहसङ्कट-कारिणा विभावादिसाधारणीकरणात्मनाऽभिधातोऽद्वितीयेनांशेन भावकत्वव्यापारेण भाव्यमानो रसोऽनुभवस्मृत्यादिविलक्षणेन रजस्तमोऽनुवेधवैचित्र्यवलाद् द्रुतिविस्तारविकासलक्षणेन सत्त्वोद्रेक-प्रकाशानन्दमयनिजसंविद्विश्रान्तिलक्षणेन परब्रह्मास्वादसविधेन भोगेन परं भुज्यत इति।

— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 644-645.

2. तत्र पूर्वपक्षोऽयं भट्टोलोल्लटपूक्षानभ्युपगमादेव नाभ्युपगत इति तद्दूषणमनुत्थानोपहतमेव।

— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 645.

which is distinguishable from perception can not be found in the world. If it is tasting (*rasanā*) then this too is a perception.¹ It is called by another name, name of *rasanā*, only on account of the particular means (*upāya*) by which it is held to come into existence. This is similar to which happens in the case of direct perception (*darśana*), reasoning (*anumāna*), the revealed word (*śruti*), analogy (*upamiti*), intuition (*pratibhāna*) etc. which are called by different names on the account of the different types of means by which they are gained.² If it is not admitted that Rasa is produced or manifested, then it is to be concluded that it is either eternal or non-existent, as there seems no third possibility of it. Again, Abhinavagupta says that the existence of an unperceived thing can not be affirmed.³ It may be said from the side of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka that the perception of Rasa is just what they call the power of bringing about enjoyment (*bhogikarāṇa*) which consists of the states of fluiding etc. But the problem arises that it can not consist only in the three states. There may exist many forms of perception as there are many kinds of rasa. There can not be only three states of the combination of *sattva*, *raja* and *tama*, as one predominates one time and another at different time. In this way it is absurd to limit the forms of taste (*rasanā*) to only three.⁴

1. प्रतीत्यादिव्यतिरिक्तश्च संसारे को भोग इति न विद्मः। रसनेति चेत्। सापि प्रतिपत्तिरेव।
— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 645.
2. केवलमुपायवैलक्षण्यान्नामान्तरं प्रतिपद्यतां दर्शनानुमितिश्चतुपमितिप्रतिभानादिनामान्तरवत्।
— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 646.
3. निष्पादनाभिव्यक्तिद्वयानुभ्युपगमे च नित्यो वा (सद्वा) असद्वा रस इति न तृतीया गतिः स्यात्।
च चाप्रतीतं वस्त्वस्ति व्यवहारे योग्यम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 646.
4. अथोच्यते— तस्य प्रतीतिरिति भोगीकरणम्। तच्च रसनाख्यं द्रुत्यादिस्वरूपम्। तदस्तु। तथाहि न तावन्मात्रम्। यावन्तो हि रसास्तावन्त एव रसनात्मानः प्रतीतयो भोगीकरणस्वभावाः। सत्त्वादिगुणानां चाङ्गाङ्गिवैचित्र्यमनन्तं कल्प्यमिति कर्तृत्वे, नेयता। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 646.

Further Abhinavagupta says that if the word revelation (bhāvanā) is taken in the sense that the poem becomes the object of a perception, which consists of a tasting made up of gustation, and which is generated by the determinants, etc., it may be accepted. He says that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka apparently considers Rasa as manifested and in this way the theory of manifestation is rather maintained than refuted. It is said that Rasa is the aim of poetry (kāvyārtha) and it is an experience (anubhāva) consisting of a tasting and is the object of cognition by a not ordinary form of consciousness (paraśamvitti) manifested (vyaṅgya) by the union of the determinants etc.¹

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1. यत् “काव्येन भाव्यन्ते रसाः” इत्युच्यते तत्र विभावादिजनितचर्वणात्मकास्वादरूप-
प्रत्ययगोचरतापादनमेव यदि भावनं तदभ्युपगम्यत एव।

यत्तुक्तम् —

“संवेदनाख्यया व्यङ्ग्यः परसंवित्तिगोचरः।

आस्वादानात्माऽनुभवो रसः काव्यार्थ उच्यते॥” इति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 647.

Chapter 5

Abhinavagupta's Concept of Rasa : The Aesthetic Experience

Abhinavagupta expounded his concept of Rasa in the light of his non-dualistic philosophy of Tantric Śaivism. In the Tantric philosophy of Śaivism the only reality is consciousness. This philosophy does not admit the existence of matter (jaḍa) as independent and ultimate real. The matter is held to be the appearance or ābhāsa of the Consciousness. The consciousness in its ultimate nature is one, universal, non-dual and the only reality. The Consciousness is active by its nature and the activity of Consciousness is called spanda, vimarśa, svāntarya and ānanda (bliss). This activity is of the nature of knowledge. In this system of philosophy knowledge itself is an activity. Knowledge and consciousness are taken synonymous and it is said that due to the activity of knowledge, or in other words, due to the activity of consciousness the consciousness is called consciousness otherwise it would be not different from matter (jaḍa). The Consciousness out of its freedom wills to manifest itself in the form of many subjects (knowers) and objects (known). It is the will, which is called the power of will (icchā śakti), which is manifested in the form of objects. This process of objectifying is the process of creation. In the ultimate state of consciousness there is no order or succession (krama). It is conscious of itself or it knows itself, that is self-consciousness (ahaṃ vimarśa) is there and it is called akrama (without succession). With the manifestation of the power

of will the krama, succession begins within the nature of consciousness. This krama begins objectified in the form of time, kalā, tattva and bhuvana. In this way the creation of the world is nothing other than the process of objectification. This process of objectification begins as its subtlest form of time and becomes more grossified upto the state of the five gross elements (bhūta tattvas) which are the grossest form of object. In this process of manifestation, although the knower is also manifested in plurality, but the knower retains its original status, i.e., its perfection, its universal character, in other words, in ābhāsavāda the knower is not ābhāsa. It remains universal or one and at the same time it becomes many. According to Tantric Śaivism the universal consciousness out of its freedom or play (līlā) assumes the form of limited ego (paśutva)¹ and becomes defiled with the impurities of māyā etc. In that state also its ultimate nature is not changed, it is only obscured and it finds itself limited. When this obstruction is removed its perfection is manifested. So the obstruction is bondage and its removal is liberation. On the basis of this Tantric philosophy some points, relevant to the discussion of Aesthetic experience may be concluded, as follows :

1. Ultimately there is no difference between the knower and the known.
2. Ultimately the object of knowledge being the appearance (ābhāsa) of the knower is not different from the knower.
3. Ultimately in the process of knowing the knower knows itself or knows its very nature.
4. Ultimately the object is of the nature of knowledge and being so it is the very nature of the knower.

1. स्वेच्छया गृहीत पशुभावः।

5. In the state of individuality when the consciousness is obscured with impurities, the object seems to be different from the knower.
6. Therefore when the individuality or the obstruction of impurities is removed the object will be experienced as the very nature of the knower.
7. Since the consciousness, when it is not obstructed with impurities, is of the nature of bliss, the experience in that state will be of the nature of bliss.

When we ponder over the concept of Rasa propounded by Abhinavagupta, the above mentioned philosophical derivations are found in the form of aesthetic concepts. Observing the aesthetic thoughts of Abhinavagupta we can find that he is not simply discussing the aesthetics or poetics rather he is establishing his Tantric philosophy of Śaivism in the disguise of aesthetics. This becomes more evident in his discussion of holding the concept of only one Rasa and that the Śānta (quietistic) rasa. He holds that during the course of aesthetic experience the knots of 'I' or egoity is temporarily removed, the knower gets rest in its own self, that is its universal state and the object of experience also appears in its universal form. In the universal state there is complete unity between the subject and object. Therefore in this state, the consciousness, temporarily experiences itself. Thus the Rasa, or the aesthetic experience is nothing other than the experience of the consciousness itself. Since consciousness in its universal state is one so rasa also can be only one. And Śānta (perfection) is the nature of consciousness so there is only Śānta rasa. Since consciousness is bliss, so the rasa is also bliss, in other words, it is pleasant, not of the nature of pain or suffering. And finally, Abhinavagupta rejects the objective status of Rasa. He says that

when it is said that a particular rasa is experienced, it is only *aupacārika* (formal). Rasa is not experienced as object but it is the subject itself which is experienced.

Before expounding his theory of Rasa, Abhinavagupta says that the existence (concept) of Rasa is already established by the *Āgamas* (*āmnāya*), he has to do nothing new in this context. The *Āgamas* and *Vedās* (*āmnāya*) are *svataḥ prāmāṇya* (self valid) and *svataḥ prakāśa* (self illuminating). Therefore the use of reasoning advanced against them will be proved futile. But still there is use of reasoning. In the process of the criticism and refutation of the views the true nature of thing becomes more clear or more clearly manifested. In the beginning it seems that there is no base for the construction of a thing but when any how a foundation is laid down then the bridges and houses can be constructed very easily upon this. Similarly on the basis of the views propounded earlier, the intellect of the scholar rises above and above and becomes capable to see the real nature of the thing. In this process the previously established theories serve the work of ladders. Although after reaching the top the ladders in itself become irrelevant but it is due to them that the man could reach at the top. Abhinavagupta says that although he has refuted the earlier established theories of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and others but there is no intention of rejecting them or proving them as absurd. There are many approaches to the Reality and those theories are also different approaches viewed from different point of views. Therefore he says that actually he has not refuted those theories but he has refined them. The refinement of the already established theory is equally significant to the establishment of the original

theory.¹

He says that the Rasa has already been defined by Bharata, as, 'kāvyārthān bhāvayanti, that the meaning or essence of the poetry is revealed, and 'tatkāvyārthorasah' that meaning or essence of the poetry is Rasa.² He gives examples of arthavāda-sentences of Veda, like, 'satramāsat' (they lay by night) and 'tāmagnau prādāt' (he gave it to the fire). He says that after the first perception of the literal sense of these statements there occurs a second perception of sense in the qualified (adhikārī) person which replaces the first sense and there arises a sense of motivation that he must also participate in the yajñās with similar devotion and commitment. This arousal of the perception of the second sense is called in Mīmāṃsā school as bhāvanā (propulsion), command (vidhi) and order (niyoga) etc. He says that the

1. आमनायसिद्धे किमपूर्वमेतत् संविद्विकासेऽधिगतागमित्वम्।

इत्थं स्वयंग्राह्यमहर्हहेतुद्वन्द्वेन किं दूषयिता न लोकः॥

ऊर्ध्वोर्ध्वमारुह्य यदर्थतत्त्वं धीः पश्यति श्रान्तिमवेदयन्ती।

अलं तदाद्यैः परिकल्पितां विवेकसोपानपरम्पराणाम्॥

चित्रं निरालम्बनमेव मन्ये प्रमेयसिद्धौ प्रथमावतारम्।

तन्मार्गलाभे सति सेतुबन्धपुरप्रतिष्ठादि न विस्मयाय॥

तस्मात् सतामत्र न दूषितानि मतानि तान्येव तु शोधितानि।

पूर्वप्रतिष्ठापितयोजनासु मूलप्रतिष्ठाफलमामनन्ति॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 649-651.

2. तर्ह्युच्यतां परिशुद्ध तत्त्वम्। उक्तमेव मुनिना न त्वपूर्वं किञ्चित्। तथाह्याह— 'काव्यार्थान् भावयन्ति' इति (ना.शा., अ.7) तत्काव्यार्थो रसः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 652.

similar thing happens in the case of poetry.¹ After hearing the poetry a perception other than the literal meaning of the poetry also occurs in the qualified person (adhikāri) of the poetry whose heart is pure and who possesses the power of intuition (pratibhāna).² Abhinavagupta refers a verse from Kālidāsa's drama, namely, Abhijñāna Śākuntalam, which narrates a fearful deer fleeing after being pursued by the hunter, the hero. He says that after the perception of the literal sense of the verse there arises a mental perception in the mind of the reader of the poem, which is of the nature of direct experience and which eliminates the temporal (of time) distinction etc. assumed by the verse.³ In this perception the deer is devoid of particularity (viśeṣa) and the actor, who plays the role of the deer, who shows himself to be in fear is unreal (not really in fear).⁴ Thus what appears there is simply fear, fear in itself, unconditioned by time, space etc. This perception of fear is different from the ordinary perception of fear like, 'I am afraid, he is afraid, my enemy is afraid, my friend is

1. यथा हि 'सत्रमासत्' 'तामग्नौ प्रादात्' इत्यादावर्थितादिलक्षितस्याधिकारिणः प्रतिपत्तिमात्रादति-
तीव्रप्ररोचितात् प्रथमप्रवृत्तादनन्तरमधिकैव उपात्तकालतिरस्कारेणैव 'आसे' 'प्रददानि' इत्यादिरूपा
संक्रमणादिस्वभावा यथादर्शनं प्रतिभा, भावना-विधि-नियोगादिभावाभिर्व्यवहृता प्रतिपत्तिः।
तथैव काव्यात्मकादपि शब्दादधिकारिणोऽधिकास्ति प्रतिपत्तिः।' — Abh., N.S. Part 1,
Ch. 6, p. 652.
2. अधिकारी चात्र विमलप्रतिभानशालिहृदयः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 653.
3. 'तस्य च "ग्रीवाभङ्गाभिरामम्।' इति (शाकु- अ. 1) "उमापि नीलालक" इति (कुमा-
3.62) 'हरस्तु किञ्चित्' (कुमा- 3.67) इत्यादिवाक्येभ्यो वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तेरनन्तरं मानसी
साक्षात्कारात्मिकाऽपहसिततत्तत्वाक्योपात्तकालादिविभागा तावत्प्रतीतिरुपजायते। — Abh.,
N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 653.
4. तस्यां च यो मृगपोतकादिर्भाति तस्य विशेषरूपत्वाभावाद्धीत इति त्रासकस्यापारमार्थिकत्वाद्भयमेव
परं देशकालाद्यनालिङ्गितम्।' — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 653.

afraid or anybody is afraid. These ordinary (worldly) types of perceptions give rise to the birth of pleasure and pain. Therefore these are obstacles in the process of aesthetic experience. In the case of the perception of the fear experienced through the representation of the deer, the perception is devoid of obstacles, it seems to enter directly into the heart of the spectator and it seems dancing before the eyes of the spectator. Abhinavagupta says that this fear is the terrible (bhayānaka) rasa. In such a fear, one's own self is neither completely immersed (tiraskṛ) nor in a state of particular emergence (ullikh) and the same thing occurs with the other selves.¹ Here the state of generality is not limited (parimita) but extended (vitata) like the notion of the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between smoke and fire or in between trembling and fear. The process of generalization occurs through the determinants etc. of the drama. In this process of generalization the real limiting causes, which work according to the rule of causation, time, space and the particularity of the subject are eliminated and the limiting causes narrated in the poetry are also eliminated. This state nourishes the generality and form a uniformity (ekaghanatā) among the perceptions of all the spectators. All the spectators experience the same rasa because they all have the same latent impressions of that permanent mental state in their mind. This state of consciousness which is devoid of obstacles is

1. तत एव 'भीतोऽहं भीतोऽयं शत्रुर्वयस्यो मध्यस्थो वा' इत्यादिप्रत्ययेभ्यो दुःखसुखादिकृत-
हानादिबुध्यन्तरोदयनियमवत् तथा विघ्नबहुलेभ्यो विलक्षणं निर्विघ्नप्रतीतिग्राह्यं साक्षादिव हृदये
निविशमानं चक्षुषोरिव विपरिवर्तमानं भयं भयानको रसः। तथाविधे हि भये नात्माऽत्यन्तं
तिरस्कृतो न विशेषत उल्लिखितः। एवं परोऽपि। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6,
p. 654.

called *camatkāra*.¹ Abhinavagupta says that the physical sign of this state are trembling, horripilation, joyful notions of limbs (*ullukasana*) etc. which are also *camatkāra*. *Camatkāra* is uninterrupted immersion in a state of enjoyment (*bhogāveśa*). The word *camatkāra* means the action of tasting subject or the enjoying subject who is immersed in the *spanda* (spontaneous activity) of a marvellous enjoyment (*adbhuta bhoga*). It may be said to be a form of mental cognition, of the nature of direct experience (*mānasādhyavasāya*), or of the form of imagination (*saṁkalpa*) or of the form of remembrance which is totally different from its ordinary nature.² Abhinavagupta refers a beautiful verse from *Abhijñāna Śākuntalam*,³ which may be rendered as 'Sometimes, being in the state of happiness, a person becomes uneasy of mind on seeing beautiful objects and hearing sweet musics. It is not memory which is understood by the logician as it has not been

1. तत एव न परिमितमेव साधारण्यम्। अपि तु विततम्। व्याप्तिग्रह इव धूमान्योः। भयकम्पयोरेव वा। तदत्र साक्षात्कारायमाणत्वे परिपोषिका नटादिसामग्री। यस्यां वस्तुसतां काव्यार्पितानां च देशकालप्रमात्रादीनां नियमहेतूनामन्योन्यप्रतिबन्धबलादत्यन्तमपसरणे स एव साधारणीभावः सुतरां पुष्यति। अत एव सर्वसामाजिकानामेकघनतयैव प्रतिपत्तिः सुतरां रसपरिपोषाय। सर्वेषामनादिवासनाचित्रीकृतचेतसां वासनासंवादात्। सा चाविघ्ना संवित् चमत्कार स्तज्जोऽपि कम्पपुलकोल्लुकसनादिर्विकार चमत्कारः।' — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 655.
2. तथा हि— स चातृप्तिव्यतिरेकेणाविच्छिन्नो भोगावेश इत्युच्यते। भुञ्जानस्वाद्भुतभोगस्पन्दाविष्टस्य च मनःकरणं चमत्कार इति। स च साक्षात्कारस्वभावो मानसोऽध्यवसायो वा सङ्कल्पो वा स्मृतिर्वा तथात्वेन स्फुरन्नस्तु। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 655.
3. यदाह—

“रम्याणि वीक्ष्य मधुरांश्च निशम्य शब्दान्

पर्युत्सुको भवति यत्सुखितोऽपि जन्तुः।

तच्चेतसा स्मरति नूनमबोधपूर्वं

भावस्थिराणि जननान्तरसौहृदानि॥”

(शाकु. 5) इत्यादि। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 656.

perceived earlier.¹ Certainly, he remembers in his soul, vaguely, associations of earlier births deeply implanted in him. In this case, it is a form of perception in which what appears is just a feeling, say delight,² which is of the nature of tasting. As this perception is not conditioned by any specification, it becomes the object of a relish. Abhinavagupta says that such perception is neither a form of ordinary cognition, nor it is erroneous, nor ineffable, nor like ordinary perception, nor it is of the form of super-imposition.³ Here refining the theory of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Abhinavagupta says that we can say it a **state of intensification** taking in the sense that it is not limited by space etc. Refining the theory of Śaṅkuka he says that it may be said reproduction taking in the sense that it is a production which repeats the feelings. Taking it in the sense of the doctrine of vijñānavāda it may be said that it is a combination of different elements. From whichever point of view it is examined, Abhinavagupta says that it is simply a mental state, which is the matter of cognition on the part of a perception without obstacles and is of the nature of tasting.⁴

Defining Rasa, Abhinavagupta says that it is that reality (artha) which makes, in the mind of the spectator a matter of a gustation consisting of a form of consciousness free of obstacles and different from ordinary experiences, with the proper combina-

1. 'अत्रहि स्मरतीति या स्मृतिरूपदर्शिता सा न तार्किकप्रसिद्धा। पूर्वमेतत्स्यार्थस्याननुभूतत्वात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 656.
2. अपि तु प्रतिभानापरपर्यायसाक्षात्कारस्वभावेयमिति। सर्वथा तावदेषास्ति प्रतीतिरास्वादात्मा यस्यां रतिरेव भाति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 657.
3. तत एव विशेषान्तरानुपहितत्वात्सा रसनीया सती न लौकिकी न मिथ्या नानिर्वाच्या न लौकिकतुल्या न तदारोपादिरूपा। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 657.
4. तथैव चोपचयावस्थासु देशाद्यनियन्त्रणादनुकारोऽप्यस्तु। भावानुगामितया करणात् विषयसामग्रयापि भवतु विज्ञानवादावलम्बनात्। सर्वथा रसनात्मकवीतविघ्नप्रतीतिग्राह्यो भाव एव रसः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 657.

tion of the determinants, the consequents and the transitory feelings. The *rasa* is different from permanent mental state as it is of the nature of tasting. It is also not an objective thing (*siddhasvabhāva*). It lasts as long as the gustation persists. The determinants etc. are not the causes as they are understood in the worldly life. The function of the determinants etc. is just to colour the consciousness of the spectator and this function is called *vibhāvanā*, *anubhāvanā* etc. so they are not called with the names of cause, effects etc. The function of the determinants etc. lies in the fact that they make expressive the latent traces of the feelings in the form of tasting and not in the form of an object (*siddhasvabhāva*).¹

It can not be maintained, as Śāṅkuka held, that *Rasa* is simply a permanent mental state which is brought to our knowledge by the determinants etc., and because this is the object of a relish so it is called by a different name of *Rasa*. Abhinavagupta says that if this be the case why should *Rasa* not exist also in everyday life? For if an unreal thing is capable of being the object of relish, a real thing has enough reason to have the capability of it. Thus it can be said that the permanent mental state can be known through inference but we can not say this about *rasa*. This is the reason that Bharata did not mention the word 'permanent mental state' in his *rasa sūtra*. Abhinavagupta says that on the

1. तत्र लोकव्यवहारे कार्यकारणसहचारात्मकलिङ्गदर्शने स्थाय्यात्मपरचितवृत्त्यनुमानाभ्यास- पाटवादधुना तैरेवोद्यानकटाक्षवीक्षादिभिलौकिकी कारणत्वादिभुवमतिक्रान्तैर्विभावानानुभावनासमुपसृज्य कत्वमात्रप्राणैः, अत एव प्राच्यकारणादिरूपसंस्कारोपजीवनरख्यापनाय अलौकिकविभावादिनामधेयव्यपदेश्य- भावाध्यायेऽपि वक्ष्यमाणस्वरूपभेदैर्गुणप्रधानतापर्यायेण सामाजिकधियि सम्यग्योगं सम्बन्धमैकाग्र्यं वाऽऽसादितवद्भिरलौकिकनिर्विघ्नसंवेदनात्मक- चर्वणागोचरतां नीतोऽर्थश्चर्व्यमाणतैक सारो न तु सिद्धस्वभावः, तात्कालिक एव न तु चर्वणातिरिक्तकालावलम्बो स्थायिविलक्षण एव रसः।'

contrary, the mention of it would have been a source of difficulties. He further says that such expressions as the permanent mental state becomes Rasa,' are due to correspondence (aucitya) only.¹ This correspondence lies in the fact that the very same things which were previously considered to be causes, etc., related to a given permanent mental state, now serve to realize the gustation and so they are presented in the form of determinants etc. The tasting of Rasa is different from memory, inference and any form of ordinary cognition.² He says that a person, who possesses the latent impressions of the ordinary inferential processes, does not apprehend a young woman, etc., as if he were indifferent to her, but, by virtue of his sensibility, which is the consent of heart, he rather apprehends her, without going through the processes of memory, inference etc., as if merged in a gustation, he identifies himself with young woman etc, which may be said, the sprout of the tasting of Rasa,³ about to appear in all its fullness. This gustation is not already born in the past, from some other means of knowledge so that it may be called memory. It is also not the fruit of the operation of ordinary means of

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1. न तु यथा शङ्कुकादिभिरभ्यधीयत "स्थाय्येव विभावादि प्रत्याय्यो रस्यमानत्वाद्रसे उच्यते।" इति। एवं हि लौकिकोऽपि किं न रसः। असतोऽपि हि यत्र रसनीयता स्यात्तत्र वस्तुसतः कथं न भविष्यति। तेन स्थायिप्रतीतिरनुमितिरूपा प्राच्या (प्या)। न रसः। अतएव सूत्रे स्थायिग्रहणं न कृतम्। तत्प्रत्युत शल्यभूतं स्यात्। केवलमौचित्यादेवमुच्यते स्थायी रसीभूत इति। औचित्यं तु तत्स्थायिगतत्वेन कारणादितया प्रसिद्धानामधुना चर्वणोपयोगितया विभावादित्वावलम्बनात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 669.
 2. तदाहि लौकिकचित्तवृत्त्यनुमाने का रसता। तेनालौकिकचमत्कारात्मा रसास्वादः स्मृत्यनुमान-लौकिकसंवेदनविलक्षण एव। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 669.
 3. तथाहि— लौकिकेनानुमानेन संस्कृतः प्रमदादिना न ताटस्थ्येन प्रतिपद्यते। अपि तु हृदय-संवादात्मकसहृदयत्वबलात्पूर्णाभविष्यद्रसास्वादाङ्कुरीभावेनानुमानस्मृत्यादिसोपानम (ना) रुद्धैव तन्मयीभावोचितचर्वणाप्राणता। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 668.

cognition. It is aroused solely by the combination of the determinants etc. which are not of ordinary nature.¹

Explaining the characteristics of aesthetic gustation, Abhinavagupta says that this gustation is distinguished from the perception of ordinary sentiments of delight etc. which are aroused by the ordinary means of cognition, as direct perception, inference, the verbal testimony, analogy etc. It is distinguished from the cognition without active participation (taṭasha) of the thoughts of others, which is said about the direct perception of the yogins. It is different from the compact (ekaghana) experience of one's own beatitude, which is said to have by the yogins of higher orders. He says that these three forms of cognition are deprived of beauty (saundarya) as they are subjected to the appearance of obstacles and are at the mercy of the object.² In the aesthetic gustation, on the contrary, there is absence of sensations of pleasure and pain etc, as it is the case of entering into our own self (svātmānupraveśa) which is the immersion (āveśa) in the latent traces of our own sentiments of delight etc., reawakened by the corresponding determinants etc. which are generalized and so there is not possibility of obstacles.³

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1. न च सा चर्वणा प्राङ्भानान्तरात् येनाधुना स्मृतिः स्यात्। न चात्र लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणव्यापारः। किन्त्वलौकिकविभावादिसंयोगबलोपनतैवेयं चर्वणा। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 670.
 2. सा च प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमोपमानादिलौकिकप्रमाणजनितरत्याद्यवबोधतः तथा योगिप्रत्यक्षजनित-तटस्थपरसंवित्तिज्ञानात्मकसकलवैषयिकोपरागशून्यशुद्धपरयोगितस्वात्मानन्दैकधनानुभावाच्च विशिष्यते। एतेषां यथायोगमर्जनादिविघ्नान्तरोदयात्ताटस्थ्यास्फुटत्वं विषयावेशवैवश्य-कृतसौन्दर्यविरहात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 670.
 3. अत्र तु स्वात्मैकगतत्वनियमासंभवात् न विषयावेशवैवश्यम् स्वानुप्रवेशात्परगतत्वनियमाभावात् न ताटस्थ्यास्फुटत्वे, तद्विभावादिसाधारण्यवशसंप्रबुद्धोचितनिजरत्यादिवासनावेशवशाच्च न विघ्नान्तरादीनां सम्भव इत्यवोचाम् बहुशः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 670.

Since the determinants etc. are generalized they are not the causes of the production (niṣṭatti) of Rasa. If this were the case Rasa should continue to exist even when they no longer are perceived under cognition. Due to this reason the determinants etc. can not be causes of the cognition (jñapti) of the Rasa, if they were, they would have to be included among the means of knowledge (pramāṇa), because Rasa is not an objective thing (siddha) which could serve the function of a knowable object. The determinants etc. do not designate any ordinary thing, but they do what serves to realize the gustation (carvaṇopayogī). It is not found elsewhere in the world; it is found only in poetry. He says that the taste of pānaka does not occur in its constituting elements as in molasses, peppers etc, so the rasa does not occur in the determinants etc.¹ Then the question arises that Rasa will become aprameya, not an object. He says that really the rasa has not the nature of an object of cognition, etc. It is solely of the nature of tasting. He says that the use of the word rasanisṭatti, the production of rasa, in the rasa sūtra of Bharata, must be understood in the sense of a production not of the Rasa, but of the tasting which refers to the Rasa (tadviṣayarasanā). This tasting is neither the fruit of the operation of the means of cognition (pramāṇa) nor of the means of action. The tasting is self proved, it does not need any proof for its validity. It is ascertained by the consciousness itself. This is no doubt a form of cognition but it is different from any other form of cognition obtained from any other ordinary

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1. अत एव विभावादयो न निष्पत्तिहेतवो रसस्य। तद्विधापगमेऽपि रससंभवप्रसङ्गात्। नापि ज्ञप्तिहेतवः येन प्रमाणमध्ये पतेयुः। सिद्धस्य कस्यचित्प्रमेयभूतस्य रसस्याभावात्। किं तर्ह्येतद्धि विभावादय इति। अलौकिक एवायं चर्वणोपयोगी विभावादिव्यवहारः। कान्यत्रेत्यं दृष्टमिति चेद्भूषणमेतदस्माकमलौकिकत्वसिद्धौ। पानकरसास्वादोऽपि किं गुडमरीचादिषु दृष्ट इति समानमेतत्।— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 671.

perception, such as sense perception, inference, memory etc. Abhinavagupta says that what is produced by the combination of the determinants etc. is tasting (*rasanā*) and the *rasa* is the non-ordinary (*alaukika*) reality.¹

Abhinavagupta has summarized the process of aesthetic experience in the *Abhinavabhāratī*. He says that in the drama the identity of the actor is concealed by the use of crowns, headwears, dresses etc. So that there is not the awareness of the real identity of the actor. The knowledge of the character, say of *Rāma*, which is brought up by the power of poetry also does not persist. The spectator takes the actor not as the real acting person but as the character, *Rāma*, as 'this is *Rāma*'. But at the same time due to the previous matured impressions latent in his consciousness, the spectator does not take him as real *Rāma*. In this way the spectator takes it neither as the real *Rāma* or as the real actor (the real acting person). The character and the actor both are generalized in the perception of the spectator. In this way the spectator comes out of the time and space of both the character and the actor. The spectator has seen in his worldly life the external sign or the physical effects like horripilation, blush etc., occurring in the persons who are actually in the situation of love. So when he observes these things represented on the stage through the determinants and the consequents etc., he becomes able to know the

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1. नन्वेवं रसोऽप्रमेयः स्यात् एवं। युक्तं भवितुमर्हति। रस्यतैकप्राणो ह्यसौ न प्रमेयादिस्वभावः। तर्हि सूत्रे निष्पत्तिरिति कथम्। नेयं रसस्य। अपितु तद्विषयरसनायाः। तन्निष्पत्त्या तु यदि तदेकाग्रजीवितस्य रसस्य निष्पत्तिरुच्यते न कश्चिदत्र दोषः। सा च रसना न प्रमाणव्यापारी न कारकव्यापारः। स्वयं तु नाप्रामाणिकः। स्वसंवेदनसिद्धत्वात्। रसना च बोधरूपैक। किन्तु बोधान्तरेभ्यो लौकिकेभ्यो विलक्षणैव। उपायानां विभावादीनां लौकिकवैलक्षण्यात्। तेन विभावादिसंयोगाद्ररसना यतो निष्पद्यतेऽतस्तथाविधरसनागोचरो लोकोत्तरोऽर्थो रस इति तात्पर्यं सूत्रम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 671.

permanent mental state being represented in the drama. Since the spectator has also the latent impression of that permanent mental state in his own consciousness, he actively participates in this knowledge of the permanent mental state; in other words, he is not indifferent to it. This knowledge is not caused by a definite cause, by a real situation, as he has not seen the real couple in the state of love-making, therefore there is no possibility for the rise of desire to get anything or achieve any thing, for instance, any sensual pleasure, from it, which Abhinavagupta holds a kind of obstacle (arjanādi) in the process of aesthetic experience. It is not caused by any definite person so that it may be taken as mine or other; in other words, the mental state perceived here can not be taken as related to the spectator himself or to the other. Therefore it is free from the rise of the senses of shame, envy, pleasure and pain which is taken as an obstacle in the process of the aesthetic experience. It is taken as generalized feeling. Since this generalized feeling is united with the consciousness, therefore the generalized permanent mental state being experienced by the consciousness is the Erotic Rasa.¹

The process of generalization is brought up by the determinants etc. Sometimes it is brought up by the predominance of the determinants, sometimes it is brought up by the predominance of the consequents and sometimes by the predominance of the

1. अयमत्र संक्षेपः। मुकुटप्रतिशीर्षकादिना तावन्नटबुद्धिराच्छाद्यते। गाढप्राक्तनसंवित्संस्काराच्च काव्यबलानीयमानाणि न तत्र रामधीर्विश्राम्यति। अत एवोभयदेशकालत्यागः। रोमाञ्चादयश्च लौकिका अपि भूयसा रतिप्रतीतिकारितया दृष्टास्तेन ते देशकालनियमेन तत्र रतिं गमयन्ति। यस्यां स्वात्मापि तद्वासनावत्वादानुप्रविष्टः अत न तदस्थतया रत्यवगमः। न च नियतकारणतया, येनार्जनाभिषङ्गादिसम्भावना। न च नियतपरात्मैकगततया, येन दुःखद्वेषाद्युदयः। तेन साधारणीभूता सन्तानवृत्तेरेकस्या एव वा संविदो गोचरभूता रतिः शृङ्गारः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 672.

transitory feelings which occurs due to the predominance of their determinant or consequent which manifests them. Abhinavagupta has given the examples of all these types in the Abhinavabhāratī. He says that where all these are equally predominating there is the climax of the experience of Rasa.¹

Abhinavagupta further says that the persons who are sahr̥daya, who have the poetic sense gained by the practice of poetry or by virtue gained in the earlier births, can be able to have the direct perception of the meaning of poetry, the rasa, even through the implicit determinants etc.² For them poetry is the medium of aesthetic experience; they do not need its dramatic representation. The dramatic representation is needed for them who do not possess the poetic sense and are called ah̥r̥daya.



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1. एवं द्वयप्राधान्ये चोदाहार्यम्। किन्तु समप्राधान्य एव रसास्वादस्योत्कर्षः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 675.
 2. तेन ये काव्याभ्यासप्राक्तनपुण्यादिहेतुबलादिभिः सहृदयास्तेषां परिमितविभावाद्युन्मीलनेऽपि परिस्फुट एव साक्षात्कारकल्पः काव्यार्थः स्फुरति। अत एव तेषां काव्यमेव प्रीतिव्युत्पत्तिकृदनपेक्षितनाट्यमपि। तेषामपि तु नाट्यं “निपतिताः स्फुरिताः शशिरश्मयः” इति न्यायेन सुतरां निर्मलीकरणम्। अहृदयानां च तदेव नैर्मल्यार्थायि। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 676.

Chapter 6

Concept of Vighna (obstacles) of the Aesthetic experience

Consciousness in its original or universal nature is perfect, bliss and *jñānarūpa* (of the nature of knowledge). When it assumes the state of limited individual soul then its nature becomes fettered with impurities (*mala*) which are called as *āṇava mala*, *māyīya mala* and *kārma mala*. Due to this obstruction of impurities the power of consciousness becomes limited. The power of knowledge is not manifested in its fullness. Hence the consciousness, in this state, normally, can not have direct experience. In this state it depends upon sense organs and other means of knowledge like sense perception, inference etc. when the impurities fettered on the consciousness are removed by *Śaktipāta* or *upāyas* prescribed in Tantricism, the consciousness manifests itself perfectly and it experiences directly. In the same way Abhinavagupta propounds that the permanent mental state, which is of the nature of *cittavṛtti*, and which is united with the consciousness from beginningless time in its generalized or universal form, is experienced directly by the consciousness when there is no obstacle (*vighna*) in the process of experience, that experience is *rasa*.¹ In the world, this consciousness (*saṃvit*) free from all kinds of *vighna* (obstacles) is called as *camatkāra*, *nirveśa*, (immersion),

1. सर्वथा रसनात्मकवीतविघ्नप्रतीतिग्राह्यो भाव एव रसः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 657.

rasanā (relish), āsvādana (tasting), bhoga (enjoyment), samāpatti (accomplishment), laya (lysis), viśrānti (rest) etc.¹

According to Abhinavagupta the vighnas (obstacles) of aesthetic experience are of seven types²-- (1) pratipattāvayogyatā sambhāvanā virahonāma (the unsuitability or the lack of verisimilitude), (2) svagataparatagatatvaniyamena deśakālaviśeṣāvesaḥ (the immersion in temporal and spatial determinations), (3) nija-sukhādivivaśībhāvaḥ (being at the mercy of one's own sensations of pleasure etc.), (4) pratītyupāyavaikalyam (absence of the proper means of perception), (5) sphuṭatvābhāvaḥ (absence of clarity in perception or lack of evidence), (6) apradhānatā (lack of some predominant factor), (7) saṁśaya-yogaśca (presence of doubt).

Explaining the first type of obstacle, Abhinavagupta says that if a person can not understand the object of his perception, as he takes it impossible to be, he can not be certain about his knowledge, then he can not get rest in his consciousness as he can not obviously immerse his consciousness in the object presented before him. In such case he will not hold the existence of rasa and in this situation there is no question of the experience of the rasa.³ The means for the elimination of this type of obstacle is the consent of heart. When the ordinary events are represented in drama the consent of the heart of the spectator takes place easily

1. तथाहि— लोके सकलविघ्नविनिर्मुक्ता संवित्तिरेव चमत्कारनिर्वेशरसनास्वादनभोगसमापत्तिलय-विश्रान्त्यादिशब्दैरभिधीयते। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 658.
2. विघ्नाश्चास्यां प्रतिपत्तावयोग्यताः, संभावनाविरहो नाम, स्वगतपरगतत्वनियमेन देशकालविशेषा-वेशो, निजसुखादिविवशीभावः, प्रतीत्युपायवैकल्यं, स्फुटत्वाभावो, अप्रधानता, संशययोगश्च। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 658.
3. तथाहि— संवेद्यमसम्भावयमानः संवेद्ये संविदं विनिवेशयितुमेव यो न शक्नोति का तत्र विश्रान्तिरिति प्रथमो विघ्नः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 658.

as he takes it possible. But when an extra-ordinary event like ocean-crossing is represented, as it is held an impossible action the heart of the spectator will not respond to it. In this situation if such extra-ordinary events are to be represented, it must be associated with extra-ordinary character like Rāma etc., whose names are famous for such extra-ordinary works. The belief that Rāma etc. are extra-ordinary persons and they can perform extra-ordinary actions is deeply rooted in the heart of spectators since very ancient time as they have learnt such things from scriptures etc. So the spectators can take such events possible when represented on stage and they can have a mental perception of it and can experience the aesthetic taste. Abhinavagupta says that the purpose of drama is learning (vyutpatti) and teaching (upadeśa) also. Therefore when teaching about the deeds for transcending the ordinary life has to be represented it must be associated with the extra-ordinary persons famous for such things, as with Rāma, not with Rāvaṇa who is famous for his ill deeds.¹

Explaining the second kind of obstacle Abhinavagupta says that the experience of the personal feelings of pleasure and pain inherent in the spectator is a principal obstacle in the tasting of aesthetic experience. If the spectator experiences his own personal feelings then he would be worried about the finishing or destruction of the pleasure and about the preservation of that pleasure. He will desire to procure other similar sensations. He will desire to get rid of them. He will desire to give them open expression, or he will hide them. In this way there will arise many such types of feelings along with his personal feelings. If the spectator per-

1. तदपसारणे हृदयसंवादो लोकसामान्यवस्तुविषयः। अलोकसामान्येषु तु चेष्टितेष्वखण्डित-
प्रसिद्धिजनितगाढारूढप्रत्ययप्रसरकारी प्रख्यातरामादिनामधेयपरिग्रहश्चोपायः। अत एव निस्सामान्यो-
त्कर्षोपदेशव्युत्पत्तिप्रयोजने नाटकादौ प्रख्यातवस्तुविषयत्वादि नियमेन निरूप्यते न तु प्रहसनादौ।
— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 659.

ceives feelings of pleasure and pain as inherent exclusively in other persons then there also will arise other forms of sensations in the spectator such as pleasure, pain, mental stupor, indifference etc, which will make the spectator unable to taste the aesthetic experience.¹

For the elimination of this type of obstacle the means is the theatrical conventions (nātyadharmī) which include, the zones (kaksyā) dividing the pavilion (maṇḍapa), the stage (raṅgapīṭha), the various types of women's dance, the various dialects (bhāṣā), the dresses, headwears of the actors and the introduction (prastāvanā) and the initial rituals (pūrvarāṅga) etc. The presence of these elements in drama eliminates the perception of a kind that this particular person in this particular place, at this particular moment, feels pain, pleasure etc. These means eliminate the knowledge of real identity of the actor and also the knowledge of the character which is superimposed upon the actor. Abhinavagupta says that all these theatrical conventions were adopted by Bharata to bring up generality to promote the gustation of Rasa.²

1. स्वैकगतानां च सुखदुःखसंविदामास्वादे यथासम्भवं तदपगमभीरुतया वा, तत्परिरक्षाव्यग्रतया वा, तत्सदृशार्जिजीविषया वा, तज्जिहासया वा, तत्प्रचिख्यापयिषया वा, तद्गोपनेच्छया वा, प्रकारान्तरेण वा, संवेदनान्तरसमुद्गम एव परमो विघ्नः।

परगतत्वनियमभाजामपि सुखदुःखानां संवेदने नियमेन स्वात्मनि सुखदुःखमोहमाध्यस्थ्यादिसंविदन्तरोद्गमनसम्भावनावश्यंभावी विघ्नः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 659.

2. तदपाकरणे 'कार्यो नातिप्रसंगोऽत्र' पूर्वरङ्गविधिं प्रति (ना. शा. 5-162) इत्यादिना पूर्वरङ्गनिगूहनेन, 'नटी विदूषको वापि' इति लक्षितप्रस्तावनावलोकनेन च यो नटरूपताधिगमस्तत्पुरस्सरः प्रतिशीर्षकादिना तत्प्रच्छादनप्रकारोऽभ्युपायः, अलौकिकभाषादि-भेद-लास्यांग-रंगपीठ-मण्डपगतकक्ष्यादिपरिग्रहनाट्यधर्मिसहितः। तस्मिन् हि सति, 'तस्यैव त्रैवै, तस्यैव, च सुखदुःखं वा इति भवति न वा भवति। प्रतीतिस्वरूपस्य निह्नवात्। रूपान्तरस्य चारोपितस्य प्रतिभासंविद्धिश्रान्तिवैकल्येन स्वरूपे विश्रान्त्यभावात्। सत्ये तदीयरूपनिह्नवमात्रे एव पर्यवसानात्। ततः स एष स्वपरनियतताविघ्नापसरणप्रकारो व्याख्यातः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 660.

The third obstacle in the aesthetic experience is the state of the spectator in which he is overpowered by his own pleasure etc. If his mind is preoccupied by his own pleasure etc. then he can not concentrate his mind upon any other thing. Hence without having the capacity of concentration he can not experience the aesthetic taste as his mind will not rest upon anything. For the elimination of this type of obstacle various means are prescribed to be used in drama at suitable times and places, such as music, vocal and instrumental, decorated halls, accomplish courtesans etc. These dramatic means help the spectator to be free from his own mental pre-occupations, tension etc, and his heart becomes responsive to the theme represented on the stage. Abhinavagupta says that the inclusion of music, dance, song etc. in drama which are to be enjoyed by all the spectators possess such a charming power that even an unaesthetic person (ahrdaya) reaches limpidity of heart and becomes 'possessed of heart' (sahrdaya).¹

The fourth obstacle in the process of aesthetic experience is the absence of the means of perception. It is said that if the means of perception are absent then there will be no perception and the question of aesthetic enjoyment will not arise.²

The fifth obstacle in the process of aesthetic experience is the less clear or less authoritative status of the means of perception. The knowledge which is gained through inference and verbal testimony are valid but it still requires evidence of direct perception to be believable finally. There remains no doubt about the

1. निजसुखादिविवशीभूतश्च कथं वस्त्वन्तरे संविदं विश्रामयेदिति तत्प्रत्यूहव्यपोहनाय प्रतिपदार्थनिष्ठ-साधारण्यमहिम्ना सकलभोग्यत्वसहिष्णुभिः, शब्दादिविषयमयीभिः, आतोद्य-गान-विचित्रमण्डपपद-विदग्धगणिकादिभिरुपरंजनं समाश्रितं, येनाहृदयोऽपि हृदयवैमल्यप्राप्त्या सहृदयीक्रियते।
— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 660-661.

2. किञ्च प्रतीत्युपायानामभावे कथं प्रतीतिभावः ? — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch.6, p.661.

knowledge which is gained through direct experience. Abhinavagupta has quoted the statement of Vātsyāyana, as, 'all valid knowledge depends upon direct experience.' It is the established fact that a thing which is directly perceived can not be proved to be otherwise by use of any inference or verbal testimony. When a burning stick is swiftly revolved there seems to be a circle of fire (alātacakra). This is not a real circle of fire but at first site it looks to be real. When it is closely perceived it is disproved to be real. Therefore to remove such types of obstacles (fourth and fifth kinds) there are initiated in drama -- the four modes of representation (acting-abhinaya), furnished with the styles (vṛtti), the local usages (pravṛtti), and the realistic representation (lokadharmī). Representation is a different operation from that of inference and verbal testimony, due to it there is, in drama, pratyakṣakalpa sākṣātkāra, the experience similar to perception.¹

The sixth obstacle of the process of aesthetic experience is to hold a thing of predominating nature which is virtually not of that status.

In poetry one may take guṇa (style) as predominating over alaṅkāra (figures of speech) and rasa, or one may take alaṅkāra as predominating over guṇa and rasa. In the drama one may hold vibhāva (determinants) predominating over anubhāvas

1. अस्फुटप्रतीतिकारिशब्दलिंगसम्भवेऽपि न प्रतीतिर्विश्राम्यति, स्फुटप्रतीतिरूपप्रत्यक्षोचित-
प्रत्ययसाक्षात्त्वाद्।

यथाहुः — 'सर्वा चेयं प्रमितिः प्रत्यक्षपरा' इति। (न्याय सू. भा. 1-3)

स्वसाक्षात्कारकृते आगमानुमानशतैरप्यन्याभावस्यासंवेदात्। अलातचक्रादौ साक्षात्कारेणैव बलवता तत्प्रतीत्यवधारणादिति लौकिकस्तावदयं क्रमः। तस्मात् तदुभयविघ्नविघाते, अभिनया लोकधर्मिवृत्तिप्रवृत्त्युपस्कृताः समभिषिच्यन्ते। अभिनयनं हि शब्दलिंगव्यापारविसदृशमेव प्रत्यक्षव्यापारकल्पमिति निश्चेष्टव्यम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 662-663.

(consequents) and *sthāyībhāvas* (permanent mental states) or another a thing over others. In this way if the virtual predominating (*pradhāna*) thing is taken as of secondary status (*apradhāna*) is a kind of obstacle in the process of aesthetic experience. Explaining this type of obstacle Abhinavagupta says that the consciousness of any person can not rest on a thing of a secondary order. He further says that such a perception will not get rest in itself and will run towards the predominant thing. The determinants and consequents are of insentient nature so they can not be the predominant things. The transitory feeling is in not of insentient nature but it is a relative thing which depends for its existence and perception upon the permanent mental state, therefore it is equally subordinate like the determinants and the consequents This is the reason that the permanent mental state can be the object of aesthetic tasting as it has the predominating nature.¹ Out of the various permanent feelings some are related to the *purusārthas* as conducive to them so they are prominent. For instance, delight (*rati*) is related to pleasure and also to the forms and gain connected with it. In the persons in whom anger predominates it is conducive to gain but it can also bring pleasure and merit. *Utsāha* (heroism) ends in all three, merit, pleasure and gain. In the same way the sentiment called *nirveda* (indifference) which arouses by the knowledge of reality becomes the means of liberation.² These four permanent

1. अप्रधाने च वस्तुनि कस्य संविद्विश्राम्यति? तस्यैव प्रत्ययस्य प्रधानान्तरं प्रत्यनुधावतः स्वात्मन्यविश्रान्तत्वात्। अतोऽप्रधानत्वं जडे विभावानुभाववर्गे व्यभिचारिनिचये च संविदात्मकेऽपि नियमेनान्यमुखप्रेक्षिणि सम्भवतीति तदतिरिक्तः स्थाय्येव तथा चर्वणापात्रम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 663.

2. तत्र पुरुषार्थनिष्ठाः काश्चित्संविद एव प्रधानम्। तद्यथारतिः 'कामतदनुषंगि-धर्मार्थनिष्ठा। क्रोध-स्तत्प्रधानेष्वर्थनिष्ठः। कामधर्मपर्यवसितोऽप्युत्साहः समस्तधर्मादिपर्यवसितः। तत्त्वज्ञानजनितनिर्वेद-प्रायोविभावो मोक्षोपाय इति तावदेषां प्राधान्यम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 663-664.

mental states only are of the predominating status. If not all together the four permanent mental states predominate in a drama, it is supposed that some one of them predominate in each type of drama. The predominating mental state should be clearly recognised in a drama. Abhinavagupta says that if it is closely observed, all the four mental states can be seen to be present in the various passages of the same drama in a pre-eminent position.¹

Abhinavagupta says that since the aesthetic experience is the tasting of one's own consciousness and the nature of consciousness is beatitude, therefore, all these rasas are dominated by pleasure (sukha). Even the pathetic rasa, whose permanent mental feeling is sorrow, is dominated by pleasure. For instance, in the world, it is found that women, even when they are immersed in the state of the consciousness of sorrow, find rest in their own heart as they experience this state without obstacle. Pain is said to be the absence of rest. So when women find rest in their heart, this is the state of pleasure as there is absence of pain. This is the reason that the disciples of Kapila, in explaining the activity of *rajah*, say that the soul of pain is mobility (*cāncalya*).² In this way all the rasas are ultimately of the nature of beatitude. In some of the rasas some extent of bitterness may also be found on the account of the objects through which they are revealed, for example in the Heroic rasa there is the appearance of misfortunes. Thus delight etc. occupy a pre-eminent status.²

1. यद्यपि चैषामन्योन्यं गुणभावोऽस्ति, तथापि तत्तत्प्रधाने रूपके तत्तत्प्रधानं भवतीति रूपकभेदपर्यायेण सर्वेषां प्राधान्यमेषां लक्ष्यते। अदूरभागाभिनिविष्टदृशस्त्वेकस्मिन्नपि रूपके पृथक् प्राधान्यम्।
— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 664.

2. तत्र सर्वेऽमी सुखप्रधाना। स्वसंविच्चर्वणारूपस्यैकघनस्य प्रकाशस्यानन्दसारत्वात्। तथाहि—
एकघनशोकसंविच्चर्वणेऽपि लोके स्त्रीलोकस्य हृदयविश्रान्तिः। अन्तरायशून्यविश्रान्तिशरीरत्वात्।
अविश्रान्तिरूपतैव दुःखम्। तत एव कपिलैर्दुःखस्य चांचल्यमेव प्राणत्वेनोक्तम् रजोवृत्तितां

Further, Abhinavagupta says that laughter etc. also occupy a pre-eminent position as its determinants are easily accessible to all type of people. The laughter possesses high power of winning the heart of the people. He says that this is the reason that laughter is mostly found in the persons of inferior nature (anuttamaprakṛti). Every man of low nature (pāmara) laughs, grieves, is afraid, tends to despise others and is astonished at the poorest gain of the pleasure. All these things depend on delight and thus may be of help in obtaining the ends of life. The division of drama into ten types is based on the pre-eminence of the permanent mental state taking place in each of them.¹ The permanent mental states are solely nine. Abhinavagupta says that every creature from its birth possesses nine forms of permanent mental states. It is said that, all beings hate to be in contact with pain and are eager to taste pleasure.² In this way, everyone is by nature pervaded by sexual desires (delight); believes himself to be superior to others, whom he is thus led to deride (laughter); grieves when he finds himself departed from what he loves (sorrow); becomes angry at the causes of such separation (anger); gets frightened when he finds himself powerless (fear); desires to overcome the danger which

वदद्भिः। इत्यानन्दरूपता सर्वरसानाम। किन्तूपरञ्जकविषयवशात् तेषामपि कटुतास्पर्शो किं नास्ति। वीरस्यैव। स हि क्लेशसहिष्णुतादिप्राण एव। एवं रत्यादीनां प्राधान्यम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 664-664.

1. हासादीनां तु सातिशयं सकललोकसुलभविभावतयोपरञ्जकत्वमिति (न) प्राधान्यम्। अत एवानुत्तमप्रकृतिषु बाहुल्येन हासादयो भवन्ति। पामरप्रायः सर्वोऽपि हसति, शोचति, विभेति, परनिन्दामाद्रियते। अल्पसुखभागित्वेन च सर्वत्र विस्मयते। रत्याद्यङ्गतया तु पुमर्थोपयोगित्वमपि स्यादेषाम्। एतद्गुणप्रधानभावकृत एव दशरूपकादिभेद इति वक्ष्यामः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 665.
2. स्थायित्वं चैतावतामेव। जात एवहि जन्तुरियतीभिः संविद्भिः परीतो भवति। तथाहि—
“दुःखसंश्लेषविद्वेषी सुखास्वादनसादरः।” — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 665.

threatens him (heroism); feels a thing of revulsion when finds an object displeasing (disgust); wonders at the sight of extra-ordinary deeds done by himself or done by others (astonishment); and, lastly, is desirous of abandoning certain things (serenity). There is no living creature who is without the latent impression of these feelings.¹ It may be the case that some of these feelings predominate in some people and others in others, and in some people they originate from the usual causes and in others from causes different from the habitual. Thus, only some permanent mental states are able to be conducive to get the ends of life and they deserve to be the object of teaching. The division of men into higher (uttama) and lower (adhama) nature is also based on the portion of the occupation of these feelings in them.²

Regarding the status of the transitory feelings, Abhinavagupta says that these feelings, like, weakness, apprehension, etc., can never possibly be manifested if the correspondent determinants do not exist, for example they can not be existent in the muni who has practised rasāyana and has got immunity from weakness, indolence, weariness, etc. Even in a person, in whom, due to determinants, these transitory feelings are present, they regularly disappear without leaving their any trace when the causes of manifestation cease to exist. On the contrary, the permanent mental states, like, heroism etc; even when they appar-

1. इति न्यायेन सर्वे रिसंसया व्याप्तः, स्वात्मन्युत्कर्षमानितया परमुपहसन, अभीष्टवियोग-संतप्तस्तद्धेतुषु कोपपरवशोऽशक्तौ च ततो भीरुः, किञ्चिदार्जिजीषुरप्यनुचितवस्तुविषयवैमुख्यात्मक-तयाक्रान्तः किञ्चिदनभीष्टतयाऽभिमन्यमानस्तत्तत्स्वकर्तव्यदर्शनसमुदित विस्मयः किञ्चिच्च जिहासुरेव जायते। न ह्येतच्चित्तवृत्तिवासनाशून्यः प्राणी भवति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 665.
2. केवलं कस्यचित्काचिदधिका चित्तवृत्तिः काचिदूना। कस्यचिदुचितविषयनियन्त्रिता कस्यचिदन्यथा। तत्काचिदेव पुमर्थोपयोगिनीत्युपदेशः। तद्विभाव (ग) कृतश्चोत्तमप्रकृत्यादिव्यवहारः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 665.

ently disappear after the completion of their tasks, do not cease to remain in the form of latent impressions; the feelings of heroism remains to accomplish the other tasks connected with heroic action.¹ Abhinavagupta says that Patanjali has rightly said, 'The fact that Caitra is in love with one woman does not imply that he is out of love with the others?'² Thus the transitory feelings being threaded on the thread of the permanent mental state appear and disappear in various times. They are like the beads of crystal, glass, magnet, topaz, emerald, sapphire, etc., which filling the thread on which they are threaded, it does not matter whether they are red or blue, etc., as to set rather far apart from each other and continuously changing their position, do not leave their traces on the thread but nourish the ornamental composition made by it; and, being themselves various, and varying in turn the permanent thread, they appear at intervals, in its nudity, though at the same time, they affect it by their polychrome reflections, the reflections meant by the reflection of the transitory jewels; it is the reason that these feelings are called 'transitory.'³ When any person says,

1. ये पुनरमी ग्लानिशङ्काप्रभृतयश्चित्तवृत्तिविशेषास्ते समुचितविभावाभावाज्जन्ममध्येऽपि न भवन्त्येव। तथाहि— रसायनमुपयुक्तवतो मुनेर्ग्लान्यालस्यश्रमप्रभृतयो नोतिष्ठन्ति। यस्यापि भवन्ति विभावबलात्तस्यापि हेतुप्रक्षये क्षीयमाणाः संस्कारशेषतां तावत् नावश्यमनुबध्नन्ति। उत्साहादयस्तु संपादितस्वकर्तव्यतया प्रलीनकल्पा अपि संस्कारशेषतां नातिवर्तन्ते। कर्तव्यान्तरविषयस्योत्साहादेर-खण्डनात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 666.
2. यथाह पतञ्जलिः — 'नहि चैत्र एकस्यां स्त्रियां रक्त इत्यन्यासु विरक्तः।' (पा.व्या.भा., भा. 2.4) इत्यादि। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 666.
3. तस्मात्स्थायिरूपचित्तवृत्तिसूत्रस्यूता एवामी व्यभिचारिणः स्वात्मानमुदयास्तमयवैचित्र्य- शतसहस्रधर्माणं प्रतिलभमाना रक्तनीलादिसूत्रस्यूतविरलभावोवलम्बनसम्भावितभङ्गीसहस्रगर्भस्फटिकाकाचाभ्रक-पद्मरागम रक्तमहानीलादिमयगोलकवत्तस्मिन् सूत्रेस्वसंस्कारवैचित्र्यमनिवेशयन्तोऽपि तत्सूत्रकृत-मुपकारसन्दर्भविभ्रतः स्वयं च विचित्रार्थस्थायिसूत्रं च विचित्रयन्तोऽन्तरा शुद्धमपि स्थायिसूत्रं प्रतिभासावकाशमुपनयन्तोऽपि पूर्वापरव्यभिचारि- रत्नच्छायाशबलिमानमवश्यमानयन्तः प्रतिभासन्त इति व्यभिचारिण उच्यन्ते। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 666.

'This is a form of weakness', it is natural to ask : by what is it provoked? This question depicts the instability of this feeling. But in the case of the assertion, "Rāma is full of heroism", one does not want to know the cause. The permanent mental states are manifested through the determinants. Even when their corresponding determinants are absent, it can not be said that the permanent mental states are non-existent. It is said that the permanent mental states live in all the beings in the form of their latent impressions. The transitory feelings, when their corresponding determinants are absent, do not exist; even their names do not remain.¹

The seventh obstacle of the aesthetic experience is the arousal of doubt in the event of the recognition of the permanent mental state and its corresponding rasa. The determinants, the consequents and the transitory feelings considered separately are in no definite relation to any specific permanent emotion; for instance, tears, etc., may arise out of bliss, due to some disease in the eye, etc. Anger and fear may arouse by seeing a tiger. The feelings of weariness and anxiety etc may accompany many permanent feelings. as, heroism, fear etc. But the combination of these elements has an unmistakable signification. Thus, where the determinant is the death of a close relation, the consequent is wailing, shedding tears etc, and the transitory feelings are anxiety, depression etc., then there is no doubt that the permanent mental state is sorrow. Therefore to remove the possibility of the arousal

1. तथाहि— ग्लानोऽयमित्युक्ते कुत इति हेतुप्रश्नेनास्थायिता स्य सूच्यते। न तु राम उत्साहशक्तिमानित्यत्र हेतुप्रश्नमाहुः। अत एव विभावास्तत्रोद्बोधकाः सन्तः स्वरूपोपरञ्जकत्वं विदधाना रत्युत्साहादेरुचितानुचितत्वमात्रमावहन्ति। न तु तदभावे सर्वथैव ते निरुपाख्याः। वासनात्मना सर्वजन्तूनां तन्मयत्वेनोक्तत्वात्। व्यभिचारिणां तु स्वविभावाभावे नामापि नास्तीति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 667.

of such doubts the combination is used.¹

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1. तत्रानुभावानां विभावानां व्यभिचारिणां च पृथक्स्थायिनि नियमो नास्ति। वाष्यादेरानन्दाक्षि-
रोगादिजत्वदर्शनात्। व्याघ्रादेश्च कोपभयादिहेतुत्वात्। श्रमचिन्तादेरुत्साहभयाद्यनेकसहचर-
त्वावलोकनात्। इत्येवं संशयोदये शङ्कात्मकविघ्नशमनाय संयोग उपात्तः। संयोगस्तु न व्यभिचारी।
तथा हि— बन्धुविनाशो यत्र विभावः परिदेविताश्रुपातादिस्त्वनुभावः चिन्तादैर्न्यादिर्व्यभिचारी
सोऽवश्यं शोक एव। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 668.

Chapter 7

Aesthetic and Spiritual Experience

In Indian Aesthetics the aesthetic experience has been held at par with the spiritual experience. On the one hand it is strictly differentiated from the empirical, the secular or sensual experience, and on the other hand its objective and subjective status too has been rejected. Rejecting its objective status it is held that the aesthetic experience is of the nature of feeling, experience, taste, and, knowledge and the feeling can not belong to the object. The object only play the role to arouse the feeling or stimulate the feeling in the spectator. Rejecting its subjective status it is held that the spectator, in the state of aesthetic experience, does not experience his own individual feeling but the generalized feeling and thus the aesthetic experience has been given the status of universal experience. In the state of aesthetic experience what is relished is the consciousness itself tinged with various bhāvas (feelings) devoid of any spacial, temporal or individual limitations. In this way the nature of aesthetic experience becomes a matter of comparison with the spiritual experience in which the nature of consciousness or self is experienced.

1. The cosmic creation and poetic creation

The Indian scholars of Aesthetics are very much fond of equating the cosmic creation with the poetic creation. The poet is often equated with God in the context of his freedom of writing. The creation of world is often narrated as the drama on the part of the creator God and on the part of the creature being.

Abhinavagupta, in his philosophical writings has preferred the analogy of drama to explain the phenomenon of the world. In the Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhan, a verse is found, in which the poet is equated with the creator- Brahmā. It is said that the world of poetry is shoreless and the poet is the unique creator. Everything is transformed in the way the poet envisions it. If the poet is filled with love then the whole world is infused with rasa. But if he is filled with vairāgya (detachment) then everything will become nīrasa (without rasa-dry).¹ In another verse found quoted in Agnipurāṇa it is said that a great poet, at his own will, makes even inanimate objects to behave as if they were animate objects and animate objects to behave as if they were inanimate.² Abhinavagupta, in Abhinavabhārati, in the context of pratibhā (poetic imagination) has said that the poet is like Prajāpati (creator), from whose will this world arises. For the poet is endowed with a power to create wondrous and unheard things (apūrvārtha). This power arises from the grace of Parāvāk (highest speech) which is called pratibhā. This partibhā has its seat in the poet's own heart and it is eternally in creative motion.³ Ānandavardhana says that there is no end to the themes of poetry as long as the poet is endowed with pratibhā.⁴ Even though subjects may have

1. अपारे काव्यसंसारे कविरैकः प्रजापतिः।

यथास्मै रोचते विश्वं तथेदं परिवर्तते॥

शृङ्गारी चेतकविः काव्ये जातं रसमयं जगत्।

स एव वीतरागश्चेत्त्रीरसं सर्वमेव तत॥ — Dhvanyāloka, p. 498.

2. भावानचेतनानापि चेतनवच्चेतनतानचेतनवत्।

व्यवहारयति यथेष्टं सुकविः काव्ये स्वतन्त्रतया॥ — Agnipurāṇa.

3. कवेरपि स्वहृदयायतनसततोदितप्रतिभाभिधानपरवाग्देवतानुग्रहोत्थितविचित्रापूर्वार्थनिर्माण-
शक्तिशालिनः प्रजापतेरिव कामजनितजगतः। — Abh., N.S. Part I, Ch. 1, p. 21.

4. न काव्यार्थविरामोऽस्ति यदि स्यात्प्रतिभागुणः। — D. L., p. 537, IV. 6.

been already used, due to the pratibhā, they all appear new, just as trees appear new during the honey months (spring).¹ Thousands of poets as eminent as vācaspati if use the subjects, yet they cannot be exhausted.²

In the works of Abhinavagupta the simile of Śiva for poet is often found. For instance in the Maṅgalācaraṇa (the first verse praying God) of the fifth chapter of the Abhinavabhāratī it is found, as follows :

We bow to that sky-form of Śiva which acts as a preliminary to the production of the play, the creation of this world by providing the proper time and place for the play -- the creation and the drama.³ Likewise statements dealing with identification of world creation and poetic creation are often used.⁴

2. Status of rasāśvāda (aesthetic taste) compared with Brahmāśvāda (experience of ultimate reality)

The Indian philosophers of aesthetics are often found comparing the aesthetic relish with the experience of the ultimate Reality. Vishwanātha, the author of Sāhitya Darpaṇa has called

1. दृष्टिपूर्वा अपि ह्यर्थाः काव्ये रसपरिग्रहात्।

सर्वे नवा इवाभान्ति मधुमास इवद्रुमाः॥ — D.L., p. 528, IV. 4.

2. वाचस्पतिसहस्राणां सहस्रैरपि यत्नतः।

निबद्धा सा क्षयं नैति प्रकृतिर्जगतामिव॥ — D.L., IV. 10.

3. संसारनाट्यनिर्माणे याऽवकाशविधानतः।

पूर्वरङ्गायते व्योममूर्तिं तां शाङ्करीं नुमः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 5, p. 497.

4. स्थायी प्रबुद्धहृदये व्यभिचारिभूतः

कामाकुलासु जनतासु महानुभावः।

अन्तर्विभावविषयो रसमात्रमूर्तिः

श्रीमान् प्रसन्नहृदयोऽस्तु मम त्रिनेत्रः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 7, p. 783.

aesthetic experience the sibling of the experience of the ultimate Reality.¹ Bhaṭṭanāyaka holds rasa (the aesthetic taste) to be nearer or similar to Brahmāsvāda (the experience of the ultimate) but not synonymic.² Abhinavagupta has also said that rasa (aesthetic taste) is relished in the same way as brahmāsvāda (the experience of the ultimate Reality) is relished.³ Commenting on the Saṅgīta Ratnākara of Sāraṅgadeva, the commentator, Kallinātha⁴ says that rasa (the aesthetic experience) is associated with the sthāyibhāvas such as rati etc., and so it is different from the Brahmasaṃvid (the ultimate consciousness) but it is partly similar to the saṁcidānanda (the highest bliss). The aesthetic experience is distinct from the spiritual experience as the bliss which the yogins obtain by force by the means of hard austerity, that bliss is received by the sahrdaya (heart responding spectator) without any effort and in pleasing way. Abhinavagupta has quoted a verse of Bhaṭṭanāyaka in which it is said that the aesthetic relish is like the cow from which the milk overflows automatically for her calf and spiritual experience is like that where the cow is milked forcefully.⁵ The pleasure of poetry is more pleasing and tender than the bliss

1. Sāhitya Darpaṇa, 3/2.

2. भाविते च रसे तस्य भोगः रजस्तमोवैचित्र्यानुविद्धसत्त्वमयनिजचित्त्वभावनिवृति- विश्रान्तिलक्षणः परब्रह्मास्वादसविधः। — D.L., p. 193.

भावकत्व— व्यापारेणभाव्यमानो रसो..... सत्त्वोद्रेकप्रकाशानन्दमयनिजसंविद्विश्रान्ति-लक्षणेन परब्रह्मा-स्वादसविधेन भोगेन परं भुज्यत इति। —Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 645.

3. परब्रह्मास्वादसब्रह्माचारित्वं चास्त्वस्य रसास्वादस्य। — D.L., p. 200.

4. नानारत्यादिसंगमाद् बहुधाभूतरत्यादिस्थायीभाव-संबन्धाद्धेतोः ब्रह्मसंविदो वैसादृश्यमुक्त्वा अंशान्तरैः सच्चिदानन्दरूपैः तत्सादृश्यमप्याह।

— Quoted by Dr. Raghavan in 'Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa of Bhoja', p. 481.

5. वाग्धेनुर्दुग्ध एतं हि रसं यदबालतृष्णया।

तेन नास्य समः स स्याद् दुह्यते योगिभिर्हियः॥ — D.L., p. 93.

obtained by yoga.¹ Abhinavagupta says that the yogic experience being devoid of the taste of objects is *paraṣa* (harsh) whereas in aesthetic experience the heart is filled with various feelings of pleasure and pain when the consciousness is experienced.² The yogic perception being of the nature of indifference is devoid of beauty.³ The *Brahmāsvāda* (the taste of Brahman) is the bliss of pure consciousness devoid of object whereas the *kāvyañānda* (bliss of poetry) is the bliss of consciousness associated with the determinants (*vibhāva*) etc.⁴ In *rasa* (the aesthetic experience) the *sthāyibhāva*, such as *rati* etc, and consciousness, both are present. From the view point of consciousness *rasa* is eternal and self luminous and from the view point of the *bhāvas* (feelings) *rasa* is temporal and dependent for its luminosity (*paraprakāśa*).⁵ In the words of R. Gnoli, 'Mystical experience involves the annihilation of every pair of opposites, every thing is reabsorbed in its dissolving fire. Sun, moon, night and day, beautiful and ugly etc., no longer exist in it. The limited 'I' is completely absorbed into

1. शब्दसमर्प्यमाणहृदयसंवादसुन्दरविभावानुभावसमुचितप्राग्विनिविष्टत्यादिवासनानुरागसुकुमार-स्वसंविदानन्दचर्वणाव्यापाररसनीयरूपो रसः। — D.L., p. 50.
2. योगिप्रत्ययाच्च विषयास्वाद-शून्यतापरुषाद्विलक्षणाकार-सुखदुःखादि-विचित्रवासनानुवेधोपयत-हृद्यतातिशय संविच्चर्वणात्मना भुजते बुधाः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 683.
3. सा च योगिप्रत्यक्षजनिततटस्थपीरसंवित्तिज्ञानात्सकलवैषयिकबोपरागशून्यशुद्धप्रयोगित-स्वात्मानन्दैकघनानुभवाच्च विशिष्यते। एतेषां यथायोगमर्जनादिविघ्नान्तरोदयाताटस्थ्येऽ-स्फुटत्वविषयावेश वैवश्यकृतसौन्दर्यविरहात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 670.
4. इयं च परब्रह्मास्वादात् समाधेर्विलक्षणा, विभावादिविषयसंवलितचिदानन्दात्मनत्वात्। — Rasagaṅgādhara, p. 90.
5. इत्य चाभिनवगुप्त-मम्मटभट्टादिग्रन्थस्वारस्येन भग्नावरण-चिद्विशिष्टो रत्यादिः स्थायी भावो रस इति स्थितम्। वस्तुतस्तु वक्ष्यमाणश्रुतिस्वारस्येन रत्याद्यावच्छिन्ना भग्नावरणा चिदेव रसः। सर्वथैव चास्या विशिष्टात्मनो विशेषणं विशेष्यं वा हि चिदंशमादाय, नित्यत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वं च सिद्धम्। रत्यादंशमादाय त्वनित्यभितरभास्यत्वं च। — Rasagaṅgādhara, p. 88-89.

Śiva or Bhairava, the adored object; everything vanishes from the field of consciousness. Aesthetic experience on the other hand, requires the presence of the Patent traces of Delight etc. (aroused by the operation of the Determinants, etc.).¹

3. Use of Spiritual terms in Aesthetics

The scholars of Aesthetics have used the same terms in aesthetics which are used to explain the nature of spiritual experience of liberation. Abhinavagupta has used the term, such as, saṃvitti, Camatkāra, nirveśa, rasanā, āsvādana, bhoga, samāpatti, laya, viśrānti etc. which have been used to illustrate the nature of consciousness in the tradition of Kashmir Śaiva Tantrism.² He does not prefer to use the terms, such as, prīti, 'pleasure' and vinoda (entertainment) to express the purpose of poetry. He prefers the religious word 'ānanda' (bliss). Vishwanātha, a scholar from Śāṅkara Advaita tradition has used the terms, such as, sattvodreka, akhaṇḍa, svaprakāśānanda, cinmaya, vedyāntara-sparśaśūnya, brahmāsvāda- sahodara, lokottara, camatkāraprāṇa etc.³ which have been used to discuss the nature of the experience of Brahman in the tradition of the Advaita-vedānta of Śāṅkarācārya. Uttuṅodaya, a commentator of Abhinavagupta, from fourteenth century, has used the term, mahāhrada for the

1. R. Gnoli, p. 100.

2. लोके सकलविघ्नविनिर्मुक्ता संवित्तिरेव चमत्कारनिर्वेशरसनास्वादनभोगसमापत्तिलयविश्रान्त्यादि-
शब्दैरभिधीयते। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 658.

3. सत्त्वोद्रेकादखण्डस्वप्रकाशानन्दचिन्मयः।

वेद्यान्तरस्पर्शशून्यो ब्रह्मास्वादसहोदरः॥

लोकोत्तरचमत्कारप्राणः कैश्चित्प्रमातृभिः।

स्वाकारवदभिन्नत्वेनायमास्वाद्यते रसः॥ — Sāhitya Darpaṇa, 3/2-3.

heart of the poet from which the poetry is poured out,¹ the term which has been used for parā-śakti in the tradition of Kashmir Śaiva Tantrism.

4. Comparison of Life with Drama and Dream

In the exposition of the philosophy of Kashmir Śaiva Tantrism the scholars have often compared life with a drama and dream. In the works of Abhinavagupta the analogy of drama and dream comes again and again. In his *Tantrāloka*, he describes a man, the creator, as destroying the produce of his life, a dream. He says that the external buildings are razed in the fire of his sudden awareness that he is Śiva, the great destroyer. After the realization that he is Śiva himself there follows the purely joy-filled dance of Śiva, the *Tāṇḍava*, that has no purpose other than to give expression to a sense of freedom and joy.² Bhaṭṭanāyaka in a verse, which has been quoted and commented by Abhinavagupta in the first verse of *Nāṭya śāstra*, says that the drama is like life. Being essentially unreal yet it affects us profoundly. The most important thing about it is that it is the means whereby we may attain bliss, which is after all the same as the Self and therefore the same as *mokṣa*.³ Abhinavagupta, in his commentary, says, 'I shall ex-

1. इदमत्र वस्तुतत्त्वम् —

कविर्हि सुकुमारमनसां राजकुमारप्रायाणाम् आस्वादपुरस्कारेण चतुर्वर्गोपायव्युत्पत्तिसंपिपादयिषया काव्यं चिकीर्षुः, चिकीर्ष्यमाणकाव्यनिबन्धनीभूतविभादियोजनास्वादानयेरसामृतं प्रवाहेण प्रथमं स्वयमेव परिपूरितगम्भीरतरनिजहृदयमहाहृदो भूत्वा ग्रहाविष्ट इवोन्मत्त इव काव्यं बहिः प्रसार्य श्रोतॄणामपि सहृदयानामात्मसमानयोगक्षेमतां संपादयति। — D.L., p. 170.

2. अनन्तचित्रसद्गर्भसंसारस्वप्नसद्मनः।

प्लोषकः शिव इवाहम् इत्युल्लासीहुताशनः॥ — *Tantrāloka*, Vol. II, 286.

3. प्रणम्य शिरसादेवौ पितामहमहेश्वरौ।

नाट्यशास्त्रं प्रवक्ष्यामि ब्रह्मणा यदुदाहृतम्॥ — *Abh.*, N.S. Part 1, Ch. 1, p. 8.

pound that drama which was propounded by Brahman the highest Self-- as an illustration by which the people might know that the worldly objects are not substantial as they are the fabrication of ignorance. Just as the unreal actions of Rāma, Rāvaṇa and others, in drama, are essentially a figment of imagination and so they do not possess any fixed form, but in a moment, they assume hundreds and thousands of forms; which though are different from dreams, etc., they are still the outcome of mental imagination, these are enacted by actors who are almost like the creator of the world and who have not given up their separate identity, those actions, presented by the actors, appear in a most unusually wondrous way; though appearing like that, they become the means of attaining the puruṣārthas (the four goal of life) in exactly the same way this universe consists of a display of unreal forms and names and yet through listening to and meditating on spiritual instruction, it leads to the realization of the highest goal of human life, mokṣa.¹

5. Exposition of Śānta rasa as a spiritual experience

Abhinavagupta's exposition of śānta rasa (the quietistic)

1. भट्टनायकस्तु 'ब्रह्मणा परमात्मना यदुदाहृतमविद्याविरचितनिस्सारभेदग्रहे यदुदाहरणीकृतं तत्राट्यं प्रवक्ष्यामि। यथाहि कल्पनामात्रसारं तत एवानवस्थितैकरूपं क्षणेन कल्पनाशतसहस्रसहं स्वप्नादिविलक्षणमपि सुसुतरां हृदयग्रहनिदानमत्यक्तस्वालम्बन ब्रह्मकल्पनतोपरचितं रामरावणादि-चेष्टितमसत्यं कुतोऽप्यद्भुतवृत्त्या भाति। तथा भासमानमपि च पुमर्थोपायतामिति। तथा तादृगेव विश्वमिदमसत्यनामरूपप्रपञ्चात्मकमथ च श्रवणमननादिवशेन परमपुमर्थप्रापकमिति लोकोत्तर-परमपुरुषार्थसूचनेन शान्तरसोपक्षेपोऽयं भविष्यति।

‘स्वं स्वं निमित्तमादाय शान्तादुत्पद्यते रसः। इति। तदनेन पारमार्थिकं प्रयोजनमुक्तं।’ इति व्याख्यानं सहृदयदर्पणे पर्यग्रहीत्।

यदाह— ‘नमस्त्रैलोक्यनिर्माणकवये शम्भवे यतः।

प्रतिक्षणं जगन्नाट्यप्रयोगरसिको जनः॥ इति।

— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 24-26.

raises the status of aesthetic experience to the status of spiritual experience. Abhinavagupta has discussed the various problems regarding the presentation, the determinants, the *sthāyībhāva* of *śānta rasa* in detail. He has answered all the objections raised against the various aspects of *śānta rasa*. He has propounded that the *śānta rasa* is the fundamental *rasa* and the other *rasas* are its modifications which arise from it and when their purposes are fulfilled they dissolve into it. The experience of *śānta rasa* is the experience of the nature of the self which is called the state of *mokṣa*, such as, *japa*, *tapa*, meditation etc. are its *vibhāvas* and the state of *mokṣa* is the *sthāyībhāva* of it. In this way there is no fundamental difference between the spiritual experience of *mokṣa* and the aesthetic experience of *śānta rasa*. The only difference which is characterised is that in the spiritual experience of *mokṣa* the consciousness, the self is experienced in its pure state, devoid of any *bhāvas* (*cittavṛtti*) whereas in the aesthetic experience of *śānta* the presence of *bhāvas* (*cittavṛttis*) in their latent forms (impressions) can not be ruled out. The spiritual experience of *mokṣa* is eternal whereas the aesthetic experience of *śānta rasa* can not be preserved eternally, it persists only during the presence of its *vibhāvas* etc. However, this is the reason that while Abhinavagupta expounded *śānta rasa* in terms of spiritual experience but he hesitated to give it the same status of spiritual experience. Commenting a verse of Ānandavardhana in which the author has realized the spiritual experience more superior than the aesthetic and others, Abhinavagupta says that -- 'For we have already explained that the happiness which results from conceptual understanding of both seen and unseen objects which are ascertained by all the means of valid cognition or even that transcendent joy which consists in relishing an aesthetic experi-

ence -- to both of these the bliss that comes from finding rest in God is far superior and that aesthetic pleasure is only the reflection of a drop of that mystic bliss.¹

6. The definition of Aesthetic experience shows its distinction from spiritual experience

Abhinavagupta himself has made distinction of Aesthetic experience from spiritual experience in a passage in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, where he says, "carvaṇā (the aesthetic experience) is different from the perception of rati (love) etc., that arises by the ordinary valid means of cognition such as *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *āgama* (textual authority), *upamāna* (simile) and others. It is also different from the *tatastha* (indifferent) knowledge of another person's thoughts that arises from direct vision in a yogin, and from the experience that consists of compact bliss (*ānandaikaghana*) of one's own self that belongs to the highest yogin and which being *śuddha* (pure) is devoid of contact with any object of the senses. The reason why aesthetic experience differs from all the above, is that of the absence of beauty caused by the appearance of the respective distractions such as the desire to acquire, the absence of active participation, the absence of clarity and being at the mercy of the objects of the senses."²

1. या व्यापारवती रसान् रसयितुं काचित्कवीनां नवा दृष्टिर्या परिनिष्ठितार्थविषयोन्मेषा च वैपश्चिती । ते द्वे अप्यवलम्ब्य विश्वमनिशं निर्वर्णयन्तो वयं श्रान्ता नैव च लब्धमब्धिशयन त्वदभक्तितुल्यं सुखम् । — D.L., Locana, p. 508.
2. किं त्वलौकिकविभावादि संयोगबलोपनतैवेयं चर्वणा । सा च प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमोपमानादि-लौकिकप्रमाणजनिन् रत्याद्यवबोधस्तथा योगिप्रत्यक्षजतटस्थपरसंवित्तिज्ञानात्सकलवैषयिको-परागशून्यशुद्धपरयोगितस्वात्मानन्दैकधनानुभवाच्च विशिष्यते, एतेषां यथायोगमर्जनादि-विघ्नान्तरोदयताटस्थ्यास्फुटत्वविषयावेशवैवश्यकृत सौन्दर्यविरहात् । — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 670.

Some points of similarity and difference may be described between the spiritual experience and the aesthetic experience. The points of similarity may be indicated as follows :

- 1- There is absence of the feeling of pain in the state of both experiences. During the course of watching drama one does not feel any sort of pain rather he finds everything blissful when he attains the state of *rasa* (the aesthetic taste). This is equally true of any higher spiritual experience.
- 2- During both experiences one forgets the self.
- 3- There is no want of material gain from the both experiences.
- 4- Both experiences are *alaukika* (non-worldly).
- 5- There is no sense of subject-object dualism in both the experiences.
- 6- The sense of time and space disappears during both the experiences. One is not aware of his surroundings during the both experiences.
- 7- During both experiences there is total immersion.
- 8- In Tantrism *avidyā* is said to be removed for the attainment of bliss, in *rasanīṣṭhā* (aesthetic experience) the *vighnas* (obstacles) must be removed before the experience.
- 9- In both cases there is a sense of rest (*viśrānti*), of having reached the goal, beyond which there is nothing to be accomplished.

Points of difference

- 1- The *Adhikārin* in the case of liberation is much more strictly defined than he is for literature. After all, children are perfectly capable of watching a drama, though they might

not take away as much as a qualified adult. Sahṛdaya is a much more worldly and concrete qualification than is mumukṣa.

- 2- The drama is not expected to change one's life radically. To have a profound aesthetic experience is simply satisfying and does not imply that one will be in any sense profoundly altered. One can not say the same for mystic experiences.



Chapter 8

Kinds of Rasa

Abhinavagupta holds that aesthetic experience (rasa) is nothing other than the relish of samvit (consciousness) which is of the nature of bliss as it is perfect, non-dual and of universal nature. Since it is non-dual or one its relish (rasa) is also one. Therefore he propounds that Rasa as such is one. It is like Brahman or sphoṭa. The different names of the rasa, like Śṛṅgāra, vīra etc, which are called the different kinds of Rasa, are ultimately only the modifications of one Rasa. He says that this is the reason that Bharata has used singular number in dealing with Rasa.¹ The different kinds of names given to rasa are according to its different evoking conditions. Rasa is ultimately one and so Bharata has used singular number.² According to Kashmir Śaiva Tantrism the nature of consciousness, in its original state, i.e., the state of perfection is spand or Ahaṃ vimarśa, which is character-

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1. न हि रसाद ऋते कश्चिदर्थः प्रवर्तते। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 620.

तत एव निर्विघ्नस्वसंवेदनात्मकविश्रान्तिलक्षणेन रसनापरपर्यायेण व्यापारेण गृह्यमाणत्वाद् रसशब्देनाभिधीयते। तेन रस एव नाट्यम्, यस्य व्युत्पत्तिः फलमित्युच्यते। तथा च 'रसादृते' (6-33) इत्यत्र एकवचनोपपत्तिः। ततश्च मुख्यभूतात् महारसात् स्फोटदृशीव असत्यानि वा, अन्वितभिधानदृशीव उभयात्मकानि सत्यानि वा, अभिहितान्वयदृशीव तत्समुदायिरूपाणि वा, रसान्तराणि भागाभिनिवेशदृष्टानि रूप्यते। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 611-612.

2. पूर्वत्र बहुवचनमत्र चैकवचनं प्रयुञ्जानस्यायमाशयः। एक एव तावत् परमार्थतो रसः सूत्रस्थानत्वेन रूपके प्रतिभाति। तस्यैव पुनर्भागदृशा विभागः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 621.

ized as activity in stillness or in other words, as quietistic. Therefore from the view point of aesthetic experience, the relish or experience of this state is called Śānta rasa (the quietistic). Abhinavagupta considered Śānta rasa as the one fundamental Rasa of which the other rasas are modifications. He called Śānta the Mahā rasa, the greatest rasa, as it is related to the highest goal of life, puruṣārtha, which is Mokṣa. He says that the taste of all the rasas is of the nature of Śānta because the rasa itself is non-worldly (alaukika) and being so it is devoid of mundane elements of desire, earning etc., hence it is of the form of Śānta.¹ The sthāyibhāva, according to Abhinavagupta is the Ātman itself. In the process of creation the Ātman identifies itself with citta and thus its functions are called cittavṛttis. In this way Ātman is the substratum of all the citta-vṛttis which from the point of view of aesthetic experience are the different sthāyibhāvas or bhāvas which turn into different forms of rasa, like śṛṅgāra, vīra etc. Thus Śānta is the prakṛti of which rati, hāsa etc. are the vikṛtis (modifications).² In favour of his thesis, Abhinavagupta says that in the older manuscripts of Nāṭya śāstra, the śānta rasa was discussed as the first rasa, prior the discussion of other rasas.³ At least two verses of Nāṭya śāstra also favour this thesis.⁴

1. तत्र सर्वरसानां शान्तं प्राय एवास्वादः, विषयेभ्यो विपरिवृत्त्या। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 776.

2. अत्र सर्वप्रकृतित्वाभिधानाय पूर्वमभिधानम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 776.

3. तथा च चिरंतनपुस्तकेषु 'स्थायिभावान् रसत्वमुपनेष्यामः' इत्यनन्तरम् 'शान्तो नाम शमस्थायिभावात्मकः' इत्यादि लक्षणं पठ्यते। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 776.

4. भावाविकारा रत्याद्याः शान्तस्तु प्रकृतिर्मतः।

विकारः प्रकृतेर्जातः पुनस्तत्रैव लीयते।

स्वं स्वं निमित्तमासाद्य शान्ताद्भावः प्रवर्तते।

पुनर्निमित्तापाये च शान्त एवोपलीयते॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 779.

Abhinavagupta says that in the aesthetic experience the *saṃvit* (consciousness) is experienced which is *ānandaghana*, the intact bliss, only to bring in varieties there are the functions of different *bhāvas* like sorrow etc.¹ There are eight fundamental mental states (*sthāyibhāvas*) and corresponding to them there are eight *rasas*. The eight fundamental mental states are : *Rati* (delight), *Hāsa* (laughter), *Śoka* (sorrow), *Krodha* (anger), *Utsāha* (heroism), *Bhaya* (fear), *Jugupsā* (disgust) and *Vismaya* (wonder). The eight *rasas* corresponding to these mental states respectively are : *Śṛṅgāra* (erotic), *Hāsyā* (comic), *Karuṇa* (pathetic), *Raudra* (furious), *Vīra* (heroic), *Bhayānaka* (terrible), *Bībhatsa* (odious) and the *Adbhut* (marvellous). The *Śānta* (quietistic) is the ninth to whom some scholars admit and some do not admit. Some scholars hold the *sthāyibhāva* of *Śānta* as *Śama* (serenity), some hold as *nirveda* (indifference or world-weariness). Abhinavagupta holds *Ātman* as the *sthāyibhāva* of *Śānta*. Holding *Śānta* as the fundamental (*mūla*) *rasa* he has discussed the nature of nine *rasas*, including *Śānta*, and has refuted the acceptance of *rasas* more than nine. Out of the eight *rasas*, excluding *Śānta*, the four are the major *rasas* which are the causes of the production of other four *rasas*. The *Śṛṅgāra* (erotic), *Raudra* (furious), *Vīra* (heroic) and *Bībhatsa* (odious) are the major *rasas* and the causes of the birth of *Hāsyā* (comic), *Karuṇa* (pathetic), *Adbhut* (marvellous) and *Bhayānaka* (terrible) respectively.² The illusion (*rasābhāsa*) or imitation (*anukaraṇa*) of *Śṛṅgāra* is *Hāsyā*. When the *vibhāva*

1. अस्मन्मते संवेदनमेवानन्दघनमास्वाद्यते। तत्र का दुःखाशङ्का। केवलं तस्यैव चित्रताकरणे रतिशोकादिवासनाव्यापारः। तदुद्बोधने चाभिनयादिव्यापारः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 687.

2. शृङ्गारादि भवेद्भासो रौद्राच्च करुणो रसः।

वीराच्चैवादभुतोत्पत्तिर्वीभत्साच्च भयानकः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 39, p. 696.

(determinant), anubhāva (consequent) and vyabhicārins (transitory feelings) are not real but illusory then the rasa is not tasted but the rasābhāsa is tasted.¹ For the example, when Rāvaṇa expresses his love for Śītā, it becomes rasābhāsa for the spectators as there is no love in the heart of Śītā for Rāvaṇa and consequently it causes hāsyā (comic) on the part of the spectators. The rati (love) on the part of Rāvaṇa is only in the form of wish or longing therefore it is there as vyabhicārī bhāva (transitory feeling), it is not the sthāyībhāva (permanent mental state). Only the sthāyībhāva is tasted as rasa, not the vyabhicārī bhāva.² Rāvaṇa is not confirm whether Śītā loves him or not. Abhinavagupta says that on the part of Rāvaṇa there is illusion of rati (rātyābhāsa) and it is not the laughter (hāsa) but on the part of Śītā there is anxiety against the arrogant nature of Rāvaṇa which is impropriety in the case of Śṛṅgāra, therefore the determinant becomes the ground of Hāsyā (comic).³ It indicates Śṛṅgāra only in the form of

1. तेषां रसानामुत्पत्तौ हैतवः सूचकाश्चत्वारः। रसानामुत्पाद्योत्पादकप्रकारो यावान् सम्भवति स चतुर्भिरेव सूचित इति यावत्। तथा हि— सदाभासत्वेन तदनुकाररूपतया हेतुत्वं शृंगारेण सूचितम्। यतो विभावाभासादनुभावाभासादव्यभिचार्याभासाद्रत्याभासे प्रतीते चर्वणा भासंसारः शृङ्गाराभासः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 694.
2. कामनाभिलाषमात्ररूपा हि रतिरत्र व्यभिचारिभावः। न स्थायी। तस्य स तु स्थायिकल्पत्वेनाभाति तद्वशाद्विभावाद्याभासता। अतश्च स्थाय्याभासत्वं रतेः। यतो रावणस्य सीता द्विष्टा मय्युपेक्षिका वेति हृदयं नैव स्पृशतीति। तत्स्पर्शं ह्यभिमानोऽस्यापि लीयत एय। 'मयीयमनुरक्ता' इति तु निश्चयो ह्यनुपयोगी। कामजमोहसारत्वात्। शुक्तौ रूप्याभासवत्। यद्यपि—
“दूराकर्षणमोहमन्त्र इव मे तन्नाम्नि याते श्रुतिं

चेतः कालकलामपि प्रसहते नावस्थितिं तां विना।

एतैराकुलितस्य विक्षतरतेरङ्गैरनङ्गातुरैः

सम्पद्येत कथं तदाप्तिमुखमित्येतत्र वेद्मि स्फुटम्।

इत्यादौ रावणवाक्ये तावति रत्याभासतैव। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 694.

3. न तु हासः स्फुरति। तथापि सीताविभावलक्षणं रावणवयः प्रकृतिविरुद्धञ्च चिन्तादैन्यमोहादिक-
व्यभिचारिणोऽश्रुपातपरिदेवितादि चानुभावजातमनौचित्यात्तदाभासरूपं सद्भास्यविभावरूपम्।
— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 694-95.

illusion.¹ In this way being there impropriety the illusion of Karuṇa (pathetic) and the illusion of Śānta (quietistic) become hāsyā (comic).² The imitation of Śṛṅgāra is Hāsyā and the karma (action) of Raudra is Karuṇa.³ The action performed in Raudra (furious) like killing etc., gives result like weeping etc. which is the vibhāva (determinant) of Karuṇa.⁴ The karma (action) of Vīra is Adbhuta and seeing of Bībhatsa is Bhayānaka.⁵ The actions which spread the name and fame are the causes of Adbhuta.⁶ The scenes of bloodshed etc. are the causes of Bhayānaka.⁷

Bharata, in Nāṭya śāstra, has described the varṇa (colour) and devatā (deity) of the rasas to which Abhinavagupta says that they are useful in worship and meditation.⁸ The colour of Śṛṅgāra

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1. एवं तदाभासतायाः प्रकारः शृङ्गारेण सूचितः।—Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 695.
 2. तेन करुणाद्याभासेष्वपि हास्यत्वं सर्वेषु मन्तव्यम्। अनौचित्यप्रवृत्तिकृतमेव हि हास्यविभावत्वम्। तच्चानौचित्यं सर्वरसानां विभावानुभावादौ सम्भाव्यते। तेन व्यभिचारिणामध्येषैव वार्ता। अत एव संवित्सतत्त्वनिपुणैश्चिरन्तनै रसभावतदाभासव्यवहारस्तत्र तत्र क्रियते। अमोक्षहेतावपि तदाभासतायां शान्ताभासो हास्य एव प्रहसनरूपः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 695.
 3. शृङ्गारानुकृतिर्या तु स हास्यस्तु प्रकीर्तिताः।
रौद्रस्यैव च यत्कर्म स ज्ञेयः करुणो रसः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 699.
 4. रौद्रस्य यत्कर्म फलात्मक वधादि चकारात्तस्य
यत्कर्म फलरूपं स एव करुणः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 699.
 5. वीरस्यापि च यत्कर्म सोऽद्भुतः परिकीर्तितः।
बीभत्सदर्शनं यच्च ज्ञेयः स तु भयानकः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 700.
 6. वीरस्य सम्यङ्निवर्तयत्फलं कर्म सोऽद्भुतः परितः समन्ताद्या कीर्तिः यशःप्रतापरूपा ततो हेतोः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 700.
 7. यदेव बीभत्सस्य दर्शनं विभावादिरूपं स एव भयानकः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 700.
 8. वर्णाभिधानं पूजादौ ध्यान उपयोगि। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 701.

is śyāma (deep blue), the colour of Hāsyā is Sita (white), the colour of Karuṇa is like of kapota (pigeon), the colour of Raudra is red,¹ the colour of Vīra is gaura (wheatish), the colour of Bhayānaka is kṛṣṇa (black), the colour of Bībhatsa is nīla (blue), the colour of śānta is svaccha (bright) and the colour of Adbhuta is pīta (yellow).² The deity of Śṛṅgāra is Viṣṇu, the deity of Hāsyā is Pramatha, the deity of Raudra is Rudra, the deity of Karuṇa is yama,³ the deity of Bībhatsa is Mahākāla, the deity of Bhayānaka is Kāla, the deity of Vīra is Mahendra (Indra), the deity of Śānta is Buddha and Brahmā is the deity of Adbhuta.⁴

Bharata has described the vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārin of each rasas and says that the sthāyībhāvas will get the form of rasa (rasatvam) with the combination of all these.⁵ Abhinavagupta says that the sthāyībhāvas, which are found in the form of cittavṛtti in the world, presented by the poet in their writings with the purpose to preach, when gets expression with

1. श्यामो भवति शृङ्गारः सितो हास्यः प्रकीर्तितः।

कपोतः करुणश्चैव रक्तो रौद्रः प्रकीर्तितः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 42, p. 701.

2. गौरो वीरस्तु विज्ञेयः कृष्णश्चैव भयानकः।

नीलवर्णस्तु बीभत्सः स्वच्छपीतौ शमाद्भुतौ॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, verse 43, Ch. 6, p. 701.

3. शृङ्गारो विष्णुदेवत्यो हास्यः प्रमथदैवतः।

रौद्रो रुद्राधिदैवत्यः करुणो यमदैवतः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, verse 44, p. 701.

4. बीभत्सस्य महाकालः कालदेवो भयानकः।

वीरो महेन्द्रदेवः स्याद् बुद्धः शान्तेऽब्जजोऽद्भुते॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, verse 44, Ch. 6, p. 702.

5. इदानीमनुभावविभावव्यभिचारिसंयुक्तानां लक्षणनिदर्शनान्यभिव्याख्यास्यामः। स्थायिभावांश्च रसत्वमुपनेष्यामः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 702.

the combination of proper vibhāva etc, and acted by the actors, become the locus of the rest of mind and the rasa is tasted.¹

1. Śṛṅgāra (Erotic)

When the sthāyibhāva, rati (delight) is mainly tasted the rasa is called Śṛṅgāra (erotic). The name, Śṛṅgāra is given to this rasa on the basis of vyavahāra (worldly practice), āpta vākya (old person's statement) and the tradition of the scholars of Nāṭya śāstra. It is related to the young nature of higher man and woman.² In the world the persons who wear clear and glamorous dresses and decorate themselves and are found involved in tasting rati (delight), are called Śṛṅgārī. Therefore the nāṭyācāryas have named the taste of rati as Śṛṅgāra rasa.³ Explaining the concept of

1. ये स्थायिनो भावा लोके चित्तवृत्त्यात्मानो बहुप्रकार- परिश्रमप्रसवनिबन्धनकर्तव्यता- प्रबन्धाभिधायिनस्तानपि नाम रसत्वं विश्रान्त्येकायतनत्वेनोपदेशदिशानेष्यामः। विभावान् यथायोगमुपहरद्भिः कविनटैर्हिते रसतां नीयन्ते। यदाह—

“या व्यापारवती रसात्रसयितुं काचित्कवीनां नवा

दृष्टिर्या परिनिष्ठितार्थविषयोन्मेषा च वैपश्चिती।

ते द्वे अप्यवलम्ब्य विश्वमनिशं निर्वर्णयन्तो वयं

श्रान्ता नैव च लब्धमब्धिशयन? त्वद्भक्तितुल्यं सुखम्।” इति। (ध्वन्या., 3.43)

— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 704.

2. तत्र शृङ्गारो नाम रतिस्थायाभावप्रभवः। उज्ज्वलवेषात्मकः। यत्किञ्चिल्लोके शुचि मेध्यमुज्ज्वलं दर्शनीयं वा तच्छृङ्गारेणोपमीयते। यस्तावदुज्ज्वलवेषः स शृङ्गारवानित्युच्यते। यथा च गोत्रकुलाचारेत्पत्रान्यातोपदेशसिद्धानि पुंसां नामानि भवन्ति तथैवैषां रसानां भावानां च नाट्याश्रितानां चार्यानामाचारेत्पत्रान्यातोपदेशसिद्धानि नामानि। एवमेष आचारसिद्धो हृद्योज्ज्वलवेषात्मकत्वाच्छृङ्गारो रसः। स च स्त्रीपुरुषहेतुक उत्तमयुवप्रकृतिः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 705-06.

3. तदेवोपसंहरति— एवं शृङ्गारो रसः। स आचाराद् व्यवहाराल्लोकेऽपि सिद्धः। कुतो हेतोः। हृद्यादिवेषात्मकत्वात्। एतदुक्तं भवति प्रतिशास्त्रसमयानुसारिणोऽपि शब्दास्तद्वृद्धव्यवहार- परम्परया लोके प्रसिद्धा उपचारतोऽन्यत्रापि व्यवहियन्ते। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 707.

rati Abhinavagupta says that it is distinct from the worldly (laukika) rati in which a man wishes the contact with a woman and a woman wishes the contact with a man. In this case the rati being in the form of wish is transitory feeling. In the drama when it is presented with the help of determinant etc. it persists from beginning to the end. There, it is in the form of sthāyibhāva and so it is tasted as perfect pleasure.¹ The playing of Kāmī (hero) with Kāminī (heroine) is rati (delight) and therein is continuous repose of pleasure.² Other things, like, flowers, garland, garden, season etc., related to the object of beauty are matter, jaḍa, they are not rati (delight) as rati is feeling. Abhinavagupta says that the immersion of each other into each other is the highest bhoga (enjoyment) wherein the saṃvid (consciousness) is predominant.³ Explaining the statement of Bharata in which he says that śṛṅgāra is related to the nature of young man and woman of higher class (uttamayuvaprakṛti), Abhinavagupta says that here the young body of man and woman is not said. Here the young consciousness of man and woman is indicated which is the matured feeling of delight, the sthāyibhāva, not the transitory feeling. If man and woman are not of higher nature then there would be the possibility of viyoga (disunion) as commitment to each other may be ex-

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1. स्त्रीपुरुषशब्देन परस्परभिलाषसंभोगलक्षणाया लौकिक्या 'अस्येयं स्त्री' इति "अस्या अयं पुरुष" इति रतेः, स्तथाभिलाषमात्रसारायाः कामावस्थानुवर्तिन्या व्यभिचारिरूपानीताया रतेश्च विलक्षणैव इयं स्थायिरूपा प्रारम्भादिफलप्राप्तिपर्यन्ता व्यापिनी परिपूर्णसुखैकफला रतिरुक्ता भवति हेतुरस्य। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 708-09.
 2. एतदुक्तं भवति— रतिः क्रीडा सार्धं च परमार्थतः कामिनोरेव। तत्रैव सुखस्य धाराविश्रान्तेः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 709.
 3. अपरस्य तु माल्यादिविषयसौन्दर्यस्य तद्विना कृतस्य संकल्पत्वात्संवेदनद्वितयान्योन्य-निमज्जनात्मकमीलनाख्यो हि परमो भोगः। संविद एव प्रधानत्वात्। अन्यत्र तु जडस्य भोग्यत्वात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 709.

pected only in the persons of higher nature.¹

There are two aspects or states of Śṛṅgāra : Saṁbhoga Śṛṅgāra (delight in union) and vipralaṁbha Śṛṅgāra (delight in separation). The determinants of Saṁbhoga Śṛṅgāra are the seasons, flowers, garland, use of powder, ornaments, decorated houses, seeing of attractive things, hearing of sweet songs, music, playing in garden, playng in water, rasalilā etc.² Abhinavagupta says that Saṁbhoga and vipralaṁbha are not the two kinds of Śṛṅgāra, these are the two states of the Śṛṅgāra, wherein the rati tasted becomes Śṛṅgāra rasa.³ This must be acted (anubhāva) by the movement of eyes, eyebrows, parts of the body and with the use of sweet statements.⁴ The vyabhicārībhāvas of Saṁbhoga Śṛṅgāra are all the bhāvas except ālasya (indolence), ugratā (pungency) and jugupsā (disgust). The vyabhicārībhāvas of vipralaṁbha śṛṅgāra are nirveda (world- weariness), glāni (repulsion), śaṅkā (doubt), śrama (exertion), cintā (anxiety), autsukya (longing), nidrā (slumber), svapna (dream), vibodha (awakening),

1. एकैव ह्यसौ तावती रतिः । यत्रान्योन्यसंविदां एकवियोगो न भवति । अत एवोत्तमयुवप्रकृतिः । उत्तमश्चोत्तमाचोत्तमौ । एवं युवानौ । तत्रोत्तमयुव शब्देन तत्संविदुच्यते । न तु कायः । चैतन्यस्यैव हि परमार्थत उत्तमयुवत्वं विशेषः । स (सा) चावस्थावान् यत्र तत्र व्यवहारस्य भूतत्वात् तत्प्रकृतिः । सा संविदास्वादयोग्यत्वात् शृङ्गाररसीभवतीति । अनुत्तमत्वे तु न दाढर्यमयुवत्वे चेति न सा रतिः संवित् । वियोगस्य संभावनात् । अवियुक्तसंवित्प्राणस्तु शृङ्गारः । — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 710.
2. तस्य द्वे अधिष्ठाने सम्भोगो विप्रलम्भश्च । तत्र सम्भोगस्तावत् ऋतुमाल्यानुलेपनालं-कारेष्टजनविषयवरभवनोपभोगोपवनगमनानुभवनश्रवणदर्शनक्रीडालीलादिभिर्विभावैरुत्पद्यते । — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 711.
3. ते न शृङ्गारस्येमौ भेदौ । गोत्वस्येव शाबलेयत्वबाहुलेयत्वे । अपि तु तदशाद्वयेऽप्यनुयायिनी या रतिरास्वादानात्मिका तस्याश्चास्वाद्यमानं रूपं शृङ्गारः । — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 711.
4. तस्य नयनचातुर्यभ्रूक्षेपकटाक्षसञ्चारललितमधुराङ्गहार वाक्यादिभिरनुभावैरभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः । — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 717.

vyādhi (illness), unmāda (lunacy), apasmāra (catelepsy), jāḍya (stupor) and maraṇa (death).¹ Abhinavagupta says that in the state of Saṁbhoga all the pleasurable bhāvas are held to be the vyabhicārī except the nirved etc. which are painful. Although the svapna (dream) is inherent in slumber as dream occurs only in slumber but they (svapna and nidrā) are counted separately. In the state of saṁbhoga (union) in the proximity of the determinant where there is absence of nidrā (slumber) the vibodha (awakening) is the vyabhicārī. In the state of saṁbhoga there is nidrā (slumber) due to śrama (exertion) after rati (delight) but it (nidrā) does not bring any distinction in rati (delight), therefore, nidrā has not been held vyabhicārī in saṁbhoga. But in the state of vipralambha (separation) there may occur the feelings of rati of nāyikā (heroine) in the dream so nidrā (slumber) is specially needed here hence nidrā is held as vyabhicārī in vipralambha.²

Abhinavagupta says that according to the old scholars the states of unmāda (lunacy), apasmāra (catelepsy), and vyādhi (illness) which are not extremely dirty can be shown in poetry and drama. In the opinion of Abhinavagupta, in those states the connection of rati (delight) with the body is broken, therefore, it is impossible to show them in the poetry and drama.³ About the

1. व्यभिचारिणश्चास्यालस्यौग्रयजुगुप्सावर्ज्याः विप्रलम्भकृतस्तु निर्वेदग्लानिशङ्कासूयाश्रमचिन्तौत्सुक्यनिद्रा स्वप्नविबोधव्याधुन्मादापस्मारजाड्यमरणादयः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 718.

2. सम्भोगदशायां तु विभावसान्निध्ये निद्राद्यभावाद्विबोधोऽपि व्यभिचारी। सम्भोगेऽपि रतिश्रमकृतनिद्रादि यद्यप्यस्ति तथाऽपि न रतौ तच्चित्रतामाधत्ते। विप्रलम्भे तु तद्वतिभावनपरम्परात एव निद्रादिबाहुल्यापेक्षं चेत्यमभिधानम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 719.

3. उन्मादापस्मारव्याधीनां या नात्यन्तं कुत्सिता दशा सा काव्ये प्रयोगे च दर्शनीया। कुत्सिता तु सम्भवेऽपि नेति वृद्धाः। वयं तु ब्रूमः। तादृश्यां दशायां स्वजीवितनिन्दात्मिकायां तद्देहोपभोगसाररत्यात्मकावस्थान्बन्धोऽपि विच्छेद्यत एवेति असम्भव एव। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 720.

inclusion of maraṇa (death) in vyabhicārībhāvas of vipralambha he says that here death should be taken in the sense of very short separation, since there is hope for reunion immediate after death so the death would not assume the form of śoka (sorrow).¹ He cites a verse from Raghuvansha wherein Aja (the hero) because of dying in the pilgrimage of Prayāga immediately gets joined with the class of deities (devas) and gets companion of a woman, Indumati, who is more beautiful than the companion of Aja in his previous body and enjoys in the garden of heaven.² The meaning of the term vipralambha is also famous as vañcanā (cheating) so in the eight types of nāyikā (heroines) the vipralabdhā nāyikā is held an independent nāyikā. The nāyikā, whose lover does not come after informing or indicating the time and place of meeting, that vañcitā (cheated) nāyikā is called vipralabdhā nāyikā. In this cheating the nāyikā feels the separation (viraha) of the nāyaka. Here holding unity (abhedopacāra) in cause and effect the viraha produced by vipralambha is called vipralambha.³ When there is love, rati in both then there is no question of cheating. Love is the state of complete surrender to each other. In such case due to tanmayatā (concentration) caused by separation the love becomes more intensified. Therefore without vipralambha the śṛṅgāra can

1. मरणमचिरकालप्रत्यापत्तिमयमत्र मन्तव्यम्। येन शोकोऽवस्थानमेव न लभते। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 720.

1. यथा—

तीर्थे तोयव्यतिकरभवे जहनुकन्यासरखो-

दैहत्यागादमरणगणनालेख्यमासाद्य सद्यः।

पूर्वावस्थाधिकचतुरया सङ्गतः कान्तयाऽसौ

लीलागारेष्वरमत पुनर्नन्दनाभ्यन्तरेषु॥ — Raghu, 8-95.

2. विप्रलम्भो विडम्बनं वञ्चनं प्रसिद्धम्। इह तूपचान्तदीयं फलं विरहात्मकं गृह्यते। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 721.

not be attractive in poetry or drama.¹ Saṃbhoga is the place of the taste of compact pleasure like the sweetness of sugar. To bring in some sort of discontinuity to avoid one type of taste the poets make involvement of other women to create jealousy competition and other things to cause vipralambha (separation). Vātsyāyana has said that kāma (sex) works in opposite way.² It becomes intensified when checked. It manifests itself for some time and vanishes, like electricity, although it makes the rati (delight) intensified but it itself can not be sthāyī (permanent mental state), it is transitory (vyabhicārī). Abhinavagupta says that although the sthāyī (rati) is also not permanent but being present continuously in the form of impressions it is sthāyī and it is matured. The vyabhicārins do not stay for more than moments.³ In Kāma sūtra of Vatsyāyana there are ten forms of śṛṅgāra described. Abhinavagupta says that they are the ten stages of love so they are inherent in the two types of śṛṅgāra as saṃbhoga and vipralambha.

Discussing the difference between Vipralambha and Karuṇa

1. तेन विरहेण कृतः सुष्ठुतमां पोषित इति दर्शयन्मुनिरनेन विना शृङ्गारो न प्रयोगे हृद्यतामवलम्बत इति दर्शयति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 721.
2. तथा हि— सम्भोगेऽप्येकघनशर्करास्वादस्थानीयतापरिहाराय वैषम्यं गोत्रस्खलितं स्पर्धामन्यद्वा कलहविप्रलम्भहेतुभूतं कवयो निबध्नन्ति। वामो हि कामः' (काम.शा., 2-7-1) इति वात्स्यायनादिभिरभिहितम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 721.
3. एते च व्यभिचारिणो विद्युदुन्मेषनिमेषयुक्त्यैव स्थायिसूत्रमध्ये स्वात्मानं प्रकटयन्तस्तिरोदधतश्च तद्वैचित्र्यमावहन्ति न तु स्थिराः। यद्यपि स्थाय्यपि न स्थिरः तथाऽपि संस्काररूपतया धारावाहिसजातीयप्रवाहरूपतया च स्थिर एव। व्यभिचारिणस्तु नैवं क्षणमपि भवन्ति। संस्कारमपि स्वकं स्थायिसंस्कार एव प्रौढयन्ति। तथैव स्मरणाच्च। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 722.

(pathetic), Abhinavagupta says that Karuṇa is an independent rasa which has Śoka (sorrow) as its sthāyībhāva which is caused by the suffering produced by curse, death of nearest person, relatives, friends etc. The vipralambha is originated by the relative feelings of autsukya (longing), cintā (anxiety) etc.¹ If the transitory feelings of Karuṇa and vipralambha are the same or there is unity of the transitory feelings of both then what will be the difference between Karuṇa and vipralambha. Explaining the problem Abhinavagupta says that there is no vipralambha in the lower nature. Vipralambha rasa is very tender and the person of lower nature is cruel so his relationship with the nāyikā (heroine) of soft nature can not be continued. Thus there is absence of the sthāyībhāva of vipralambha due to the absence of the determinant in the form of nāyikā etc. The Karuṇa different from Vipralambha is there in the lower nature. Karuṇa is also there in higher nature but there śoka (sorrow) opposite to rati is the sthāyībhāva. Therefore, it is said that Karuṇa is an independent rasa. In rati the expectation of ālambana vibhāva continues as the rati can not exist without ālambana vibhāva. The expectation of relatives, friends etc. does not continue in Karuṇa as there can not be śoka (sorrow) in the presence of relatives etc.² Abhinavagupta says that the feelings like nirveda (world-weariness) etc. which are found in

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1. करुणस्तु शापक्लेशविनिपतितेष्टजनविभवनाशवधबन्धसमुत्थो निरपेक्षभावः। औत्सुक्य- चिन्तासमुत्थः सापेक्षभावो विप्रलम्भकृतः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 725.
 2. नन्वेवं, व्यभिचार्यभेदात्करुणः कथं विप्रलम्भाद्भिद्यत इत्याशङ्क्याह— करुणस्त्विति। अधमप्रकृतेस्तावन्निप्रलम्भः स्थाय्याभावात्। तदभावो विभावसामग्रीवैकल्यादिति। तत्र तावत्करुणः पृथक् लब्धप्रतिष्ठः। एवमुत्तमप्रकृतावपि रतिविपरीतः शोकः करुणे स्थायी। अत एवाह निरपेक्षः। बन्धुजनादिविषये याऽपेक्षा रताविवालम्बनम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 725.

Karuṇa, they are produced by independent śoka (sorrow) being quite unrelated to rati. The cintā (anxiety) where the feeling of longing dominates is relative to rati and autsukya (longing), cintā (anxiety) are produced from the feeling of rati. Abhinavagupta again says that the sthāyī and determinant of vipralambha and sambhoga are the same.¹ Longing occurs for the object. If the object is destroyed there can not be longing.² Thus the Karuṇa and vipralambha are different. Associated with all such types of feelings is śṛṅgāra.² The person united with enormously pleasure producing means, enjoying the seasons, garlands, play (vihāra) and when he is united with woman (pramadā) he is called as Śṛṅgāra.⁴ Commenting on the Above statement of Bharata, Abhinavagupta says that the use of the term Śṛṅgāra in singular number indicates that Śṛṅgāra is one.⁵ Puruṣa is the bhoktā

1. येऽपि चैते निर्वेदाद्यास्तेऽपि वस्तुतो रत्यननुगृहीता निरपेक्षाच्छोकाद्भवन्तोऽन्यएव। ततोऽप्याह निरपेक्षभाव इति।

एवं प्रसङ्गात्करुणस्य स्वरूपमभिधाय प्रकृते योजयति— औत्सुक्यचिन्तेति। चिन्ताशब्दोऽशेष-निर्वेदाद्युपलक्षम्। औत्सुक्यप्रधाना ये चिन्तादयस्तेभ्यः सम्यगुत्थानं विजृम्भो यस्य। अत एव सापेक्षो यत्र रत्याख्यो भावः। ते च सापेक्षाद्रत्याख्याद्भवन्ति। न हि विप्रलम्भे विभावः स्थायी च सम्भोगाद्भिद्यते। एक एवासाविति हि बहुश उक्तम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 726.

2. एतदुक्तं भवति। औत्सुक्यं विषयौन्मुख्यम्। तच्चनष्टे विषये न सम्भवति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 727.

3. एवमन्यः करुणोऽन्यश्च विप्रलम्भ इति। एवमेष सर्वभावसंयुक्तः शृङ्गारो भवति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 726.

4. अपि च

सुखप्रायेषु सम्पन्नः ऋतुमाल्यादिसेवकः।

पुरुषः प्रमदायुक्तः शृङ्गारः इति संज्ञितः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 727.

5. शृङ्गार इत्येकवचनेनैक एव शृङ्गार इत्युपसंहृतम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 727.

(enjoyer) which is consciousness and the enjoyer is the sthāyī (permanent) bhāva of the form of consciousness. The transitory feelings are of the nature of bhoga (enjoyed). So rati itself is the puruṣa. As it is said 'this man is full of piety' or 'the man is of the nature of piety'. In the same way pramadā (woman) is also of the form of rati. In the both pramadā (woman) and the puruṣa (man), the puruṣa (man) is the enjoyer (bhoktā) and the pramadā (woman) is the enjoyed (bhoga). Due to being bhoktā (enjoyer) there is predominance of the puruṣa. The pramadā is bhogya (enjoyed). Due to the predominance the puruṣa is not dependent on the bhogya. So when the puruṣa is connected with other nāyikā (heroine) there is no brake in Śṛṅgāra but when the nāyikā (bhogyā) is connected with other there is brake in Śṛṅgāra because the bhogyā is paratantra (dependent on other).¹ About the determinants characterized by Bharata as the puruṣa combined with pleasing things, Abhinavagupta says that this is so said that there should be proper and complete determinants for the rise of rasa. Before the rise of rasa and its being tasted, the determinants have the status of determinants as separate from the enjoyer. In the state of tasting of rasa there is no sense of duality. The enjoyer is completely immersed into the determinants. He says that before the tasting also the determinants lie in the consciousness of the enjoyer but there is sense of enjoyer and enjoyed. But in the state of tasting there is complete unity of the enjoyer and enjoyed. In

1. पुरुष इति भोक्ता संवेदनात्मकोऽभिप्रेतः। भोक्तैव च स्थायिसंविद्रूपः। व्यभिचारिणस्तु भोगस्वभावः। तेन रतिरेव पुरुषः। तथा चोक्तम् 'श्रद्धामयोऽयं पुरुष' इति। एवं प्रमदाऽपि। तत्र भोक्तृत्वे पुरुषस्य प्राधान्यम्। प्रमदायास्तु भोग्यत्वम्। प्राधान्यादेव च तस्य भोग्येनापरतन्त्रीकरणमिति नायिकान्तरयोगेऽपि न शृङ्गारहा भोज्यस्य तु पारतन्त्र्यादेवान्यसम्मीलने शृङ्गारभंग इति दर्शितम्। अत एव न स्थायिभेदः शङ्कनीयः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 728.

that state there is only one consciousness. He further says that if the object of taste (viṣayasāmagrī) is complete and proper there will be proper rati¹ but the fulness of the object is not rasa.² It is rasa when there is taste. Bharata has said that the Śṛṅgāra rasa originates from enjoying the seasons, wearing garlands and ornaments, union with the beloved person and dancing, hearing music, sweat songs and poetry, in that union, walking in garden and playing (vihāra) there. It should be acted by the movement of eyes, face, smile, sweat speech, patience, hilarity (pramoda) and with sweat movement of the limbs of body.³ Here abhinavagupta says that by the word, gāndharva, song etc. the objects of heart are indicated, and, with the use of poetry the ideal (will form) nature of the determinant is indicated. The words dhṛti (patience) and pramoda (hilarity) indicate the transitory feelings. He says that the view that the meaning of poetry which causes the birth of the feelings in the knower of the poetry and thus the poetic meaning which produces pleasure, is rasa, has been refuted here. It has already been shown that the object of rasa is not rasa and at last

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1. सुखप्रायेषु सम्पन्न इत्यादिपुरुषविशेषणत्वेन समुदितस्य विभावत्वं दर्शयति। विभावादयो निः। रसोदयं विनाऽऽस्वादैश्च भोक्तरीति निमग्नत्वे भोक्तृप्रधानत्वं च दर्शयन्ति। विषयसम्भारपूर्णताभिमानजैव रतिरुचिता। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 728.
 2. विषमसामग्रीसम्पूर्णो रस इति ये मन्यन्ते तेषामभ्रान्तिकारणमयं श्लोकः। स चेत्यं व्याख्यातो न भ्रान्तिजनकः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 728.
 3. अपि चात्र सूत्रार्थानुविद्धं आर्ये भवतः।
 ऋतुमाल्याङ्कारैः प्रियजनगान्धर्वकाव्यसेवाभिः।
 उपवनगमनविहारैः शृङ्गाररसः समुद्भवति
 नयनवदनप्रसादैः स्मितमधुरवचोदृतिप्रमोदैश्च।
 मधुरैश्चाङ्गविहारैस्तस्याभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 729.

it has been shown that Śṛṅgāra is one.¹

2. Hāsyā rasa (comic)

The sthāyibhāva of Hāsyā rasa (comic) is laughter. It is produced by the determinants of wearing uncommon dresses, ornaments of others; and by arrogance, greed (laulya), kuhaka (to touch abdomen, neck and side of the hand to make a child or person laughed), false speech, showing unnatural part of the body; and by giving the analogy of defects.² Commenting on Bharata's statement Abhinavagupta says that in the statement, 'hāsasthāyibhāvātmakah', it is said that hāsyā is of the form of hāsasthāyī. Here the sthāyibhāva makes possible or produce the rasa. This is not in the case of rati and śoka. Rati does not form or produce the experience which is said tasting. In the experience of the taste of rati and śoka the determinants used are extraordinary (asādhāraṇa).³ The determinants of hāsyā rasa are the same as they are found in the empirical world (loka). The unnatural dress etc. are the causes of laughter in the world and they are also the determinants of hāsyā in poetry and drama. Abhinavagupta says that in rati and śoka there are continuous experience of pleasure and pain respectively at extreme so they

1. प्रियजनो विदूषकादिः। गान्धर्वशब्दो गीतादिहृद्यविषयोपलक्षणम्। काव्यसेवाशब्देन विषयसङ्कल्पं विभावत्वेन लक्षयति। यस्त्वाह काव्यार्थीभूताद्रसात्काव्यार्थविदो भवान्तरं प्रादुर्भवति। अतः सुखजनकत्वात्काव्यार्थो रस इति। स प्रत्युक्तः। न हि विषयसामग्री रस इति पूर्वं दर्शितम्। धृतिप्रमोदशब्देन व्यभिचारिणो लक्षयति। एक एव च परमार्थतः शृङ्गार इत्यभिप्रायेणादाववस्थोपलक्षणद्वारेण सर्व एवोपसहतो मन्यव्यः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 729.
2. अथ हास्यो नाम हासस्थायिभावात्मकः। स च विकृत परवेष्टालङ्कारधाष्टर्यलौल्य-कुहकासत्प्रलापव्यङ्गदर्शन दोषोदाहरणादिभिर्विभावैरुत्पद्यते। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 731.
3. आत्मशब्देनेदमाह — रतिरास्वादनाख्यां प्रतीतिं विदधाना न तां रतिरूपामेव विधत्ते। प्रमुखे विभावादावसाधारण्यात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 730.

are experienced from extra ordinary means and so the muni has used the word 'prabhava (pre-eminent) for them. The other rasas (all the other 7 rasas) are experienced from ordinary determinants so the muni has used the word 'ātmak' (of the nature of) for them. The conduct of meekness (obeisance) and arrogance is of the form of injustice and so in any time and space it is the case of anger, fear, disgust and wonder for all.¹

Bharata says that the hāsyā should be acted by shaking and shrinking lips and noses, by beating cheek, by opening and winking the eyes, by showing sweets, by changing the colour of face, and by touching the sides etc. The transitory feelings of hāsyā are avahithā (hiding), ālasya (laziness), tandrā (sleeping), svapna (dream), prabodha (awakening) and asūyā (jealousy) etc. It is of two kinds -- ātmastha (laughing by self) and parastha (making others laughed).² Explaining Bharata's statement Abhinavagupta says that when the vidūṣaka (joker) laughs due to

1. हासे तु य आस्वादः सोऽपि विकृतवेषादीनां सामाजिकान्त्रिलोकवृत्तेन हासहेतुतेति विभाव-
साधारण्यद्वारेण तदेकस्वभाव एवेति हासात्मकरसनाख्यचर्वणीयत्वाच्चास्य। रतिशोकावेव
परमतज्जातीयसंविदास्वादौ धारारूढसुखदुःखरूपत्वेन निस्साधारणात्मीयत्वनियमग्रह-
गृहीतहेतुबलादेवोत्पद्येते यतः अतोऽनयोर्मुनिना प्रभवग्रहणं कृतम्। अन्येषु तु विभावे
साधारण्यसम्भावनात्तदात्मकग्रहणम्। नयविनयादेरन्यायकारिणः समानं कालादेरपूर्ववस्तुनश्च
सर्वान्प्रत्युत्साहक्रोधभयजुगुप्साविस्मयहेतुत्वेन साधारण्यविभावत्वादित्यलं बहुना। — Abh.,
N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 730.

2. तस्योष्ठनासाकपोलस्पन्दनदृष्टिव्याकोशाकुञ्चनस्वेदास्यरागपार्श्वग्रहणादिभिरनुभावैरभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः।
व्यभिचारिणश्चास्यावहित्यालस्यतन्त्रानिद्रास्वप्नप्रबोधासूयादयः। द्विविधश्चायमात्मस्थः परस्थश्च।
यदा स्वयं हसति तदाऽऽत्मस्थः। यदा तु परं हासयति तदा परस्थः। अत्रानुवंश्ये आर्ये भवतः।
विपरीतालङ्कारैर्विकृताचाराभिधानवेषैश्च।

विकृतैरर्थविशेषैर्हसतीति रसः स्मृतो हास्यः॥

विकृताचारैर्वाक्यैरङ्गविकारैश्च विकृतवेषैश्च।

हासयति जनं यस्मात्तस्माज्ज्ञेयो रसो हास्यः॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6,
p. 731-732.

the uncommon dresses of himself it is his (ātmastha) hāsa (laughter) which lies in himself and when he makes the nāyikā (devī) laughed this is the hāsa (laughter) which lies in other (parastha). Abhinavagupta says that this is not true. This is the differentiation of the determinants and the circumstances. This is not the differentiation of hāsa (the sthāyī bhāva).¹ Bharata says that hāsyā rasa (comic) is seen much in women and the men of lower (adhama) nature. It is of six kinds -- smita, hasita, vihasita, upahasita, apahasita and atihāsita. There are two kinds of hāsa of each category of uttama, madhyama and adhama nature respectively.² Smita and hasita are the kinds of the persons of higher nature, vihasita and upahasita are the kinds of the persons of middle (madhyama) nature, apahasita and atihāsita are the kinds of persons of lower (adhama) nature.³ In which the cheeks expand very shortly, attractive eye movement (kaṭākṣa) and teeth are not seen, that laughter is called smita and it belongs to the persons of higher nature.⁴ In which the mouth and eyes are blossomed and

1. द्विविधश्चायमिति । आत्मस्थैर्विभावैर्विकृतवेषादिभिर्विदूषकः स्वयं हसति स तस्यात्मस्थः । देवीं चहासयतीति तस्यः परस्थः । तदिदमसत् । एवं हि विभावानामात्मस्थत्वविभागः स्यात् । न हासस्य । — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 732.

2. स्त्रीनीचप्रकृतावेष भूयिष्ठं दृश्यते रसः ।

षड्भेदाश्चास्य विज्ञेयास्तांश्च वक्ष्याम्यहं पुनः ॥ 51 ॥

स्मितमथहसितं विहसितमुपहसितं चापहसितमतिसितम् ।

द्वौ द्वौ भेदौ स्यातामुत्तममध्याधमप्रकृतौ ॥ 52 ॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 51-52, p. 733.

3. स्मितहसिते ज्येष्ठानां मध्यानां विहसितोपहसिते च ।

अधमानामपहसितं ह्यतिहसितं चापि विज्ञेयम् ॥ 53 ॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 53, p. 734.

4. ईषद्विकसितैर्गण्डैः कटाक्षैः सौष्ठवान्वितैः ।

अलक्षितद्विजं धीरमुत्तमानां स्मितं भवेत् ॥ 54 ॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 54, p. 735.

cheeks are expanded and teeth are seen that laughter is called Hasita.¹ In which the eyes and cheek are shrunken and oblique, there is some sound, the face is red, and the laughter which takes place in society on proper time, that sweat laughter is vihasita and it belongs to the persons of middle nature.² In which the nose is puffed up, the tongue is seen, the parts of body and the head is bent, that laughter is upahasita.³ In which the laughter takes place on improper time, the eyes are filled with tears, the shoulders and head are shrunken, that laughter is Apahasita.⁴ In which there is superimposition of origin, the eyes are filled with tears, the sound is originated with rubbing, the hand is kept on the back, that laughter is Atihasita and along with Apahasita it belongs to the persons of lower nature.⁵ Bharata says that the Hāsyā being arising in one's ownself and being arising in otherself is of two kinds and being belonging to the three natures of persons it is of

1. उत्फुल्लानननेत्रं तु गण्डैर्विकसितैरथ।

किञ्चिल्लक्षितदन्तं च हसितं तद्विधीयते॥55॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, verse 55, Ch. 6, p. 735.

2. आकुञ्चिताक्षिगण्डं यत्सस्वनं मधुरं तथा।

कालागतं सास्यरागं तद्वै विहसितं भवेत्॥56॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 56, p. 735.

3. उत्फुल्लनासिकं यन्तु जिह्वादृष्टिनिरीक्षितम्।

निकुञ्चिताङ्गकशिरस्तच्चापहसितं भवेत्॥57॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 57, p. 735.

4. अस्थानहसितं यत्तु साश्रुनेत्रं तथैव च।

उत्कम्पितांसकशिरस्तच्चापहसितं भवेत्॥58॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 58, p. 735.

5. संरब्धं साश्रुनेत्रं च विकृष्टस्वरमुद्धतम्।

कोपगूढपार्श्वं च तच्चातिहसितं भवेत्॥59॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 59, p. 736.

three states and it must be acted accordingly on the stage.¹ Abhinavagupta says that the kinds of Hāsyā as of two kinds of each nature, higher, middle and lower must be understood in the sense of transmission of laughter from one nature to other. For example the laughter lying in the higher nature being transmitted it becomes Hasita. It is so that there are three states of laughter said otherwise it may be many. The little feeling of laughter is Smita and its special form is Hasita. The more specific form than that is Vihasita and the more specific form than that which is transmitted to other (para) is Upahasita which is different. The exaggerated laughter is Apahasita.²

3. Karuṇa Rasa (The Pathetic)

Karuṇa rasa is produced from the permanent mental state of sorrow (śoka). The determinants of Karuṇa are pain of separation of beloved persons due to curse, destruction of property, killing of relatives, abduction of relatives, relatives being wounded by stampede, and the pain caused by the relatives being fallen in bad

1. हास्यस्थानानि यानि स्युः कार्योत्पन्नानि नाटके।

उत्तमाधममध्यानामेव तानि प्रयोजयेत्॥60॥

इत्येष स्वसमुत्थस्तथा परसमुत्थश्च विज्ञेयः।

द्विविधस्त्रिप्रकृतिगतस्त्रयवस्थभावो रसो हास्यः॥61॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 60-61, p. 736.

2. तस्मात्सङ्क्रमणाभिप्रायेणैतत्। स्मितं हि यदुत्तमप्रकृतौ तत्सङ्क्रान्तं हसितं सम्पद्यते। अत एव त्रयवस्थो हास इति वक्ष्यते। षडवस्थो ह्यन्यथा स्यात्॥52॥

स्मितमीषतायाम्। हसितं, ततो विशेषेण हसितं विहसितं। ततोऽपि परस्य समीपगतमन्यत्। अपहसितमतिशयेन चेत्युपसर्गभेदादर्थभेदः॥53॥

सौष्ठवमनुत्पणता। द्विजा दन्ताः। धीरमिति मन्यरं कृत्वा ईषत्त्वनिर्वाहः॥54॥ विकसितैरथेति। स्मितानन्तरं संक्रमणकाल इत्यर्थः। तदिति। स्मितमेव संक्रान्तं सदेवंरूपतामेतीत्यर्थः॥55॥

— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 734.

habits (dissipation). The Karuṇa should be acted by tearing, weeping, drying of palate, changing the colour of the face, laziness of the body, by expiration, lack (loss) of memory, being benumbed, by tremor, and, by change of voice.¹ The transitory feelings of it are : nirveda (world weariness), glāni (languor), cintā (anxiety), autsukya (longing), āvega (excitement), bhrama (doubt), moha (delusion), shrama (weariness), bhaya (fear), viṣāda (gloom), dainya (affliction), vyādhī (illness), jaḍatā (stupor), unmāda (frenzy), apasmāra (epilepsy), trāsa (horror), ālasya (indolence), maraṇa (death) etc.² Bharata says that by seeing the killing of relatives, by hearing unpleasant statements (messages) and by above mentioned specific feelings the karuṇa rasa becomes possible.³ It must be acted by weeping in high pitch, breaking body and slapping (beating) chest.⁴ Explaining the Karuṇa rasa Abhinavagupta says that according to a commentator (Śaṅkuka) hāsyā is required for Śṛṅgāra and the Karuṇa is required for vipralambha due to the similar transitory feelings of both. But, he says, this view is contradictory in the sense of succession (pūrvāpara). The kind hearted person possesses compassion in his heart, it is prevalent in the world and this compassion by signs is

1. अथ करुणो नाम शोकस्थायिभावप्रभवः। स च शापक्लेशविनिपतितेष्टजनविप्रयोगविभवनाश-
वधबन्धविद्रवोपघातव्यसनसंयोगादिभिर्विभावैः समुपजायते। तस्याश्रुपातपरिदेवतालुमुखशोषण-
वैवर्ण्यश्रस्त्रस्तगात्रतानिःश्वासस्मृतिलोपस्तम्भवेपथुस्वरभेदादिभिरनुभावैरभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः।
— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 737-38.
2. व्यभिचारिणश्चास्य निर्वेदग्लानिचिन्तौत्सुक्यावेगभ्रममोहश्रमभयविषाददैन्यव्याधिजडतोन्मादा-
पस्मास्त्राससालस्यमरणदयः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 738-739.
3. इष्टवधदर्शनाद्वा विप्रियवचनस्य संश्रवाद्वापि।
एभिर्भावविशेषैः करुणरसो नाम संभवति॥62॥—Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p.739.
4. सस्वनरुदितैर्मोहागमैश्च परिदेवितैर्विलषितैश्च।
अभिनेयः करुणरसो देहायासाभिघातैश्च॥63॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p.739.

understood to be in the actor by the spectators henceforth the compassion itself is Karuṇa rasa; this is the view of Śaṅkuka. Abhinavagupta says that this is due to forgetting the context of succession (pūrvāpara). The action in the context of sorrow (śoka) is karuṇā and the desire to protect is compassion. So how can it be the follow up of śoka (sorrow). We are unable to understand for whom is his kindness. Therefore the tasting of sorrow is called Karuṇā or the name of experience of sorrow (śoka) is karuṇā in its generalized form. As rati being tasted is Śṛṅgāra so the śoka being tasted is Karuṇa.¹

4. Raudra Rasa (The Furious)

The sthāyībhāva (permanent mental state) of Raudra rasa is krodha (anger). It lies in rākṣas (demon), dānava (monster) and the persons of arrogant nature and the cause (hetu) of it is war. It is produced from the determinants of vadha (killing), ādharṣaṇa (to misbehave with sister, daughter and woman), adhikṣepa (to reprehend caste and family), mithyā bhāṣaṇa (slandering), upaghāta (destruction- hurting), abusing, rebel, will to kill, and mātsarya (envy). It should be acted by the anubhāvas (acting) of tāḍana (beating), pāṭana (ripping or cleaving), pīḍana (crushing), chedana (cutting), bhedana (act of piercing), to take arms of

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1. तत्र चायं क्रमः — सम्भोगेन हास्योऽङ्गत्वेनापेक्षितः । विप्रलम्भेन च समानव्यभिचारिकत्वात्करुण इति टीकाकारः । एतच्च पूर्वापरविरुद्धम् । अस्माभिस्तूद्देशविभाग एव क्रमो दर्शितः । तस्याभिनयः प्रयोज्यो यस्यास्वाद्यमानस्य करुण इति व्यपदेशः । सदयहृदयता हि करुणा लोके प्रसिद्धा । सा च लिङ्गैरनुकर्तरी शोकं प्रतियतां सामाजिकानामिति करुणव्यपदेश इति श्रीशङ्कुः ।

एतच्च पूर्वापरविस्मरणविजृम्भितमस्य । यतः शोकप्रतिकृतिस्ततः करुणा । दया च नाम परित्राणेच्छा । सा कथं शोकानुकरणम् । किं प्रति च तेषां दयेति न विद्यः ।

तस्मात् करुण इति शोकस्य सर्वसाधारणत्वेन प्राग्युक्त्या आस्वाद्यमानस्य संज्ञा । तदर्थमेव नामशब्दः । तत्प्रभवत्वं शृङ्गारवद् व्याख्येयम् । — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 737.

enemies, to knock down the arms, to kill by arms, to draw the blood and to drink, etc. It should be acted by red eyes, bending eyebrows, pressing the lips by teeth, slapping the cheek, sweating, vepathu (shivering, tremor), excitement, and gadgadikā (sobbing), etc.¹ The transitory feelings in it are : sammoha (foolishness), utsāha (enthusiasm), āvega (excitement), amarṣa (intolerance), capalatā (fickleness, frivolity, flippancy), ugratā (acrimony) and garva (pride) etc.² It is said that the Raudra rasa lives in rākṣasa (demon), dānava (monsteer) and the persons of arrogant nature then the question arises that does it not live in others? In answer to this it is said that it lives in others also but here it is said in the sense of adhikārī (eligibility) because these rākṣas (demon) etc. are by nature raudra (furious).³ Here question arises why they are furious by nature? It is said in answer that because they have many mouths, many hands, the hairs of head are shaking, discarded and of yellow colour, the eyes are red and protuberant and they are of deep black colour. Whatever the gesture they perform with speech and body part that all are of Raudra by their nature. They often use śṛṅgāra by force. The persons who follow them are also permitted for Raudra rasa due to war and blow

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1. अथ रौद्रोनामक्रोधस्थायिभावात्मको रक्षोदानवोद्धत मनुष्यप्रकृतिः संग्रामहेतुकः। स च क्रोधाघर्षणाधिक्षेपोनृतवचनोपघातवाक्पारुष्यभिद्रोहमात्सर्यादिभिर्विभावैरुत्पद्यते। तस्य च ताडन-पाटनपीडनच्छेदनभेदनप्रहरणाहरणशस्त्रसम्पातसम्प्रहाररुधिराकर्षणाद्यानि कर्माणि। पुनश्च रक्तनयन-भ्रुकुटीकरणदन्तोष्ठपीडनगण्डस्फुरणहस्ताग्रनिष्पेष स्वेदवेपथुरोमाञ्जगद्गदिकादिभिरनुभावैरभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 741-742.
 2. भावाश्चास्यासम्मोहोत्साहावेगामर्षचपलतौग्यगर्वादयः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 742.
 3. अत्राह— यदभिहितं रक्षोदानवादीनां रौद्रो रसः। किमन्येषां नास्ति। उच्यते— अस्त्यन्येषामपि रौद्रो रसः। किन्त्वधिकारोऽत्र गृह्यते। ते हि स्वभावत एव रौद्राः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 744-45.

(prahāra).¹ Abhinavagupta says that injustice is the subject of krodha (anger). Seeing the act of injustice, in the world, the persons become angry and possess thirst of drinking the blood of the unjust person and they say that if they can find the unjust person they will drink his blood. The person incapable of drinking blood possesses will to do that in mind. In this way the determinant of Raudra is general like Hāsya which is found in the world. The anger being tasted is Raudra rasa.²

5. Vira Rasa (The Heroic)

The Vira rasa has the permanent mental state (sthāyībhāva) of utsāha (heroism) and it lives in the persons of higher nature. It is born from the determinants of the diligence of right knowledge (asam̐mohadhyavasāya), humility (vinaya), bala (might), parākrama (valour), śakti (power), pratāpa (majesty), and prabhāva

1. कस्मात्। बहुबाहवो बहुमुखाः प्रोद्धूतविकीर्णपिङ्गलशिरोजाः रक्तोद्वृत्तविलोचना भीमासितरूपिणश्चैव। यच्च किञ्चित्समारभन्ते स्वभावचेष्टितं वागङ्गादिकं तत्सर्वं रौद्रमेवैषाम्। शृङ्गारश्च तैः प्रायशः प्रसभं सेव्यते। तेषां चानुकारिणो ये पुरुषास्तेषामपि सङ्ग्रामसम्प्रहारकृतो रौद्रो रसोऽनुमन्तव्यः। अत्रानुवंश्ये आर्ये भवतः —

युद्धप्रहारघातनविकृतच्छेदनविदारणैश्चैव।

सङ्ग्रामसम्प्रमाद्यैरेभिः सञ्जायते रौद्रः॥६४॥

नानाप्रहरणमोक्षैः शिरः कबन्धभुजकर्तनैश्चैव।

एभिश्चार्थविशेषैरस्याभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः॥६५॥

इति रौद्ररसो दृष्टो रौद्रवागङ्गचेष्टितः।

शस्त्रप्रहारभूयिष्ठ उग्रकर्मक्रियात्मकः॥६६॥ —Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 745-748.

2. अन्यायकारिता प्राधान्येन क्रोधस्य विषयः। तादृश च जने सर्वेऽपि मनोरथैरपि रुधिरपानमपि नामाद्रियन्ते। तथा चाह लोकः— तादृशो यदि लभ्यते तत्तदीयं रुधिरमपि पीत्वान तृप्यते। तेन हास्यवत्साधारणविभावत्वाच्चर्वणापि क्रोधमय्येवेति तद्रसनाचरणे रौद्रः क्रोधात्मक एव। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 740-41.

(infulence) etc. It should be acted with the anubhāvas (effects) of sthairyā (firmness), dhairyā (patience), śauryā (valour bravery), tyāga (abnegation, relinquishment), vaiśāradyā (competence, skillfulness), and romāñca (horripilation, titillation) etc. The transitory feelings of it are : dhṛti (patience), mati (intelligence), garva (pride), āvega (excitement), augryā (wrathfulness, pungency), amarṣa (envy), smṛti (memory) and cintā (anxiety) etc.¹

Abhinavagupta says that the determinant of war and strike which is found in Raudra is also in Vīra rasa but in Vīra it is not with the desire of killing as in Raudra rather it is with the desire of victory. The utsāha (heroism) is found in the persons of higher nature so Vīra is found in the persons of higher nature. The utsāha (heroism) of the persons of higher nature is tastable (āsvādyā) everywhere. He says, further, that heroism (utsāha) is found in all the persons but it is not preachable as it is not found on the proper occasion. The persons whose character (caritra) is preachable the

1. अथ वीरोनामोत्तमप्रकृतिरुत्साहात्मकः । स चा संमोहाध्यवसायनयविनयबलपराक्रमशक्तिप्रताप-
प्रभावादिभिर्विभावैरुत्पद्यते । तस्य स्थैर्यधैर्यत्यागवैशारद्यरोमाञ्चादिभिरनुभावैरभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः ।
भावाश्चास्य धृतिमतिगर्वाविगौग्यामर्षस्मृतिचिन्तादयः ।

अत्रार्ये रसविचारमुखे—

असम्मोहाध्यवसायादविषादित्वादविस्मयामोहात् ।

विविधादर्थविशेषाद्वीररसो नाम सम्भवति ॥ 67 ॥

स्थितिधैर्यवीर्यगर्वैरुत्साहपराक्रमप्रभावैश्च ।

वाक्यैश्चाक्षेपकृतेर्वीररसः सम्यग्भिनयः ॥ 68 ॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 67, 68, p. 749-51.

utsāha (heroism) of them is found on the proper occasion.¹

6. Bhayānaka Rasa (The Terrible)

The Bhayānaka rasa (terrible) has the sthāyībhāva (permanent mental state) of bhaya (fear). It is born from the determinants of hearing terrific sounds, seeing terrific beings, hearing the sound of owl and jackal, udvega (fury), wandering in empty forest, by seeing, hearing and narrating of the killing and abduction of relatives etc. It should be acted by shivering of hands and feet, frivolity (capalatā) of eyes, horripilation (pulaka), change of the colour of face (mukhavaivarṇya), change in voice (svarabheda), stumbha (astrigency), sveda (sweatig) and gadgadikā (puffed up of body) etc. The transitory feelings of it are doubt (śaṅkā), moha (delusion), dīnatā (distress), āvega (fit-flurry), capalatā (fickleness), jaḍatā (stupor), trāsa (awe-horror), apasmāra (epilepsy) and maraṇa (death) etc.² Bharata says by citing a verse that there must be artificial (kṛtak) fear from guru (teacher) and king.³ Explaining the verse cited by Bharata Abhinavagupta says that fear lives

1. युद्धवीरे हि संग्रामसम्प्रहारयोगो रौद्रेऽपीति किन्तु वीरे न जिघांसेति। उत्तमानां प्रकृतिः स्वभावो यत् उत्साहोऽतो वीररसोऽपि तथा। यदि वा काव्ये नाट्ये च प्रयुज्यमान उत्तमः प्रकृतिर्हेतुर्यस्य। उत्तमवर्णानां हि सर्वत्रोत्साह आस्वाद्यो भवति। अत एव चतुर्विधं नायकेषु धीरत्वमनुयायित्वेन वक्ष्यते धीरोदात्त इत्यादि। तत्र सर्वो जन उत्साहवानेव। किन्त्वविषय इत्यनुपदेश्यचरितता। यदीयं तु चरितमुपदेशार्हं तेषामुचित एवावसरे उत्साहाभिव्यक्तिः। उचितत्वं चावसरस्यासंमोहादे-
सम्पत्तिरिति सैव विभावत्वेनोपदिष्टा। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 749.
2. अथ भयानको नाम भयस्थायिभावात्मकः। स च विकृतरवश्रवसत्त्वदर्शनशिवोलूकत्रासोद्वेगशून्यागारण्यगमनस्वजनवधबन्धदर्शनश्रुतिकथादिभिर्विभावैरुत्पद्यते। तस्यप्रवेपितकरचरणनयनचपल-
पुलकमुखवैवर्ण्यस्वरभेदस्तम्भस्वेदगद्गदिकादिभिरनुभावैरभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः। भावाश्चास्य शंकामोह-
दैर्न्यावेगचापलजडतात्रासापस्मारमरणादयः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 752.
3. विकृतरवसत्त्वदर्शनग्रामारण्यशून्यगृहगमनात्।
गुरुनृपयोरपराधात्कृतकश्च भयानको ज्ञेयः॥६९॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6,
verse 69, p. 753.

naturally in women, persons of lower nature and in children, it is not found in the persons of the nature of higher and middle. The persons of higher and middle nature must show artificial fear from guru (teacher) and the king. Being done so the guru and the king will understand the doer a humble person. Here question arises that being artificial the bhaya can not be sthāyībhāva as it is produced by artificial determinant. And artificial determinant can not produce the real tasting of Rasa. Abhinavagupta says that if it is followed for a long time it appears to be natural and as the result it begins to produce tasting. Therefore it is permanent mental state not the transitory feeling.¹

7. Bibhatsa Rasa (The Odious)

Bībhatsa rasa has the sthāyībhāva of jugupsā (disgust). It is born from the determinants of the hearing, seeing and narrating of ahrādaya (disheartful), apriya (not liked), acodya (unsayable) and unwanted (avāñchita) things. It should be acted by the anubhāvas of destruction of whole body (sarvāṅga), shrinking of the whole body, by covering the mouth and nose, by shrinking mouth, nose, eyes etc., broken parts of the body, spitting, udvejana (purturbation) etc. Its transitory feelings are apasmāra (epilepsy), āvega (fury), moha (delusion), vyādhi (illness) and maraṇa (death)

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1. गुरुनृपयोरिति। अयमाशयः — भयं तावत् स्त्रीनीचबालादिषु वक्ष्यते। नोत्तममध्यमप्रकृतिषु। तेऽपि तु गुरुभ्यो राज्ञश्च भयं दर्शयेयुः। तदभावेऽप्येवं सुतरामुत्तमानं भवति। अप्रभुत्वं चमात्यानाम्। यथाह— 'स्वेच्छाचारी भीत एवास्मि भर्तुः' इति। (रत्ना. 1.7)। अनुभावाश्च तथा श्लिष्टास्तत्र क्रियन्ते लोके येन सत्यत एव भीतोऽयमिति गुर्वादीनां प्रतीतिर्भवति। अस्वाभाविकत्वाच्च कृतकम्। बहुतरकालानुवर्तनेनास्वाद्यत्वाच्च रसत्वम्। न च व्यभिचारित्वम्। तद्धि तदा स्याद्यदि स्वभावत एव न किञ्चित्काललवमुत्पाद्यते— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 753.

etc.¹

8. Adbhuta Rasa (The Marvelous)

The Adbhuta rasa (marvelous) has the sthāyībhāva of vismaya (wonder). It is born from the determinants of seeing divine persons, obtaining of desired (īpsita) and willed (manoratha) things, wandering in garden and family of deities (devakula); sabhā (meeting), vimāna (air-vehicle), māyā and indrajāla (magic) and possibility etc. It should be acted with the anubhāvas (consequents) of seeing with open eyes, without winking, horripilation, stumbha (perplexity), gadgadikā (pleasing gesture), pralaya (falling), āśru (tears), sveda (sweating), harṣa (happiness), managing charity, thanking, sound laughing, raising hands on clothes of the body and face, moving hands and fingers etc. The transitory feelings of it are āvega (fury), saṁbhrama (perplexity), jaḍatā (stupor) and capalatā (fickleness) etc.²

9. Śānta Rasa (The Quietistic)

Śānta rasa motivates towards Mokṣa (liberation) and has the

1. अथ बीभत्सोनाम जुगुप्सास्थायिभावात्मकः। स चाहृद्यप्रियाचोव्यानिष्टश्रवणदर्शनकीर्तनादि-
भिर्विभावैरुत्पद्यते। तस्य सर्वाङ्गसंहारमुखविकूणनोल्लेखननिष्ठीवनोद्वेज् नादिभिरनुभावैरभिनयः
प्रयोक्तव्यः। भावाश्चास्यापस्मारोद्वेगावेगमोहव्याधिमरणादयः। अत्रानुवंश्ये आर्ये भवतः—
अनभिमतदर्शनेन च गन्धरसस्पर्शशब्ददोषैश्च।
उद्वेजनैश्च बहुभिर्विभत्सरसः समुद्भवति॥73॥
मुखनेत्रविकूणनया नासाप्रच्छादनावनमितास्यैः।
अव्यक्तपादपतनैर्वीभत्सः सम्यगभिनयः॥74॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6,
p. 756-57.
2. अथाद्भुतोनाम विस्मयस्थायिभावात्मकः। स च दिव्यजनदर्शनेप्सितमनोरथावाप्त्युपवनदेवकुला-
दिगमनसभावमानमायेन्द्रजालसम्भावनादिभिर्विभावैरुत्पद्यते। तस्य नयनविस्तारानिमिषप्रेक्षणरोमाञ्च-
श्रुस्वेदहर्षसाधुवाददानप्रबन्धहाहाकारबाहुवदनचेलाङ्गुलिभ्रमणादिभिरनुभावैरभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः।
भावाश्चास्य आवेगसम्भ्रमजडताचलतादयः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 757-58.

sthāyībhāva of Śama (nirveda -- world weariness). It arises from the determinants of tattvajñāna (knowledge of the reality), vairāgya (detachment), purity of citta (mind) etc. It should be acted with the anubhāvas (consequents) of yama (abstentions), niyama (observances), adhyātmadhyāna (meditation on self), dhāraṇā (concentration), upāsana (devotion), sarvabhūṭadayā (compassion towards all beings), liṅagrahaṇa (wearing of religious signs), stumbha (astrigency) and romāñca (thrill) etc. Its vyabhicārībhāvas (transitory feelings) are nirveda (world-weariness), smṛti (remembrance), dhṛti (firmness of mind), sarvāśramaśauca (purity in all the four āśramas- stages of life) etc.¹ Bharata says that in this regard there are the āryās (sayings) and ślokaś (verses) according to them the Śānta rasa has been preached to attain highest good which arises from the knowledge of truth by means of concentration on the self.² The Śānta rasa should be known as that which is for the happiness and welfare of all beings and is accompanied by the stabilization in the self that results from the controlling of sense organs and organs (jñānendriyas and karmendriyas) of physical activities.³ Śānta rasa is that state wherein there is no pain, no happiness, no hatred, no envy, and wherein there is the sense of equality for all the

1. अथ शान्तो नाम शमस्थायिभावात्मको मोक्षप्रवर्तकः। स तु तत्त्वज्ञानवैराग्याशयशुद्ध्यादि-
भिर्विभावैः समुत्पद्यते। तस्य यमनियमाध्यात्मध्यानधारणोपासनसर्वभूतदयालिङ्गग्रहण-
स्तम्भरोमाञ्चादिभिरनुभावैर्भिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः। व्यभिचारिणश्चास्य निर्वेदस्मृतिधृतिसर्वाश्रम- शौचादयः।
— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 762-63.

2. अध्यात्मध्यानसमुत्पद्यते तत्त्वज्ञानार्थहेतुसंयुक्तः।

नैः श्रेयसोपदिष्टः शान्तरसो नाम सम्भवति॥८३॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6,
verse 83, p. 777.

3. बुद्धीन्द्रियकर्मेन्द्रियसंरोधाध्यात्मसंस्थितोपेतः।

सर्वप्राणिसुखहितः शान्तरसो नाम विज्ञेयः॥८४॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6,
verse 84, p. 778.

beings.¹ The emotions (bhāvas) like delight (rati) etc. are the vikāras (deformations) and Śānta is the prakṛti (natural state of mind). The vikāras (deformations) arise out of prakṛti (the original state of mind) and again merge into it.² The emotions arise out of Śānta due to their respective causes and when their specific causes cease to exist, they all merge back into Śānta.³

Explaining Bharata's statement about Śānta rasa Abhinavagupta says that Bharata has described the characteristics of Śānta rasa according to those who hold the number of rasa nine (nava rasāḥ) instead of holding the number as eight (aṣṭau rasāḥ).⁴ In this regard some holds that śama (tranquillity) is the sthāyībhāva of Śānta rasa and it arises out of the determinants of ascetic practices (tapa) and with the association of yogins etc. It should be acted by the anubhāvas (consequents) of the absence of lust, anger etc. Its vyabhicārībhāvas are firmness (dhṛti) and wisdom (mati) etc.⁵ He says that some others do not accept it

1. न यत्र दुःखं न सुखं न द्वेषो नापि मत्सरः।

समः सर्वेषु भूतेषु स शान्तः प्रथितो रसः॥८५॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 85, p. 777-78.

2. भावा विकारा रत्याद्याः शान्तस्तु प्रकृतिर्मतः।

विकारः प्रकृतेर्जातः पुनस्तत्रैव लीयते॥८६॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 86, p. 778.

3. स्वं स्वं निमित्तमासाद्य शान्ताद्भावः प्रवर्तते।

पुनर्निमित्तापाये च शान्त एवोपलीयते॥८७॥ — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, verse 87, p. 778.

4. ये पुनर्नव रसा इति पठन्ति तन्मते शान्तस्वरूपमभिधीयते। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 762.

5. तत्र केचिदाहुः — शान्तः शमस्थायिभावात्मकस्तपस्यायोगसम्पर्कादिभिः विभावैरुत्पद्यते। तस्य कामक्रोधाद्यभावरूपैरनुभावैरभिनयः। व्यभिचारी धृतिमतिप्रभृतिः। इति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 762.

because according to them śama and śānta are synonymous, and the number of bhāvas given by Bharata will increase more than given number of 49 (forty nine). Another point in not holding śama as the sthāyībhāva they say that in regard to śṛṅgāra rasa the vibhāvas of seasons, flowers etc cause immediately the rise of love etc., but ascetic practices, vedic recitation etc., do not immediately give rise to Śānta. Tapa and Vedic recitation etc. are the causes of the tranquillity of mind, they are not the cause of Śānta. It can be argued that ascetic practices, Vedic recitations etc., are the immediate causes of the knowledge of the truth (tattvajñāna), and, since the knowledge of the truth which precedes Śānta is the effect of the ascetic practices etc. so they cease to be the determinant of Śānta. The absence of lust etc. can not be the anubhāva of Śānta as they are present in other rasas also and it can not be presented on the stage. The cessation of activity can not be presented on the stage. The anubhāvas, like sleep, swoon etc. can be presented by action like breathing in and out, falling down, lying on the ground etc. How can the firmness of mind (dhṛti) etc. accompanied with the attainment of objects be the vyabhicārībhāvas in Śānta? It can not be instructed how to attain the knowledge of the truth by means of a state of inactivity. The persons who are found affected with the sufferings of other persons in the world can not be said to have attained the state of tranquillity which is the characteristic state of the attainment of highest knowledge as they are found more involved in the turmoil of worldly life. Therefore, they conclude that Śānta rasa does not exist.¹

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1. एतदपरे न सहन्ते। शमशान्तयोः पर्यायत्वात्। एकात्रपञ्चाशद्भावा इति सङ्ख्यात्यागात्। किञ्च विभावाऋतुमाल्यादयस्तत्समनन्तरभाविनि शृङ्गारादावनुसन्धीयन्ते इति युक्तम्। तपोऽध्ययनादयस्तु न शान्तस्य, शमस्य (ये) हेतवः। तत्त्वज्ञानस्यानन्तरहेतव इति चेत्पूर्वोदिततत्त्वज्ञानेऽपि तर्हि एषां प्रयोज्यतेति तपोऽध्ययनादीनां विभावता त्यक्ता स्यात्।

In reply to this Abhinavagupta says that just as in the world the trivarga, three puruṣārthas (goal of life) viz. dharma, artha and kāma, are known so also mokṣa too is well known as the fourth puruṣārtha and it is found to be taught in the śāstras, like smṛtis and itihāsas with the prescription of means for its attainment. Just as the states of mind (cittavṛtti) which are proper to love (kāma) etc., and are said by the words as rati (delight -- sex) etc., when made capable of relishing through the attempts of the poet and the actor, are brought to the status of rasas like śṛṅgāra etc., in relation to the spectators who possess the proper sympathetic response; in the same way, why the state of mind appropriate to the highest goal of life called as mokṣa can not be brought to the status of a rasa?¹ The mental state found in the state of mokṣa is the sthāyībhāva of Śānta. The point is that by what word it be called. Some say that it is nirveda (world-weariness) born out of the knowledge of the truth (tattvajñāna). This nirveda (world weariness) is different from that which arises from poverty etc., as its cause, viz. knowledge of the truth (tattvajñāna) is distinct from poverty. Abhinavagupta says that this is the reason that Bharata has mentioned nirveda in the middle of the sthāyībhāvas and the

कामाद्यभावोऽपि नानुभावः। अशान्ताद्विपक्षादव्यावृत्तेः। अगमकत्वात्प्रयोगासमवायित्वाच्च। न हि चेष्टाव्युपरमः प्रयोग योग्यः। सुप्तमोहादयोऽपि हि निःश्वासोच्छ्वासपतनभूषिततादिभि-
 श्रेष्ठाभिरिवानुभाव्यन्ते। धृतिप्रभृतिरपि प्राप्तविषयोपभोगः कथं शान्ते स्यात्। न चाकिञ्चित्करत्वमात्रेण
 तत्त्वज्ञानोपायेव्युत्पाद्यन्ते विनेयाः, परदुःखदुःखितमनसो दृश्यन्ते सम्यग्दर्शनसमावस्थां प्राप्ताः।
 अपि तु संसारे। तत्र शान्तो रस इति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 762-63.

1. अत्रोच्यते— इह तावद्धर्मादित्रितयामेव मोक्षोऽपि पुरुषार्थः। शास्त्रेषु स्मृतीतिहासादिषु च प्राधान्येनोपायते व्युत्पाद्यत इति सुप्रसिद्धम्। यथा च कामादिषु समुचिताश्चित्तवृत्तयो रत्यादिशब्दवाच्याः कविनटव्यापारेणास्वादयोग्यताप्रापणद्वारेण तथाविधहृदयसंवादवतः सामाजिकान्प्रति रसत्वं शृङ्गारादितया नीयन्ते तथा मोक्षाभिधानपरमपुरुषार्थोचिता चित्तवृत्तिः किमिति रसत्वं नानीयत इति वक्तव्यम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 763-64.

sañcaribhāvas otherwise the muni (Bharata) who is māṅgalika (auspicious) would not have mentioned it at the place (in the middle of the vyabhicārībhāvas). Bharata did not grant the use of disgust (jugupsā) as a vyabhicārībhāva of śṛṅgāra while he has accepted the interchangability of the characters of the sthāyībhāvas, the vyabhicārībhāvas, the sāttvikabhāvas, and the anubhāvas, in regard to all the 49 bhāvas in the context of the requirements of a particular situation and on the presentation by the power of words and their meanings.¹ Nirveda which arises from the knowledge of the truth overpowers (upamardaka) or pervades other sthāyībhāvas as it is more stable than other sthāyībhāvas like rati (love) etc. which persists together with the existence of the variety of emotions.²

The objection is raised that if nirveda arising from the knowledge of truth is the sthāyībhāva of Śānta which amounts to hold the knowledge of truth (tattvajñāna) to be the vibhāva (determinant) of nirveda then how can the other things like vairāgya (detachment), samādhi (meditation) etc. be the vibhāva (determinant) of nirveda. If it is said that vairāgya etc. become the vibhāva of nirveda because they are the means for attaining the knowledge of the truth then it will amount to giving the name

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1. चा चासौ तथाभूताचित्तवृत्तिः सैवात्र स्थायिभावः । एतत्तुचिन्त्यम् । किं नामासौ— तत्त्वज्ञानोत्थितो निर्वेद इति केचित् । तथा हि— दारिद्र्यादिप्रभवो यो निर्वेदः स ततोऽन्य एव । हेतोस्तत्त्वज्ञानस्य वैलक्षण्यात् । स्थायिसञ्चारमध्ये चैतदर्थमेवायं पठितः । अन्यथा माङ्गलिको मुनिस्तथा न पठेत् । जुगुप्सां च व्यभिचारित्वेन शृङ्गारे निषेधन्मुनिर्भावानां सर्वेषामेव स्थायित्वसञ्चारित्वचिन्तनात्तावन्ति अनुभावत्वानि योग्यतोपनिषातितानि शब्दार्थबलाकृष्टान्यनुजानाति । — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 764.
 2. तत्त्वज्ञानजश्च निर्वेदः स्थाय्यन्तरोपमर्दकः । भाववैचित्र्यसहिष्णुभ्योरत्यादिभ्योः यः परमः स्थायिशीलः स एव हि स्थाय्यन्तराणामुपमर्दकः । — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 764.

vibhāva to that which is the cause of another cause, as it will lead to the fallacy of atiprasaṅga¹ (out of context), as the vibhāva means the direct cause of the sthāyībhāva, not the remote cause. It is also said that nirveda is the rejection of everything (detachment) and it is helpful to the attainment of the knowledge of truth (tattvajñāna). When a detached person seeks the knowledge of truth he attains it. The attainment of Mokṣa is due to the knowledge of truth. It is not the case that a person knows the truth, and then feels detached and from that detachment mokṣa is attained. Here Abhinavagupta refers Īśvarakṛṣṇa of Sāṃkhya system who says in his Sāṃkhyakārikā (45th verse) that from detachment (vairāgya) only prakṛtilaya (dissolution of prakṛti) is attained, not the mokṣa.² It is also said that the person who is the knower of the truth (tattvajñānin) sees detachment everywhere. Patanjali has also said that from the knowledge of truth (puruṣakhyāti) there arises an extreme detachment for the guṇas. Abhinavagupta says that it is true but Patanjali himself has said that such detachment is actually the highest state of knowledge. Thus the knowledge of truth is nothing than a state of knowledge arising from a state to another state. Therefore, nirveda is not the sthāyībhāva of Śānta. The knowledge of the truth is the sthāyībhāva of śānta. The knowledge of truth (saṃyagjñāna) is like a person coming to the state of dissipation of the attitude of acceptance who has been

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1. इदमपि पर्यनुयुञ्जते— तत्त्वज्ञानजो निर्वेदोऽस्य च स्थायीति वदता तत्त्वज्ञानमेवात्र विभावत्वेनोक्तं स्यात्। वैराग्यबीजादीषु कथं विभावत्वम्। तदुपायत्वादिति चेत्कारणकारणेऽयं विभावताव्यवहारः। स चातिप्रसङ्गावहः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 764.
 2. किञ्च निर्वेदो नाम सर्वत्रानुपादेयताप्रत्ययः। वैराग्यलक्षणः। स च तत्त्वज्ञानस्य प्रत्युतोपयोगी। विरक्तो हि तथा प्रयतते यथाऽस्य तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते। तत्त्वज्ञानाद्धि मोक्षः। न तु तत्त्वं ज्ञात्वानिर्विद्यते निर्वेदाच्चमोक्ष इति। “वैराग्यात्प्रकृतिलयः।” इति हि तत्र भवन्तः। (ई.कृ. सांख्यकारिका, 45) — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 765.

deceived by a delusion of long standing for an unworthy object of the world. Abhinavagupta quotes a verse in which a poet describes about his right knowledge of a miser. The poet says that he served a miser for a long time like milking a bull mistaking it for a cow bending under the burden of her full udder; in vain he embraced an ugly eunuch taking him to be a young girl, in vain he cherished a longing for a piece of glittering glass taking it to be beryl. All this he did when bemused as he was, he bowed to a miser who was unable to appreciate merit.¹ In another objection it is said that attachment to the sense-objects is due to the false knowledge and it will cease on the attainment of the knowledge of truth. Abhinavagupta says that this is the same what Akṣapāda has said when he says that knowledge of the truth is caused by the removal of false knowledge and that it is further the cause of vairāgya which is of the nature of the removal of all faults (doṣas). This means that vairāgya and nirveda are same and therefore it can be said that nirveda is the sthāyībhāva and tattvajñāna is a

1. ननु तत्त्वज्ञानिनः सर्वत्र दृढतरं वैराग्यं दृष्टम्। तत्र भवद्भिरप्युक्तं तत्परं पुरुषख्यातेर्गुणवैतृण्यम्' इति (योगसूत्र, 1-16)। भवत्येवम्। तादृशं तु 'वैराग्यं ज्ञानस्यैव पराकाष्ठा।' इति (व्यासभाष्य, 1-16) भुजङ्गविभुनैव भगवताऽभ्युत्थायि। ततश्च तत्त्वज्ञानमेवेदं वैराग्यमालयं परिपोष्यमाणमिति न निर्वेदः स्थायी। किन्तु तत्त्वज्ञानमेव स्थायीति भवेत्। यत्तु व्यभिचारिव्याख्यानावसरे वक्ष्यते तच्चिरकालविभ्रमविप्रलब्धस्योपादेयत्वनिवृत्तये। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 765.

2. यत्सम्यग्ज्ञानम्—

यथा—

'वृथा दुग्धोऽनड्वांस्तनभरता गौरिति परं

परिष्वक्त; षण्डो युवतिरिति लावण्यरहितः।

कृता वैडूर्याशा विकचकिरणे काचशकले

मया मूढेन त्वां कृपणमगुणज्ञां प्रणमता॥' इति — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 765-66.

vibhāva. Abhinavagupta says that vairāgya and nirveda are not same. Vairāgya is a higher form of detachment. While nirveda is a state of mind which is characterized as a state of sadness whereas vairāgya is the complete cessation of rāga, etc. which includes even śoka.¹ Even assuming vairāgya and nirveda as identical, Gautam has placed it in the midst of the means of mokṣa and has not mentioned it as the immediate cause of mokṣa. It may be said that nirveda arising from tattvajñāna is the sthāyībhāva of Śānta means it is like giving to śama the name nirveda. In reply to this Abhinavagupta says that śānta and śama are said to be synonyms like hāsa and hāsyā, but the synonymity in the case of śānta and śama is apparent not real. There is difference between śānta as a rasa and śama as a sthāyībhāva because śama is siddha (accomplished) while śānta is sādhyā (to be accomplished); śama is laukika (worldly) while śānta is alaukika (non-worldly), śama is sādharmaṇa (ordinary), while śānta is asādharmāṇa (extraordinary). Therefore, Abhinavagupta concludes that nirveda can not be the sthāyībhāva of Śānta.²

Others hold that there are only eight mental states, such as rati etc., said by Bharata. Those mental states when they are based on extra-worldly (alaukika) vibhāvas such as śruti which are

1. ननु मिथ्याज्ञानमूलो विषयगन्धस्तत्त्वज्ञानात्प्रशाम्यतीति दुःखजन्मसूत्रेणाक्षपादैर्वदद्भिर्मिथ्याज्ञानापचयकारणं तत्त्वज्ञानं वैराग्यस्य दोषापायलक्षणस्य कारणमुक्तम्। ननु ततः किम्। ननु वैराग्यं निर्वेदः। क एवमाह। निर्वेदो हि शोकप्रवाहप्रसररूपश्चित्तवृत्ति विशेषः। वैराग्यं तु रागादीनां प्रध्वंसः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 766.
2. भवतु वा वैराग्यमेव निर्वेदः। तथापि तस्य स्वकारणवशान्मध्यभाविनोऽपि न मोक्षसाध्ये सूत्रस्थानीयताक्षपादैश्चारीव। किञ्च तत्त्वज्ञानोत्थितो निर्वेद इति शमस्यैवेदं निर्वेदनाम कृतं स्यात्। शमशान्तयोः पर्यायत्वं तु हासहास्याभ्यां व्याख्यातम्। सिद्धसाध्यते यदलौकिकालौकिकत्वेन साधारणासाधारणतया च वैलक्षण्यं शमशान्तयोरपि सुलभमेव। तस्मान्न निर्वेदः स्थायीति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 766-67.

different from the ordinary (kathita) vibhāvas become unusual (vicitra). Out of them one sthāyībhāva can become the sthāyībhāva of Śānta rasa. The rati when it is for one's own self can become the means for attaining mokṣa. Henceforth that rati itself is the sthāyībhāva of Śānta. In Bhagavadgītā it has been said that the man whose love is centred in the self and is gratified in his own self, and who receives all delight in the self, there is nothing any longer to be accomplished for him.¹

Abhinavagupta says that in this way any of the eight sthāyībhāvas beginning with rati and hāsa and ending with vismaya can be explained as the sthāyībhāva of Śānta. It is found that a person attains mokṣa when he realises the oddity of everything in the world (hāsa); when he finds that the whole world is lamentable (śoka), when he finds the happenings in the world harmful to his spiritual development (krodha), when he resorts to extra-ordinary energy dominated by the absence of delusion (utsāha), when he feels fear from all the objects of the senses (bhaya), when he feels disgust for young women (jugupsā), when he feels astonished on his unprecedented realisation of his own self (vismaya). Abhinavagupta says that it is not the case that

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1. अन्ये मन्यन्ते रत्यादय एवाष्टौ चित्तवृत्तिविशेषा उक्ताः। त एव लोकदृष्ट श्रुतानुमित-
कथितविभावविविक्ता लौकिकविभावविशेषसंश्रया विचित्रा एव तावत्। ततश्च तन्मध्यादेवान्यतमोऽत्र
स्थायी। तत्रानाहतनादव्यक्ताद्वयानन्दमय स्वात्मविषया रतिरेव मोक्षसाधनमिति सैव शान्ते स्थायिनीति।

यथोक्तम् —

‘यस्त्वात्मरतिरेव स्यादात्मतृप्तश्च मानवः।

आत्मन्येव च सन्तुष्टस्तस्य कार्यं न विद्यते॥’इति॥ (गीता, 3.17)

— Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 767.

Bharata has not agreed with this position.¹ It is found that when Bharata enumerates particular bhāvas by using words like rati etc., and describes therein its other varieties by using the word ca (and), it seems that he admits their ability to lead to mokṣa, the condition is that they must be the result of extra-ordinary causes (vibhāvas) not of the ordinary causes. Abhinavagupta says that in the case to hold that any sthāyībhāva can be the sthāyībhāva of Śānta, the different sthāyībhāvas would reject each other and in this way none of them can be regarded the sthāyībhāva of Śānta because of their contradictory character. If it is said that the different sthāyībhāvas can be the sthāyībhāvas of Śānta because they lead to mokṣa in view of their different approaches, Abhinavagupta says that their view has already been refuted. Further, he says that due to the different sthāyībhāvas of Śānta depending on the approaches of the different persons concerned, there would be an infinity of Śānta rasas. If it is said that there would be only one Śānta rasa, not infinite, because its result is one, mokṣa, Abhinavagupta says that, then, vīra and raudra would have to be regarded as one rasa because they both lead to a single result, i.e., the destruction of enemy. Some hold that all the sthāyībhāvas become merged together, like different flavours merge together in a beverage, and in this way by merging together they become the sthāyībhāvas of Śānta. In reply to this view Abhinavagupta says that different states of mind can not co-exist at the same time, and also because of being mutually antagonistic

1. एवं समस्तविषयं वैकृते पश्यतो विश्वं च शोच्यं विलोकयतः सांसारिकं च वृत्तान्तमपकारित्वेन पश्यतः सातिशयसम्मोहप्रधानं वीर्यमाश्रितवतः सर्वस्माद्विषयसार्थाद्विभ्यतः सर्वलोकस्पृहणीयादपि प्रमदादेर्जुगुप्समानस्यस्यां पूर्वस्वात्मातिशयलाभाद्विस्मयमानस्य मोक्षसिद्धिरिति। हासादीनां विस्मयान्तानामन्यतमस्य स्थायित्वम् निरूपणीयम्। न चैतन्मुनेर्न सम्मतम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 768.

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they can not co-exist. Therefore, this thesis is also not tenable.¹

Now the problem arises what is the sthāyībhāva of Śānta? explaining the sthāyībhāva of Śānta Abhinavagupta says that since mokṣa is attained by the means of the knowledge of the truth so it would be proper to hold knowledge of truth (tattvajñāna) the sthāyībhāva of mokṣa. Tattvajñāna (knowledge of truth) is another name of ātmajñāna (knowledge of self). The knowledge of the self is different from the knowledge attained by senses. The knowledge attained by senses is the knowledge of worldly objects, whereas the knowledge of the self is non-sensuous, non-worldly, super-sensuous. Anything which is different from the self is non-self.² Therefore, Ātman (self) itself is the sthāyībhāva of Śānta, which is characterised as possessing pure qualities (dharma), such as knowledge, bliss etc., and is devoid of imagined enjoyment of sense objects. This sthāyībhāva of the self can not be expressed in terms of the other sthāyībhāvas. For, the other sthāyībhāvas, like rati etc., arise and disappear on the emergence and disappearance of their respective causes being attached for some time with the self (as its substratum-bhitti) and so they are called sthāyībhāvas, whereas ātman (self) is of un-

1. यावदेवहि 'विशिष्टान्विभावान्परिगणयति आदिशब्देन च तत्प्रकारानेवान्यान्संगृहीते तावदेव तद्व्यतिरिक्तालौकिकहेतूपनतानां रत्यादीनामनुजानात्येवापवर्गविषयत्वम्। एवंवादिनान्तु परस्परमेव विचारयतामेकस्य स्थायित्वं विशीर्यत एव। तदुपायभेदात्तस्य तस्य स्थायित्वमित्यप्युच्य- मानमगुणमेव प्रयुक्तमेव। स्थायिभेदेन प्रतिपुरुषं रसस्याप्यानन्त्यापत्तेः। मोक्षैकफलत्वादेको रस इति चेत्, क्षमैकफलत्वे वीररौद्रयोरज्येकत्वं स्यात्। अन्ये तु पानकरसवदविभागं प्राप्ताः सर्व एव रत्यादयोऽत्र स्थायिन इत्याहुः। चित्तवृत्तीनामयुगपद्भावादन्योन्यं च विरोधादेतदपि न मनोज्ञम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 768-69.

2. कस्तर्ह्यत्र स्थायी। उच्यते— इह तत्त्वज्ञानमेव तावन्मोक्षसाधनमिति तस्यैव मोक्षे स्थायिता युक्ता। तत्त्वज्ञानं च नामात्मज्ञानमेव। आत्मनश्च व्यतिरिक्तमनिर्द्रियं ज्ञानम्। परो ह्येवमात्माऽनात्मैव स्यात्। विपश्चित्तं चैतदस्मद्गुरुभिः। अस्माभिश्चान्यत्र वितन्यत इतीह नातिनिर्बन्धः कृतः। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 769.

changing nature in comparison to them. *Tattvajñāna* (*ātmajñāna*) is the substratum (*bhitti*) for all the *bhāvas* (emotions) and it is most stable of all the *bhāvas*. Its status as *sthāyībhāva* is established by itself, by its own nature. It transforms all the states of mind, like love etc., into transitory feelings. It is self-established *sthāyībhāva* so it does not require any specific mention and so it is not proper to count it separately, in addition to the eight *sthāyībhāvas*. Abhinavagupta says that by considering a lame bull and a dehorned bull, the bullness is not counted as a third thing. This is why the number of 49 *bhāvas* has not been disturbed by adding *tattvajñāna* or *ātman* as *sthāyībhāva*.¹ It may be asked that why *ātmajñāna* (the knowledge of truth) is considered separately (by Abhinavagupta). In reply to this Abhinavagupta says that it is so because it is separately enjoyable (*āsvādayoga*). The other *sthāyībhāvas*, like *rati* etc., in their pure form, can be the object of ordinary perception, without being mingled with anything else; the nature of the self is not the subject of ordinary perception in its pure form, as the *rati* etc. are, without being mingled with anything else. In its pure nature it is of an indeterminate form. But, in the state of *vyutthāna* (after return from *samādhi*-meditation), it is experienced mingled with various states.² Abhinava-

1. तेनात्मैव ज्ञानानन्दादिविशुद्धधर्मयोगी परिकल्पितविषयोपरागरहितोऽत्र स्थायी। न चास्य स्थायितयाऽन्येषां स्थायित्वं वचनीयम्। रत्यादयो हि तत्तत्कारणान्तरोदयप्रलयोत्पद्यमाननिरुध्यमानवृत्तयः कश्चित्कालमापेक्षिकतया स्थायिरूपात्मभित्तिसंश्रयाः सन्तः स्थायिन इत्युच्यन्ते। तत्त्वज्ञानं तु सकलभावान्तरभित्तिस्थानीयं सर्वस्थाधिभ्यः स्थायितमं सर्वाः रत्यादिका स्थायिचितवृत्तीर्व्यभिचारीभावयत् निसर्गत एव सिद्धस्थाधिभावमिति तन्त्रवचनं, न। अत एव पृथगस्य गणना न युक्ता। न हि खण्डमुण्डयोर्मध्ये तृतीयं गोत्वमिति गण्यते। तेनैकान्नपञ्चाशद्भावा इत्यव्याहतमेव। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 769.

2. अस्यापि कथं पृथग्गणनेति चेत् — पृथगास्वादयोगादिति ब्रूमहे। न हि रत्यादय इवेतरासम्पृक्तेन वपुषा तथाविधमात्मरूपं लौकिकप्रतीतिगोचरम्। स्वगतमप्यविकलरूपं व्युत्थानावसरेऽनुसन्धीयमानं चित्तवृत्त्यन्तरकलुषमेवावभाति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 770.

gupta says that it does not matter whether the self appears soiled with various mental states or it appears without mingling with other mental states. All possible mental states can not be regarded as sthāyībhāvas because they are of no use in regard to the rasas (eight rasas) mentioned by Bharata. They can be regarded only as transitory feelings. In this it can be justified that there are 49 bhāvas. The nature of self can not be held transitory as it would be impossible, unimaginative and also improper. Śama is the nature of the self and Bharata has also described the nature of self with the use of the word śama. There is no problem if that nature of self is called śama or nirveda. Here the point is that nirveda (world-weariness) is also found arising out of poverty. etc. This nirveda though apparently is similar to the nirveda which arises out of tattvajñāna (ātmajñāna) but it is different in regard to the means and it can not be regarded the sthāyībhāva of Śānta. Although the both types of nirveda are different in regard to their respective means but they both are called nirveda. Abhinavagupta says that it is the same as rati and bhaya though associated with different causes, such as different women in the case of rati but still it is called rati, the fear may arise from lion, snake etc. but still it is called fear.¹

Abhinavagupta says that ātmasvarūpa (nature of self) itself is tattvajñāna (knowledge of truth) and is śama (tranquillity). The rati etc. are the specific impurities of rāga (attachment technically

1. भासतां वा लोके तथा। तथापि न सम्भवन्मात्रं स्थायिनां गणनम्। रसेषूक्तेष्वनुपयोगात्। अपि तु व्यभिचारित्वाल्लक्षणीयत्वं विज्ञायते नेतरथा। तथाह्येकात्रपञ्चाशता भावैरित्येतत्प्रघट्टकोपपत्तिः। शम आत्मस्वभावः न चास्यात्मस्वभावस्य व्यभिचारित्वमसम्भवादवैचित्र्यावहत्वादनौचित्याच्च स शमशब्दो न मुनित्रयपदिष्टः। यदि तु स एव शमशब्देन व्यपदिश्यते निर्वेदशब्देन वा तन्व कश्चिद्बाधः। केवलं शमश्चित्तवृत्त्यन्तरम्। निर्वेदोऽपि दारिद्र्यादिविभावान्तरोत्थितनिर्वेदतुल्यजातीयो न भवति तज्जातीय एव। हेतुभेदेऽपि तद्व्यपदेशयो रतिभयादिभिरिव। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 770.

the category of Māyā) which fetters the self. By means of continued concentration (samādhi-meditation) the real pure nature of self can be realised. Although in the state of vyutthāna (returning back from meditation), these feelings of rati etc. continue to arise in mind as it is said that the flow of saṁskāras (impressions) continue, still the tranquillity (śama) is experienced. All these ordinary and extraordinary states of mind act as vyabhicārins in regard to the sthāyībhāva that is tattvajñāna (knowledge of truth). Its anubhāvas are that which are performed in yama and niyama etc., and also svabhāvābhinaya which are described in the third chapter under upāṅgābhinayas. They are concerned with Śānta rasa itself. This itself is its nature. The vibhāvas of Śānta rasa are grace of God, etc. Rati (love) etc. are tasted in Śānta rasa like vyabhicārins. In the Śānta rasa rati etc. are tasted as eagerness (autsukya), though a vyabhicārin (transitory) is tasted predominantly in vipralambha śṛṅgāra (love in separation), in saṁbhoga (love in union) the love which has not reached its maturity (has not yet got satisfaction of its fulness) is tasted predominantly), augrya, (pergency) a vyabhicārin appears as predominant in raudra (the furious), as nirveda (indifference), dhṛti (firmness of mind), trāsa (fear), and harṣa (joy) being transitory in nature, appear as prominent in karuṇa (pathetic), vīra (heroic), bhayānaka (furious) and adbhuta (the marvelous). But in jugupsā (disgust) other transitory feelings do not appear as prominent because it is completely opposed to love (śṛṅgāra). The point is that the transitory feelings of all the other rasas can appear as prominent in the Śānta or in other rasas for some time except jugupsā (disgust).¹ In the mahāvratā of kāpālikas to carry skulls, use of

1. तदिदमात्मस्वरूपमेव तत्त्वज्ञानं शमः। तथा च यत्कालुष्योपरागविशेषात्मान एव रत्यादयः। तदनुगमेऽपि विशुद्धमस्य रूपमव्यवधानसमाधिबलादधिशय्य व्युत्थानेऽपि प्रशा(न्तता) भवति।

wine and woman which are prescribed whether to practise in full or short, are the causes of hatred in the tradition of Smārtas and Śrāutas. In the same way if a widow begets a son from the younger brother of her husband it is prescribed to anoint her with oil that is to create feeling of hatred in such actions.¹

Abhinavagupta says that the person, who has realized the true nature of his self, will not be inactive in his life, but he will make all the efforts for the good of the others. His enthusiasm (utsāha) assumes the form of an effort which is motivated by the will to help others. This energy willing to help others is a synonym of compassion and it is very intimately connected with Śānta rasa. Due to this characteristics of Śānta some people call Śānta rasa dayāvīra (compassionate heroism), and some call it dharmavīra (religious heroism) because of utsāha (enthusiasm) which becomes intensive.²

An objection is raised that utsāha (enthusiasm) is related to

यथोक्तं— 'तस्य प्रशान्तवाहिता संस्कारात्' (योगसू., 3.10) इति। तत्त्वज्ञानलक्षणस्य च स्थायिनः समस्तोऽयं लौकिकालौकिकचित्तवृत्तिकलापो व्यभिचारितामभ्येति। अतः तदनुभावा एव च यमनियमाद्युपकृता अनुभावाः। आङ्गिकाध्यायत्रये (9/10/11) च ये स्वभावाभिनया वक्ष्यन्ते एते तद्विषया एव। अयमेव हि स्वभावः। विभावा अपि कथम्। ईश्वरानुग्रहप्रभृतयः। प्रक्षयाश्च रत्यादयोऽत्रास्वाद्याः। यथा विप्रलम्भे औत्सुक्यं संभोगेऽपि वा 'प्रेमासमाप्तोत्सवम्' केवलम् (तापसवत्सराज, 1.17) इति। यथा रौद्रे औद्यं यथा च करुणवीरभयानकादभुतेषु निर्वेदधृतित्रासहर्षा व्यभिचारिणोऽपि प्राधान्येनावभासन्ते तथा न जुगुप्सायाम्। सर्वथैव रागप्रतिपक्षत्वात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 771.

1. यथा हि— महाव्रते नरकपालादिधारणम् सुराभार्यादिसम्मदादिविस्तारसंक्षेपादिकर्मकृतिर्हि धर्मे जुगुप्साहेतुत्वेनैव। निजाङ्गाभ्यञ्जनेन च देवरात्पुत्रजन्माद्युपदिष्टम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 772.
2. स्वात्मनि च कृतकृत्यस्य परार्थघटनायामेवोद्यम इत्युत्साहोऽस्य परोपकारविषयेच्छाप्रयत्न-रूपोदयापारपर्यायोऽभ्यधिकोऽन्तरङ्गः। अत एव तत्केचिदयावीरत्वेन व्यपदिशन्ति। अन्ये धर्मवीरत्वेन। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 772.

ego whereas *Śānta* is the state of the loosening of egoism. In reply to this Abhinavagupta says that an opposing feeling can be a *vyabhicārībhāva* in its opposite *rasa*, for instance, we find *nirveda* (indifference) in some states of love as its *vyabhicārībhāva*. There is no state which is devoid of enthusiasm (*utsāha*). There is a great deal of *utsāha* (enthusiasm) found in helping others. If there is no *utsāha* (enthusiasm) in a person he would be like a stone. Abhinavagupta says that the person who has realized the higher and lower self, there is nothing to do for his own. Therefore he will do for the sake of others. It is not contradictory to the person whose heart is tranquil if he gives his all in all, his body for others. The saying of *śāstra*, 'one should preserve his body' is meant for those who have not realized their true nature of self, because realization can be attained only with the help of life.¹ It is not said for the *śaṁnyāsins*, ascetics (sages) as there is no motive in protecting the bodies for them as they have realized the self. It is said that 'life (*prāṇa*) is meant for the attainment of the four *puruṣārthas* -- *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. When these are destroyed what is not destroyed? When they are portected

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1. ननूत्साहोऽहङ्कारप्राणः। शान्तस्त्वहङ्कारशैथिल्यात् तद्विरुद्धात्मकः। व्यभिचारित्वं हि विरुद्धस्यापि न नोचितं रताविव निर्वेदादेः।

‘शय्या शाद्वलमासनं शुचि शिला सद्य द्रुमाणामधः

शीतं निर्झरवारि पानमशनं कन्दाः सहाया मृगाः।

इत्यप्रार्थितसर्वलभ्यविभवे दोषोऽयमेको वने

दुष्पापार्थिनि यत्पराधघटनावन्ध्वैर्वृथास्थीयते॥ (नागानन्द, 4.2)

इत्यादौ हि परोपकारकरणे ह्युत्साहस्यैव प्रकर्षो लक्ष्यते। न तूत्साहशून्या काचिदप्यवस्था। इच्छाप्रयत्नव्यतिरेकेण पाषाणतापत्तेः। यत एव परिदृष्टपरापरत्वेन स्वात्मोद्देशेन कर्तव्यान्तरं नाविशिष्यते अत एव शान्तहृदयानां परोपकाराय शरीरसर्वस्वादिदानं न शान्तविरोधि। ‘आत्मानं गोपायेत्’ (गौतमधर्मसूत्र, 9.35) इत्यादिना ह्यकृतकृत्यविषयं शरीररक्षणमुपदिश्यते। —

Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 772-73.

what is not protected', in other words, by preserving the *puruṣārthas* everything is preserved.¹ Thus the utility of body in regard to *puruṣārthas* is shown. For the person who has realized his self it is said in the context of asceticism (*saṁnyāsa*) that he should give up his body into water, fire or in a pit. Here the point is that if he has to renounce his body at his will, after getting realization, then what is harm in giving up his body for the sake of others.² Abhinavagupta says that for the persons who have not attained the knowledge of truth and hold their bodies to be all in all (who do not know the true nature of self), it would be inconceivable to abandon their bodies for the sake of others. They enter the battle only to conquer the enemy. For them in the case of suicide by jumping off a cliff etc., the main purpose is the desire to attain a more beautiful body in the life to come. It is inconceivable for the persons who have not attained the knowledge of the self to renounce their bodies for the sake of others without any reference to their own benefits. For the persons who know the truth there is liberation in all the *āśramas* (stages) of life. This is what is taught in the *smṛtis* and the *śrutis*. It has been said that the person who continues to worship gods, who is based in the knowledge of the self, who loves to host the guests, who, in order to perform ceremonial rites to his ancestors, gives out all the

1. संन्यासिनां तद्रक्षादितात्पर्याभावात् । तथा हि—

धर्मार्थकाममोक्षाणां प्राणाः संस्थितिहेतवः ।

तान्निहता किञ्च हतं रक्षता किं न रक्षितम् ॥ (हितोपदेश, 1.83 इति) — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 773.

2. सुप्रसिद्धचतुर्वर्गसाधकत्वमेव देहरक्षायाः निदानं दर्शितम् । कृतकृत्यस्य 'जलेऽग्नौ श्वप्ने वा पतेत्, इति संन्यासित्वे श्रवणात् । तद्यथाकथञ्चित्याज्यं शरीरं यदि परार्थं त्यज्यते तत्किमिव न सम्पादितं भवति । — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 773.

wealth, he is liberated even he is a householder.¹ The Bodhisattvas who perform actions for the welfare of others get another body in rebirth according to their deeds as result of their previous karmas. The knowers of the truth (tattvajñāna) also get repose (aesthetic enjoyment) and it is proper to their nature. For instance, Rāma, in the Rāmāyaṇa, obeys his father's order and goes into exile he gets repose, though this repose is subsidiary as his main sthāyībhāva is vīra (the heroic). In the same way other rasas like śṛṅgāra may occupy subsidiary position in a poetic work. In this sense the śānta is not the major rasa in the drama entitled Jīmūtavāhana; wherein welfare of others is means for the attainment of trivarga (dharma, artha and kāma).²

For the contention that anubhāvas can not exist because of a complete absence of action in the case of Śānta and thus the Śānta can not be represented, Abhinavagupta says that it is true in regard to other rasas also. In the culminating stages of love and sorrow etc., there is no possibility of representation. Sympathetic

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1. तत्त्वज्ञानित्वं तावदवश्यमस्ति। अन्यथादेहात्ममानिनां देह एव सर्वस्वभूतः। धर्माद्यनुदेशेन परार्थे त्यागस्यासम्भवात्। युद्धेऽपि हि न शरीरस्य त्यागायोद्यमः। परापजयोद्देशेनैव प्रवृत्तेः। भृगुपतनादावपि शुभतरदेहान्तरसम्पिपादयिषैवाधिकं विजृम्भते। तत्त्वार्थानुदेशेन परार्थसम्पत्त्यै यद्यच्चेष्टितं देहत्यागपर्यन्तमुपदेशदानादि तत्तदलब्धात्मतत्त्वज्ञानानामसम्भाव्यमेवेति तेऽपि तत्त्वज्ञानिनः। ज्ञानिनां सर्वेष्वश्रमेषु मुक्तिः' इति स्मार्तेषु श्रुतौ च। यथोक्तम् —

‘देवार्चनरतस्तत्त्वज्ञाननिष्ठोऽतिथिप्रियः।

श्राद्धं कृत्वा ददुर्द्रव्यं गृहस्थोऽपि हि मुच्यते॥’ इति — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p.773-74.

2. केवलं परार्थाभिसन्धिजाद्धर्मात्परोपकारात्मकफलत्वेनैवभिसंहितात् पुनरपि देहस्य तदुचितस्यैव प्रादुर्भावो बोधिसत्त्वादीनाम्। तत्त्वज्ञानिनामपि विश्रान्तिलाभस्वभावौचित्यात्। यथा रामस्य वीरोऽङ्गपितुराज्ञा पालयितुः। एवं शृङ्गाराद्यङ्गेष्वपि मन्तव्यम्। अत एव शान्तस्य स्थायित्वेऽप्य-प्राधान्यम्। जीमूतवाहने त्रिवर्गसम्पत्तेरेवपरोपकृतिप्रधानायाः फलत्वात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 774.

response is possible for the persons who have got the knowledge of truth. Bharata has said that the people take delight in mokṣa who are devoid of passion. But it is not possible for everybody to get sympathetic response to everything, for instance, the person of heroic nature can not sympathetically respond to the character of bhayānaka rasa.¹ An objection may be raised that how can a heroic person takes delight in such presentation. In reply to this Abhinavagupta says that in a work where Śānta is presented, other rasas useful to puruṣārthas are also presented. The aesthetic taste of other rasas are grounded in Śānta. In Prahāsana etc. too where hāsyā etc. are major, the aesthetic taste is grounded in other rasas which arise in their wake. Some hold the view that different types of drama are meant for the different type of spectators.²

Therefore, Abhinavagupta says that the Śānta rasa does exist. This is the reason that in older manuscripts of Nāṭya śāstra after the passage., "We will show how the sthāyībhāvas become resas", the definition of Śānta in the phrase, 'what is called Śānta has for its sthāyībhāva śama', etc. is found. The taste of all rasas is similar to the taste of Śānta as in it the taste is experienced without actual sense-object contact, as only the latent impressions

1. अत एव निश्चेष्टत्वादानुभावाभाव इति प्रत्युक्तम्। यदा तु पर्यन्तभूमिकालाभहेतुभावाभावस्तादास्याप्रयोज्यत्वम्। रतिशोकादावपि पर्यन्तदशायामप्रयोगस्यैव युक्तत्वात्। हृदयसंवादोऽपि तथाविधतत्त्वज्ञानबीजसंस्कारभावितानां भवत्येव। यद्वक्ष्यति 'मोक्षे चापि विरागिणः' (ना.शा., 27-58) इति। 'सर्वस्य' (ना.शा., 1.107) इत्यत्र हृदयसंवादे भयानके वीरप्रकृतेरभावात्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 775.

2. ननु तादृशि प्रयोगे वीरस्य क आस्वादः। उच्यते-यत्र यायं निबध्यते तत्रावश्यं पुरुषार्थोपयोगिशृङ्गारवीराद्यन्यतममस्त्येव। तन्निष्ठस्तेषामास्वादः। यत्रापि प्रहसनदौ हास्यादेः प्रधानता तत्राप्यनुनिष्पादिरसान्तरनिष्ठ एवास्वादो भिन्नभिन्नाधिकारिणः। एतदुद्देश एव रूपक भेदचिन्तन-निमित्तमिति केचित्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 776.

(vāsanā) of the particular sthāyībhāvas are found there mixed with Śānta. The Śānta was mentioned in the beginning to indicate that it is the root of all rasas. Abhinavagupta says that in ordinary worldly parlance a thing which is common to a number of other things, is not mentioned separately. So the Śānta and its sthāyībhāva being common to all rasas were not mentioned separately. The analyst for the sake of analysis describes the thing which is common to all. So the Śānta has become a separate subject as the experience of the tasting spectator for study. The description of nine rasas are found in the itihāsas, purāṇas and dictionaries etc. It is said in Siddhāntaśāstra that the eight rasas should be displayed in the places of eight gods and the Śānta rasa, the nature of supreme God, Śiva, should be displayed in the centre.¹

The vibhāvas (determinants) of Śānta are vairāgya (detachment) and fear of saṃsāra (world) etc. Śānta is known through the presentation of these. Its anubhāvas (consequents) are the study, thinking of mokṣa śāstras, the texts which deal with liberation. The vyabhicārībhāvas of Śānta are nirveda (world-weariness), mati (wisdom), dhṛti (patience) etc. Abhinavagupta says that

1. तस्मादस्ति शान्तो रसः। तथा च चिरन्तनपुस्तकेषु 'स्थायिभावान् रसत्वमुपनेष्यामः' (ना.शा., पु. 299) इत्यनन्तरं 'शान्तो नाम शमस्थायिभावात्मकः' (ना.शा., पु. 332) इत्यादिशान्तलक्षणं पठ्यते। तत्र सर्वरसानां शान्तप्राय एवास्वादो विषयेभ्यो विपरिवृत्त्या तन्मुख्यतालाभात्केवलं वासनान्तरोपहित इत्यस्य सर्वप्रकृतित्वाभिधानाय पूर्वमभिधानम्। लोके च पृथक्पृथक् सामान्यस्य न गणनमिति स्थाय्यस्य पृथङ्नोक्तः। सामान्यमपि तु विवेचकेन पृथगेव गणनीयमिति विवेचकाभिमतसामाजिकास्वादलक्षणप्रतीतिविषयतया स पृथग्भूत एव। इतिहासपुराणाभिधानकोशादौ च नवरसाः श्रूयन्ते श्रीमत्सिद्धान्तशास्त्रेष्वपि। तथा चोक्तम् —

‘अष्टानामिह देवानां शृङ्गारादीन् प्रदर्शयेत्।

मध्ये च देवदेवस्य शान्तं रूपं प्रकल्पयेत्॥ इति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 776-777.

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bhakti (devotion) and śraddhā (piety) which are means for meditation on God and which include smṛti, mati, dhṛti and utsāha, should not be counted as separate rasas. In this regard there is a saṅgraha kārīkā in which it is said that Śānta rasa is that which arises from a desire to secure the liberation of the self, which leads to a knowledge of the truth and is of the nature of highest happiness. In this verse the vibhāvas, sthāyībhāvas and anubhāvas are shown respectively by the three adjectives of Śānta rasa. In another verse it is said that the various bhāvas (feelings) arise from Śānta due to the arousal of their particular respective causes and when these causes disappear, they merge back into Śānta. In this way it is said that Śānta is the source of all other rasas.¹

Here a problem is raised that in defining ḍim (a type of drama), Bharata has said that there are six rasas, excluding both hāsyā and śṛṅgāra because it is based on a composition with an exciting rasa (dīptarasa), there can be no question at all of Śānta, as it is opposed to raudra which is predominant in Ḍima. The question is what is the point of excluding it? Since Ḍima is based on exciting rasa (dīpta rasa) Śānta is not possible in it. Does the saying of Bharata means that a Ḍima is associated with six rasas,

1. तस्य च वैराग्यसंसारभीरुतादयो विभावाः। स हि तैरुपनिबद्धैर्विज्ञायते। मोक्षशास्त्रचिन्ता-
दयोऽनुभावाः। निर्वेदमतिस्मृतिधृत्यादयो व्यभिचारिणः। अत एवेश्वरप्रणिधान् विषये भक्तिश्रद्धे
स्मृतिमतिधृत्युत्साहाद्यनुप्रविष्टे अङ्गमिति न तयोः पृथग्रसत्वेन गणनम्। अत्र सङ्ग्रहकारिका—
'अध्यात्मध्याननिमित्तस्तत्त्वज्ञानार्थहेतुसंयुक्तः।

निःश्रेयसधर्मयुतः शान्तरसो नाम विज्ञेयः॥

अनुभावविभावस्थायियोगः क्रमाद्विशेषणत्रयेण दर्शितः।

स्वं स्वं निमित्तमासाद्य शान्ताद्भावः प्रवर्तते।

पुनर्निमित्तापाये तु शान्त एव प्रलीयते॥

इत्यादिना रसान्तरप्रकृतित्वमुपसंहृतम्। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 777-79.

excluding śṛṅgāra and hāsyā and so the Śānta would not have been excluded. There is an objection that the quarter stanza (dīptarasakāvyā yoni) excludes karuṇa, bībhatsa and bhayānaka as predominant rasas. Abhinavagupta says that is not true as the Dīma is associated with the Sāttvati and Ārabhaṭī styles, in this way they are excluded automatically as they belong to Kāśikī style. In Śānta only sāttvati style is used, and so only this reason would not be enough to exclude it. Abhinavagupta says that the definition of the Dīma does not go against the existence of Śānta. Śṛṅgāra is possible in a Dīma because the demons make love in a violent way. Hāsyā is helpful to śṛṅgāra and therefore only their exclusion is specifically mentioned. He says that only a possible thing can be excluded, but not an impossible thing. So Śānta is not excluded.¹

Abhinavagupta says that since Śānta is common to all rasas, it is not proper to name especially a colour or god for it, but still some do so. In this way the reasonableness of Śānta has been said. The hāsyā, vīra and bībhatsa tend to lead towards Śānta. Therefore in the case of Śānta the practice of yama, niyama meditation on God etc. are instructed which leads towards mokṣa, the highest goal of life. It eschews the enjoyment of worldly objects and it is

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1. यत्तु डिमे हास्यशृङ्गारपरिहारेण षड्रसत्वं च वक्ष्यते तत्रायं भावः। दीप्तरसकाव्ययोनिः' (ना.शा. 18.85) इति भाविना लक्षणेन रौद्रप्रधाने तावद्धिमे तद्विरुद्धस्य शान्तस्य सम्भावनैव न। किं निषेधेन। शान्तासम्भवे तु दीप्तरसकाव्ययोनिरित्येतेन किं व्यवच्छेद्यम्। 'शृङ्गारहास्यवर्जं षड्रसयुक्तः (ना.शा., 18.84) इति ह्युक्ते कस्तत्र प्रसङ्गः।

ननु करुणबीभत्सभयानकप्राधान्यमनेन पादेन व्यवच्छेद्यते। नैतत्। 'सात्त्वत्यारभटीवृत्तिसम्पन्नः' (ना.शा., 18.88) इत्यनेनैव तन्निरासात्। शान्ते तु सात्त्वत्येव वृत्तिरिति तद्व्यवच्छेदकमेवैतत्। तेन डिमलक्षणं प्रत्युत शान्तरसस्य सद्भावे लिङ्गम्। शृङ्गारस्तु प्रसभं सेव्यमानः सम्भाव्य एव। तदङ्गं च हास्य इति तयोरेव प्रतिषेधः कृतः प्राप्तत्वात्सर्वसाम्याच्च। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 779.

more important than any other rasas as it pervades the entire aesthetic work.¹

The question arises that what is the nature of the taste of Śānta. Abhinavagupta says that the nature of the soul is tinged by utsāha, rati etc., like in a garland the white thread is tinged with jewels. As the white thread shines assuming the form of the jewels and also sometimes separately, in the same way the soul tinged with various feelings shines through them and sometimes separately also. It is devoid of all sorts of miseries of the world. It is identical with the consciousness of the realisation of the highest bliss.¹

Abhinavagupta concludes that there are only these nine rasas which are useful in the four goals (puruṣārthas) of life. It is wrong to say that affection, with a sthāyībhāva of ārdratā (being moved) can be a rasa, because affection is nothing other than attachment and all attachment culminates in rati, utsāha etc. For instance, the love of a child for its mother and father terminates in fear. The affection of young man for his friends terminates in rati. The affection as of Lakṣmaṇa etc., for his brother terminates in dharmavīra. The same may be applied in the case of an old man

1. विशेषतो वर्णदेवताभिधानमनुचितमप्यस्य तत्कल्पितमिति ज्ञेयम्। उत्पत्तिस्तु शान्तस्यापि दर्शितैव। तस्याभावोहि हास्यः। सहविभावत्वेन चास्य वीरबीभत्सौ। अत एवास्य रसस्य यमनियमेश्वर-प्रणिधानाद्युपदेशः उपयोगितया, महाफलत्वं सर्वप्राधान्यमिति वृत्तव्यापकत्वं चोपपन्नमित्यमतिप्रसङ्गेन। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 779.
2. तत्त्वास्वादोऽस्य कीदृशः। उच्यते— उपरागदायिभिरुत्साह रत्यादिभिरुपरक्तं यदात्मस्वरूपं तदेव विरलोम्भितरत्नान्तरात्मनिर्भासमानसिततरसूत्रवदाभातस्वरूपं सकलेषु रत्यादिषूपरञ्जकेषु तथाभावेनापि सकृद्विभातोऽयमात्मेति न्यायेन भासमानं परोन्मुखतात्मसकलदुःखजालहीन-परमानन्दलाभसंविदेकत्वेन काव्यप्रयोगप्रबन्धाभ्यां साधारणतया निर्भासमानमन्तर्मुखावस्थाभेदेन लोकोत्तरानन्दानयनं तथाविधहृदयं विधत्त इति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 780.

for his son etc. The so-called rasa 'cupidity' with the sthāyībhāva of 'greed' can be refuted in the same manner, as it can terminate in hāsa or rati. The same is applicable in the case of Bhakti holding it a separate rasa.¹

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1. एवं ते नवैव रसाः। पुमर्थोपयोगित्वेन रञ्जनाधिक्येन वा इयतामेवोपदश्यत्वात्। तेन रसान्तरसंभवेऽपि चार्षप्रसिद्धया सङ्ख्यानियम इति यदन्यैरुक्तं तत्प्रत्युक्तम्। भावाध्यायेऽपि चैतद्वक्ष्यते। आर्द्रतास्थायिकः स्नेहो रस इति त्वसत्। स्नेहो ह्यभिषङ्गः। स च सर्वो रत्युत्साहादावेव पर्यवस्यति। तथा हि— बालस्य मातापित्रादौ स्नेहो भये विश्रान्तः। यूनेमित्रजने रतौ। लक्ष्मणादौ भ्रातरि स्नेहो धर्ममय एव। एवं वृद्धस्य पुत्रादाविति द्रष्टव्यम्। एषैव गन्धस्थायिकस्य लौल्यरसस्य प्रत्याख्यानं सरणिर्मन्तव्या। हासे वा रतौ वान्यत्र पर्यवसानात्। एवं भक्तावपि वाच्यमिति। — Abh., N.S. Part 1, Ch. 6, p. 781.

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
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